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From: andrey.konovalov@linux.dev
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 05/20] kasan: introduce kasan_mempool_unpoison_object
Date: Mon,  6 Nov 2023 21:10:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6b096bcf531f457b13959ea99b1e270b96d5ca34.1699297309.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1699297309.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>

Introduce and document a kasan_mempool_unpoison_object hook.

This hook serves as a replacement for the generic kasan_unpoison_range
that the mempool code relies on right now. mempool will be updated to use
the new hook in one of the following patches.

For now, define the new hook to be identical to kasan_unpoison_range.
One of the following patches will update it to add stack trace
collection.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kasan/common.c     |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 33387e254caa..c5fe303bc1c2 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ bool __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
  * bugs and reports them. The caller can use the return value of this function
  * to find out if the allocation is buggy.
  *
+ * Before the poisoned allocation can be reused, it must be unpoisoned via
+ * kasan_mempool_unpoison_object().
+ *
  * This function operates on all slab allocations including large kmalloc
  * allocations (the ones returned by kmalloc_large() or by kmalloc() with the
  * size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE).
@@ -241,6 +244,32 @@ static __always_inline bool kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr)
 	return true;
 }
 
+void __kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long ip);
+/**
+ * kasan_mempool_unpoison_object - Unpoison a mempool slab allocation.
+ * @ptr: Pointer to the slab allocation.
+ * @size: Size to be unpoisoned.
+ *
+ * This function is intended for kernel subsystems that cache slab allocations
+ * to reuse them instead of freeing them back to the slab allocator (e.g.
+ * mempool).
+ *
+ * This function unpoisons a slab allocation that was previously poisoned via
+ * kasan_mempool_poison_object() without initializing its memory. For the
+ * tag-based modes, this function does not assign a new tag to the allocation
+ * and instead restores the original tags based on the pointer value.
+ *
+ * This function operates on all slab allocations including large kmalloc
+ * allocations (the ones returned by kmalloc_large() or by kmalloc() with the
+ * size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE).
+ */
+static __always_inline void kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(void *ptr,
+							  size_t size)
+{
+	if (kasan_enabled())
+		__kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(ptr, size, _RET_IP_);
+}
+
 /*
  * Unlike kasan_check_read/write(), kasan_check_byte() is performed even for
  * the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation.
@@ -301,6 +330,8 @@ static inline bool kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr)
 {
 	return true;
 }
+static inline void kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(void *ptr, size_t size) {}
+
 static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address)
 {
 	return true;
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 087f93629132..033c860afe51 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -441,6 +441,11 @@ bool __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 	}
 }
 
+void __kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	kasan_unpoison(ptr, size, false);
+}
+
 bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
 {
 	if (!kasan_byte_accessible(address)) {
-- 
2.25.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-06 20:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-06 20:10 [PATCH RFC 00/20] kasan: save mempool stack traces andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 01/20] kasan: rename kasan_slab_free_mempool to kasan_mempool_poison_object andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 02/20] kasan: move kasan_mempool_poison_object andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 03/20] kasan: document kasan_mempool_poison_object andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 04/20] kasan: add return value for kasan_mempool_poison_object andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` andrey.konovalov [this message]
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 06/20] kasan: introduce kasan_mempool_poison_pages andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 07/20] kasan: introduce kasan_mempool_unpoison_pages andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 08/20] kasan: clean up __kasan_mempool_poison_object andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 09/20] kasan: save free stack traces for slab mempools andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 10/20] kasan: clean up and rename ____kasan_kmalloc andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 11/20] kasan: introduce poison_kmalloc_large_redzone andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 12/20] kasan: save alloc stack traces for mempool andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 13/20] mempool: use new mempool KASAN hooks andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 14/20] mempool: introduce mempool_use_prealloc_only andrey.konovalov
2023-11-22 17:20   ` Marco Elver
2023-11-23 18:06     ` Andrey Konovalov
2023-11-23 18:47       ` Marco Elver
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 15/20] kasan: add mempool tests andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 16/20] kasan: rename pagealloc tests andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 17/20] kasan: reorder tests andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 18/20] kasan: rename and document kasan_(un)poison_object_data andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 19/20] skbuff: use mempool KASAN hooks andrey.konovalov
2023-11-06 20:10 ` [PATCH RFC 20/20] io_uring: use mempool KASAN hook andrey.konovalov
2023-11-22 17:13 ` [PATCH RFC 00/20] kasan: save mempool stack traces Marco Elver
2023-11-23 18:06   ` Andrey Konovalov

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