From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
christina.schimpe@intel.com, debug@rivosinc.com
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:32:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <70681787-0d33-a9ed-7f2a-747be1490932@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230218211433.26859-15-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
On 18.02.23 22:14, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> Some OSes have a greater dependence on software available bits in PTEs than
> Linux. That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a
> new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to
> repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1. So in order to support
> shadow stack memory, Linux should avoid creating memory with this PTE bit
> combination unless it intends for it to be shadow stack.
>
> The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by HW
> _before_ a write. A write with a Write=0 PTE would typically only generate
> a fault, not set Dirty=1. Hardware can (rarely) both set Dirty=1 *and*
> generate the fault, resulting in a Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE. Hardware which
> supports shadow stacks will no longer exhibit this oddity.
>
> So that leaves Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs created in software. To achieve this,
> in places where Linux normally creates Write=0,Dirty=1, it can use the
> software-defined _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY.
> In other words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0,Dirty=1, it instead
> creates Write=0,SavedDirty=1 except for shadow stack, which is
> Write=0,Dirty=1. Further differentiated by VMA flags, these PTE bit
> combinations would be set as follows for various types of memory:
I would simplify (see below) and not repeat what the patch contains as
comments already that detailed.
>
> (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0):
> - A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page. Previously when a typical
> anonymous writable mapping was made COW via fork(), the kernel would
> mark it Write=0,Dirty=1. Now it will instead use the SavedDirty bit.
> This happens in copy_present_pte().
> - A R/O page that has been COW'ed. The user page is in a R/O VMA,
> and get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE) needs a writable copy. The page fault
> handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as
> Write=0 and SavedDirty=1.
> - A shared shadow stack PTE. When a shadow stack page is being shared
> among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so
> the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is
> duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for
> shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
> copy-on-write.
>
> (Write=0,SavedDirty=0,Dirty=1):
> - A shadow stack PTE.
> - A Cow PTE created when a processor without shadow stack support set
> Dirty=1.
>
> There are six bits left available to software in the 64-bit PTE after
> consuming a bit for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. No space is consumed in 32-bit
> kernels because shadow stacks are not enabled there.
>
> Implement only the infrastructure for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. Changes to start
> creating _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY PTEs will follow once other pieces are in place.
>
> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
>
> ---
> v6:
> - Rename _PAGE_COW to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY (David Hildenbrand)
> - Add _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY to _PAGE_CHG_MASK
>
> v5:
> - Fix log, comments and whitespace (Boris)
> - Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
>
> v4:
> - Teach pte_flags_need_flush() about _PAGE_COW bit
> - Break apart patch for better bisectability
>
> v3:
> - Add comment around _PAGE_TABLE in response to comment
> from (Andrew Cooper)
> - Check for PSE in pmd_shstk (Andrew Cooper)
> - Get to the point quicker in commit log (Andrew Cooper)
> - Clarify and reorder commit log for why the PTE bit examples have
> multiple entries. Apply same changes for comment. (peterz)
> - Fix comment that implied dirty bit for COW was a specific x86 thing
> (peterz)
> - Fix swapping of Write/Dirty (PeterZ)
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +-
> 3 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index 2b423d697490..110e552eb602 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -301,6 +301,45 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
> return native_make_pte(v & ~clear);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * COW and other write protection operations can result in Dirty=1,Write=0
> + * PTEs. But in the case of X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK, the software SavedDirty bit
> + * is used, since the Dirty=1,Write=0 will result in the memory being treated as
> + * shadow stack by the HW. So when creating dirty, write-protected memory, a
> + * software bit is used _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY. The following functions
> + * pte_mksaveddirty() and pte_clear_saveddirty() take a conventional dirty,
> + * write-protected PTE (Write=0,Dirty=1) and transition it to the shadow stack
> + * compatible version. (Write=0,SavedDirty=1).
> + */
> +static inline pte_t pte_mksaveddirty(pte_t pte)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pte;
> +
> + pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +static inline pte_t pte_clear_saveddirty(pte_t pte)
> +{
> + /*
> + * _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY is unnecessary on !X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK kernels,
> + * since the HW dirty bit can be used without creating shadow stack
> + * memory. See the _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY definition for more details.
> + */
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pte;
> +
> + /*
> + * PTE is getting copied-on-write, so it will be dirtied
> + * if writable, or made shadow stack if shadow stack and
> + * being copied on access. Set the dirty bit for both
> + * cases.
