From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, bp@alien8.de,
vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com,
tony.luck@intel.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
alpergun@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
nikunj.dadhania@amd.com, pankaj.gupta@amd.com,
liam.merwick@oracle.com, zhi.a.wang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 28/35] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 13:50:13 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <75151ba8-87fe-444a-b855-0d2e21b36e05@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231230172351.574091-29-michael.roth@amd.com>
On 12/31/2023 1:23 AM, Michael Roth wrote:
> This will handle RMP table updates and direct map changes needed to put
> a page into a private state before mapping it into an SEV-SNP guest.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
> virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 4 +-
> 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> index 4ec53d6d5773..79c002e1bb5c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
> depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
> depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
> select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> + select HAVE_KVM_GMEM_PREPARE
> help
> Provides support for launching Encrypted VMs (SEV) and Encrypted VMs
> with Encrypted State (SEV-ES) on AMD processors.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index b2ac696c436a..91f53f4a6059 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -4154,3 +4154,101 @@ void handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code)
> out:
> put_page(pfn_to_page(pfn));
> }
> +
> +static bool is_pfn_range_shared(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end)
> +{
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn = start;
> +
> + while (pfn < end) {
> + int ret, rmp_level;
> + bool assigned;
> +
> + ret = snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &assigned, &rmp_level);
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("SEV: Failed to retrieve RMP entry: PFN 0x%llx GFN start 0x%llx GFN end 0x%llx RMP level %d error %d\n",
> + pfn, start, end, rmp_level, ret);
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + if (assigned) {
> + pr_debug("%s: overlap detected, PFN 0x%llx start 0x%llx end 0x%llx RMP level %d\n",
> + __func__, pfn, start, end, rmp_level);
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + pfn++;
rmp_level can be got from snp_lookup_rmpentry().
I think the pfn can be updated according to rmp_level to avoid unnecessary
loops for 2MB large page, right?
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static u8 max_level_for_order(int order)
> +{
> + if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M))
> + return PG_LEVEL_2M;
> +
> + return PG_LEVEL_4K;
> +}
> +
> +static bool is_large_rmp_possible(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int order)
> +{
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn_aligned = ALIGN_DOWN(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD);
> +
> + /*
> + * If this is a large folio, and the entire 2M range containing the
> + * PFN is currently shared, then the entire 2M-aligned range can be
> + * set to private via a single 2M RMP entry.
> + */
> + if (max_level_for_order(order) > PG_LEVEL_4K &&
> + is_pfn_range_shared(pfn_aligned, pfn_aligned + PTRS_PER_PMD))
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn_aligned;
> + gfn_t gfn_aligned;
> + int level, rc;
> + bool assigned;
> +
> + if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &assigned, &level);
> + if (rc) {
> + pr_err_ratelimited("SEV: Failed to look up RMP entry: GFN %llx PFN %llx error %d\n",
> + gfn, pfn, rc);
> + return -ENOENT;
> + }
> +
> + if (assigned) {
> + pr_debug("%s: already assigned: gfn %llx pfn %llx max_order %d level %d\n",
> + __func__, gfn, pfn, max_order, level);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (is_large_rmp_possible(kvm, pfn, max_order)) {
> + level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
> + pfn_aligned = ALIGN_DOWN(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD);
> + gfn_aligned = ALIGN_DOWN(gfn, PTRS_PER_PMD);
> + } else {
> + level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
> + pfn_aligned = pfn;
> + gfn_aligned = gfn;
> + }
> +
> + rc = rmp_make_private(pfn_aligned, gfn_to_gpa(gfn_aligned), level, sev->asid, false);
> + if (rc) {
> + pr_err_ratelimited("SEV: Failed to update RMP entry: GFN %llx PFN %llx level %d error %d\n",
> + gfn, pfn, level, rc);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + pr_debug("%s: updated: gfn %llx pfn %llx pfn_aligned %llx max_order %d level %d\n",
> + __func__, gfn, pfn, pfn_aligned, max_order, level);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 240518f8d6c7..32cef8626b57 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -5065,6 +5065,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
> .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
> +
> + .gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare,
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index d953ae41c619..9ece9612dbb9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -725,6 +725,7 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code);
> void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
>
> /* vmenter.S */
>
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> index feec0da93d98..ddea45279fef 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ static int kvm_gmem_prepare_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, struct fol
> gfn = slot->base_gfn + index - slot->gmem.pgoff;
> rc = kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(kvm, gfn, pfn, compound_order(compound_head(page)));
> if (rc) {
> - pr_warn_ratelimited("gmem: Failed to prepare folio for index %lx, error %d.\n",
> - index, rc);
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("gmem: Failed to prepare folio for index %lx GFN %llx PFN %llx error %d.\n",
> + index, gfn, pfn, rc);
> return rc;
> }
> }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-11 5:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-30 17:23 [PATCH v11 00/35] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 01/35] KVM: Add hugepage support for dedicated guest memory Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 02/35] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 03/35] KVM: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 04/35] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing memory Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 05/35] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating memory Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 06/35] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Michael Roth
2024-02-06 20:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-12 10:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-12 16:42 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 07/35] KVM: x86: Add KVM_X86_SNP_VM vm_type Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 08/35] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 09/35] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults based on vm_type Michael Roth
[not found] ` <CABgObfanrHTL429Cr8tcMGqs-Ov+6LWeQbzghvjQiGu9tz0EUA@mail.gmail.com>
2024-02-12 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-12 16:47 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 10/35] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 11/35] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 12/35] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 13/35] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 14/35] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 15/35] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2024-02-06 23:51 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 17:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 16/35] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 17/35] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 18/35] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-01-10 15:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-16 4:14 ` Michael Roth
2024-02-02 22:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-06 23:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-07 2:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 8:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-09 1:52 ` Michael Roth
2024-02-09 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-18 21:02 ` Peter Gonda
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 19/35] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 20/35] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 21/35] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 22/35] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 23/35] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 24/35] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 25/35] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 26/35] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-01-05 22:08 ` Jacob Xu
2024-01-08 15:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 27/35] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 28/35] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-03-11 5:50 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 29/35] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 30/35] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-02-12 10:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-12 17:03 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 31/35] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 32/35] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 33/35] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 34/35] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG_{START,END} commands Michael Roth
2023-12-30 17:23 ` [PATCH v11 35/35] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=75151ba8-87fe-444a-b855-0d2e21b36e05@linux.intel.com \
--to=binbin.wu@linux.intel.com \
--cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
--cc=alpergun@google.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=ashish.kalra@amd.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dovmurik@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=jroedel@suse.de \
--cc=kirill@shutemov.name \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=liam.merwick@oracle.com \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nikunj.dadhania@amd.com \
--cc=pankaj.gupta@amd.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=pgonda@google.com \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=slp@redhat.com \
--cc=srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tobin@ibm.com \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
--cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=zhi.a.wang@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox