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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
	jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
	christina.schimpe@intel.com, debug@rivosinc.com
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:32:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <70681787-0d33-a9ed-7f2a-747be1490932@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230218211433.26859-15-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

On 18.02.23 22:14, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> Some OSes have a greater dependence on software available bits in PTEs than
> Linux. That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a
> new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to
> repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1. So in order to support
> shadow stack memory, Linux should avoid creating memory with this PTE bit
> combination unless it intends for it to be shadow stack.
> 
> The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by HW
> _before_ a write. A write with a Write=0 PTE would typically only generate
> a fault, not set Dirty=1. Hardware can (rarely) both set Dirty=1 *and*
> generate the fault, resulting in a Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE. Hardware which
> supports shadow stacks will no longer exhibit this oddity.
> 
> So that leaves Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs created in software. To achieve this,
> in places where Linux normally creates Write=0,Dirty=1, it can use the
> software-defined _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY.
> In other words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0,Dirty=1, it instead
> creates Write=0,SavedDirty=1 except for shadow stack, which is
> Write=0,Dirty=1. Further differentiated by VMA flags, these PTE bit
> combinations would be set as follows for various types of memory:
I would simplify (see below) and not repeat what the patch contains as 
comments already that detailed.

> 
> (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0):
>   - A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page. Previously when a typical
>     anonymous writable mapping was made COW via fork(), the kernel would
>     mark it Write=0,Dirty=1. Now it will instead use the SavedDirty bit.
>     This happens in copy_present_pte().
>   - A R/O page that has been COW'ed. The user page is in a R/O VMA,
>     and get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE) needs a writable copy. The page fault
>     handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as
>     Write=0 and SavedDirty=1.
>   - A shared shadow stack PTE. When a shadow stack page is being shared
>     among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so
>     the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is
>     duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for
>     shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
>     copy-on-write.
> 
> (Write=0,SavedDirty=0,Dirty=1):
>   - A shadow stack PTE.
>   - A Cow PTE created when a processor without shadow stack support set
>     Dirty=1.
> 
> There are six bits left available to software in the 64-bit PTE after
> consuming a bit for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. No space is consumed in 32-bit
> kernels because shadow stacks are not enabled there.
> 
> Implement only the infrastructure for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. Changes to start
> creating _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY PTEs will follow once other pieces are in place.
> 
> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> 
> ---
> v6:
>   - Rename _PAGE_COW to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY (David Hildenbrand)
>   - Add _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY to _PAGE_CHG_MASK
> 
> v5:
>   - Fix log, comments and whitespace (Boris)
>   - Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
> 
> v4:
>   - Teach pte_flags_need_flush() about _PAGE_COW bit
>   - Break apart patch for better bisectability
> 
> v3:
>   - Add comment around _PAGE_TABLE in response to comment
>     from (Andrew Cooper)
>   - Check for PSE in pmd_shstk (Andrew Cooper)
>   - Get to the point quicker in commit log (Andrew Cooper)
>   - Clarify and reorder commit log for why the PTE bit examples have
>     multiple entries. Apply same changes for comment. (peterz)
>   - Fix comment that implied dirty bit for COW was a specific x86 thing
>     (peterz)
>   - Fix swapping of Write/Dirty (PeterZ)
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h      |  3 +-
>   3 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index 2b423d697490..110e552eb602 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -301,6 +301,45 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
>   	return native_make_pte(v & ~clear);
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * COW and other write protection operations can result in Dirty=1,Write=0
> + * PTEs. But in the case of X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK, the software SavedDirty bit
> + * is used, since the Dirty=1,Write=0 will result in the memory being treated as
> + * shadow stack by the HW. So when creating dirty, write-protected memory, a
> + * software bit is used _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY. The following functions
> + * pte_mksaveddirty() and pte_clear_saveddirty() take a conventional dirty,
> + * write-protected PTE (Write=0,Dirty=1) and transition it to the shadow stack
> + * compatible version. (Write=0,SavedDirty=1).
> + */
> +static inline pte_t pte_mksaveddirty(pte_t pte)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pte;
> +
> +	pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +static inline pte_t pte_clear_saveddirty(pte_t pte)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY is unnecessary on !X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK kernels,
> +	 * since the HW dirty bit can be used without creating shadow stack
> +	 * memory. See the _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY definition for more details.
> +	 */
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pte;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * PTE is getting copied-on-write, so it will be dirtied
> +	 * if writable, or made shadow stack if shadow stack and
> +	 * being copied on access. Set the dirty bit for both
> +	 * cases.
> +	 */
> +	pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
>   static inline int pte_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
>   {
> @@ -420,6 +459,26 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)
>   	return native_make_pmd(v & ~clear);
>   }
>   
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_mksaveddirty(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pmd;
> +
> +	pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_saveddirty(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pmd;
> +
> +	pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
>   static inline int pmd_uffd_wp(pmd_t pmd)
>   {
> @@ -491,6 +550,26 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
>   	return native_make_pud(v & ~clear);
>   }
>   
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_mksaveddirty(pud_t pud)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pud;
> +
> +	pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_clear_saveddirty(pud_t pud)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pud;
> +
> +	pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
>   static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
>   {
>   	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index 0646ad00178b..3b420b6c0584 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2	10	/* " */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3	11	/* " */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE	12	/* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
> -#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	58	/* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	57	/* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5	58	/* available for programmer */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0	59	/* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1	60	/* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2	61	/* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
> @@ -34,6 +35,15 @@
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
>   
> +/*
> + * Indicates a Saved Dirty bit page.
> + */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY		_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* copy-on-write */