> + */
> + pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
> static inline int pte_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
> {
> @@ -420,6 +459,26 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)
> return native_make_pmd(v & ~clear);
> }
>
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_mksaveddirty(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pmd;
> +
> + pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_saveddirty(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pmd;
> +
> + pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
> static inline int pmd_uffd_wp(pmd_t pmd)
> {
> @@ -491,6 +550,26 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
> return native_make_pud(v & ~clear);
> }
>
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_mksaveddirty(pud_t pud)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pud;
> +
> + pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_clear_saveddirty(pud_t pud)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> + return pud;
> +
> + pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> + return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
> {
> return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index 0646ad00178b..3b420b6c0584 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
> #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2 10 /* " */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 11 /* " */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE 12 /* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
> -#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 58 /* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 57 /* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 58 /* available for programmer */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0 59 /* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1 60 /* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2 61 /* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
> @@ -34,6 +35,15 @@
> #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
>
> +/*
> + * Indicates a Saved Dirty bit page.
> + */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* copy-on-write */
Nope, not "copy-on-write" :) It's more like "dirty bit when the hw-dirty
bit cannot be used". Maybe simply drop the comment.
> +#else
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY 0
> +#endif
> +
> /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
> /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
> #define _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL
> @@ -117,6 +127,40 @@
> #define _PAGE_SOFTW4 (_AT(pteval_t, 0))
> #endif
>
> +/*
> + * The hardware requires shadow stack to be read-only and Dirty.
> + * _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY is a software-only bit used to separate copy-on-write
> + * PTEs from shadow stack PTEs:
I'd suggest phrasing this differently. COW is just one scenario where
this can happen. Also, I don't think that the description of
"separation" is correct.
Something like the following maybe?
"
However, there are valid cases where the kernel might create read-only
PTEs that are dirty (e.g., fork(), mprotect(), uffd-wp(), soft-dirty
tracking). In this case, the _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY bit is used instead of
the HW-dirty bit, to avoid creating a wrong "shadow stack" PTEs. Such
PTEs have (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0) set.
Note that on processors without shadow stack support, the
_PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY remains unused.
"
The I would simply drop below (which is also too COW-specific I think).
> + *
> + * (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0):
> + * - A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page. Previously when a typical
> + * anonymous writable mapping was made COW via fork(), the kernel would
> + * mark it Write=0,Dirty=1. Now it will instead use the Cow bit. This
> + * happens in copy_present_pte().
> + * - A R/O page that has been COW'ed. The user page is in a R/O VMA,
> + * and get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE) needs a writable copy. The page fault
> + * handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as
> + * Write=0 and SavedDirty=1.
> + * - A shared shadow stack PTE. When a shadow stack page is being shared
> + * among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so
> + * the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is
> + * duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for
> + * shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
> + * copy-on-write.
> + *
> + * (Write=0,SavedDirty=0,Dirty=1):
> + * - A shadow stack PTE.
> + * - A Cow PTE created when a processor without shadow stack support set
> + * Dirty=1.
> + */
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-20 11:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 115+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-18 21:13 [PATCH v6 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/41] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/41] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/41] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/41] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 05/41] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 06/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 07/41] x86: Move control protection handler to separate file Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/41] x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/41] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/41] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 11/41] mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:38 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 11:17 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 11:19 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-01 15:39 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 12/41] s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:39 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 11:21 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-23 12:14 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-02-23 17:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 13/41] mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:40 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 1:00 ` Michael Ellerman
2023-02-20 21:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-20 11:23 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 22:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 15:41 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 11:32 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2023-02-20 21:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21 8:38 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-21 20:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21 20:13 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-22 1:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-22 9:05 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 17:23 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-22 17:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-22 17:54 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-22 19:39 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 15/41] x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 16/41] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 17/41] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 18/41] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 12:56 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 22:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21 8:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 22:13 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 19/41] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 12:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 23:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-23 12:55 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 20/41] x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:41 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 15:42 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 21/41] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 22/41] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 12:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 22:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21 8:31 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 0:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 23/41] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 24/41] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-21 8:42 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-21 20:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 25/41] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:43 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 26/41] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 27/41] x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:45 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 28/41] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-24 12:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-24 18:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-28 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-28 22:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 29/41] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-24 12:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-24 18:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-24 18:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 30/41] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 31/41] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 32/41] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 33/41] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-23 0:03 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-23 1:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-23 21:20 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-23 23:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 34/41] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 35/41] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 36/41] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 37/41] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:47 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-21 8:48 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-21 20:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-23 13:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-23 17:54 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-24 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-24 18:39 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 38/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 39/41] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 40/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 41/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 3:42 ` [PATCH v6 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:54 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-20 6:50 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-02-20 21:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-20 20:22 ` John Allen
2023-02-21 2:38 ` Pengfei Xu
2023-02-22 19:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-22 19:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=70681787-0d33-a9ed-7f2a-747be1490932@redhat.com \
--to=david@redhat.com \
--cc=Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=christina.schimpe@intel.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=debug@rivosinc.com \
--cc=dethoma@microsoft.com \
--cc=eranian@google.com \
--cc=esyr@redhat.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
--cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jamorris@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=john.allen@amd.com \
--cc=kcc@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox