From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>,
rientjes@google.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, oliver.sang@intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] mm/munmap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 18:02:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <78017d84-9e3c-40b0-bc95-4ad8026d9e6c@lucifer.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABi2SkUZ-OQFCNZcc0OMN_4YV8NoqrRu2HGEeFms+Ty6Bnofdg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Aug 21, 2024 at 09:33:06AM GMT, Jeff Xu wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 21, 2024 at 9:24 AM Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 21, 2024 at 5:16 PM Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 5:18 PM Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > We were doing an extra mmap tree traversal just to check if the entire
> > > > range is modifiable. This can be done when we iterate through the VMAs
> > > > instead.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > mm/mmap.c | 11 +----------
> > > > mm/vma.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
> > > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> > > > index 3af256bacef3..30ae4cb5cec9 100644
> > > > --- a/mm/mmap.c
> > > > +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> > > > @@ -1740,16 +1740,7 @@ int do_vma_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > > > unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct list_head *uf,
> > > > bool unlock)
> > > > {
> > > > - struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
> > > > -
> > > > - /*
> > > > - * Check if memory is sealed, prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
> > > > - * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
> > > > - */
> > > > - if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
> > > > - return -EPERM;
> > > Another approach to improve perf is to clone the vmi (since it
> > > already point to the first vma), and pass the cloned vmi/vma into
> > > can_modify_mm check, that will remove the cost of re-finding the first
> > > VMA.
> > >
> > > The can_modify_mm then continues from cloned VMI/vma till the end of
> > > address range, there will be some perf cost there. However, most
> > > address ranges in the real world are within a single VMA, in
> > > practice, the perf cost is the same as checking the single VMA, 99.9%
> > > case.
> > >
> > > This will help preserve the nice sealing feature (if one of the vma is
> > > sealed, the entire address range is not modified)
> >
> > Please drop it. No one wants to preserve this. Everyone is in sync
> > when it comes to the solution except you.
>
> Still, this is another option that will very likely address the perf issue.
Nack to your approach. Feel free to send a follow up series replacing
Pedro's with yours for review if you feel differently, and stop stalling
things. Thanks.
>
> -Jeff
>
> >
> > --
> > Pedro
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-21 17:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-17 0:18 [PATCH v3 0/7] mm: Optimize mseal checks Pedro Falcato
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] mm: Move can_modify_vma to mm/vma.h Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:15 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-19 21:00 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 6:31 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] mm/munmap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:22 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:40 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 16:15 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 16:23 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 16:33 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 17:02 ` Lorenzo Stoakes [this message]
2024-08-21 18:25 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 17:00 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mm/mprotect: " Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:33 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:51 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] mm/mremap: " Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:34 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:53 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] mseal: Replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:32 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:41 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] mm: Remove can_modify_mm() Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:32 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:42 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] selftests/mm: add more mseal traversal tests Pedro Falcato
2024-08-18 6:36 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-20 15:45 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:47 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 15:56 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 16:20 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 16:27 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 17:28 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 17:36 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 23:37 ` Pedro Falcato
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