Nope, not "copy-on-write" :) It's more like "dirty bit when the hw-dirty 
bit cannot be used". Maybe simply drop the comment.

> +#else
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY		0
> +#endif
> +
>   /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
>   /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE	_PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL
> @@ -117,6 +127,40 @@
>   #define _PAGE_SOFTW4	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
>   #endif
>   
> +/*
> + * The hardware requires shadow stack to be read-only and Dirty.
> + * _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY is a software-only bit used to separate copy-on-write
> + * PTEs from shadow stack PTEs:

I'd suggest phrasing this differently. COW is just one scenario where 
this can happen. Also, I don't think that the description of 
"separation" is correct.

Something like the following maybe?

"
However, there are valid cases where the kernel might create read-only 
PTEs that are dirty (e.g., fork(), mprotect(), uffd-wp(), soft-dirty 
tracking). In this case, the _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY bit is used instead of 
the HW-dirty bit, to avoid creating a wrong "shadow stack" PTEs. Such 
PTEs have (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0) set.

Note that on processors without shadow stack support, the 
_PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY remains unused.
"

The I would simply drop below (which is also too COW-specific I think).

> + *
> + * (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0):
> + *  - A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page. Previously when a typical
> + *    anonymous writable mapping was made COW via fork(), the kernel would
> + *    mark it Write=0,Dirty=1. Now it will instead use the Cow bit. This
> + *    happens in copy_present_pte().
> + *  - A R/O page that has been COW'ed. The user page is in a R/O VMA,
> + *    and get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE) needs a writable copy. The page fault
> + *    handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as
> + *    Write=0 and SavedDirty=1.
> + *  - A shared shadow stack PTE. When a shadow stack page is being shared
> + *    among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so
> + *    the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is
> + *    duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for
> + *    shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
> + *    copy-on-write.
> + *
> + * (Write=0,SavedDirty=0,Dirty=1):
> + *  - A shadow stack PTE.
> + *  - A Cow PTE created when a processor without shadow stack support set
> + *    Dirty=1.
> + */


-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb



  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-20 11:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 115+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-18 21:13 [PATCH v6 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/41] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/41] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/41] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/41] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 05/41] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 06/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:13 ` [PATCH v6 07/41] x86: Move control protection handler to separate file Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/41] x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/41] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/41] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 11/41] mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:38   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 11:17     ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 11:19   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-01 15:39   ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 12/41] s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:39   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 11:21   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-23 12:14   ` Heiko Carstens
2023-02-23 17:59     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 13/41] mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:40   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20  1:00   ` Michael Ellerman
2023-02-20 21:24     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-20 11:23   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 22:56     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 15:41   ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 11:32   ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2023-02-20 21:38     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21  8:38       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-21 20:08         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21 20:13         ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-22  1:02           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-22  9:05           ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 17:23             ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-22 17:27               ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 17:42                 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-22 17:54                   ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-22 19:39                     ` Kees Cook
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 15/41] x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 16/41] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 17/41] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 18/41] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 12:56   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 22:08     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21  8:34       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 22:13         ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 19/41] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 12:57   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 23:07     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-23 12:55       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 20/41] x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:41   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 15:42   ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 21/41] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 22/41] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20 12:58   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-20 22:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-21  8:31       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22  0:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 23/41] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 24/41] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-21  8:42   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-21 20:02     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 25/41] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:43   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:38     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 26/41] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 27/41] x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:45   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:32     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 28/41] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-24 12:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-24 18:37     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-28 10:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-28 22:35         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 29/41] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-24 12:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-24 18:25     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-24 18:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 30/41] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 31/41] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 32/41] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 33/41] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-23  0:03   ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-23  1:11     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-23 21:20       ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-23 23:42         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 34/41] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 35/41] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 36/41] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 37/41] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:47   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-21  8:48   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-21 20:02     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-23 13:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-23 17:54     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-24 11:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-24 18:39         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 38/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-19 20:48   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 39/41] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 40/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 41/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-20  3:42 ` [PATCH v6 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace Kees Cook
2023-02-20 22:54   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-20  6:50 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-02-20 21:23   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-20 20:22 ` John Allen
2023-02-21  2:38 ` Pengfei Xu
2023-02-22 19:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-22 19:31   ` Edgecombe, Rick P

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