From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de,
dyoung@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de,
keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.or
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2016 12:45:42 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6a6e6a1a-eec8-c547-553d-7746d65fc182@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190849706.9523.17127624683768628621.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
On 23/08/2016 01:28, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The ioctl will be used by qemu to issue the Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization (SEV) guest commands to transition a guest into
> into SEV-enabled mode.
>
> a typical usage:
>
> struct kvm_sev_launch_start start;
> struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd data;
>
> data.cmd = KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START;
> data.opaque = &start;
>
> ret = ioctl(fd, KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &data);
>
> On SEV command failure, data.ret_code will contain the firmware error code.
Please modify the ioctl to require the file descriptor for the PSP. A
program without access to /dev/psp should not be able to use SEV.
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 ++++
> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 9b885fc..a94e37d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1040,6 +1040,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +
> + int (*sev_issue_cmd)(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd __user *argp);
> };
>
> struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index d6f2f4b..0c0adad 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -3820,6 +3820,15 @@ split_irqchip_unlock:
> return r;
> }
>
> +static int kvm_vm_ioctl_sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd __user *argp)
> +{
> + if (kvm_x86_ops->sev_issue_cmd)
> + return kvm_x86_ops->sev_issue_cmd(kvm, argp);
> +
> + return -ENOTTY;
> +}
Please make a more generic vm_ioctl callback.
> long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
> unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
> {
> @@ -4085,6 +4094,10 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
> r = kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(kvm, &cap);
> break;
> }
> + case KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD: {
> + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_sev_issue_cmd(kvm, argp);
> + break;
> + }
> default:
> r = kvm_vm_ioctl_assigned_device(kvm, ioctl, arg);
> }
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 300ef25..72c18c3 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -1274,6 +1274,131 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
> /* Available with KVM_CAP_X86_SMM */
> #define KVM_SMI _IO(KVMIO, 0xb7)
>
> +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */
> +enum sev_cmd {
> + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START = 0,
> + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
> + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH,
> + KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS,
> + KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT,
> + KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT,
> + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START,
> + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE,
> + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH,
> + KVM_SEV_SEND_START,
> + KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE,
> + KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH,
> + KVM_SEV_API_VERSION,
> + KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd {
> + __u32 cmd;
> + __u64 opaque;
> + __u32 ret_code;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
> + __u32 handle;
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u32 policy;
> + __u8 nonce[16];
> + __u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
> + __u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_launch_update {
> + __u64 address;
> + __u32 length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_launch_finish {
> + __u32 vcpu_count;
> + __u32 vcpu_length;
> + __u64 vcpu_mask_addr;
> + __u32 vcpu_mask_length;
> + __u8 measurement[32];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
> + __u32 policy;
> + __u32 state;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_dbg_decrypt {
> + __u64 src_addr;
> + __u64 dst_addr;
> + __u32 length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_dbg_encrypt {
> + __u64 src_addr;
> + __u64 dst_addr;
> + __u32 length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
> + __u32 handle;
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u32 policy;
> + __u8 policy_meas[32];
> + __u8 wrapped_tek[24];
> + __u8 wrapped_tik[24];
> + __u8 ten[16];
> + __u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
> + __u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
> + __u8 nonce[16];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_receive_update {
> + __u8 iv[16];
> + __u64 address;
> + __u32 length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_receive_finish {
> + __u8 measurement[32];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_send_start {
> + __u8 nonce[16];
> + __u32 policy;
> + __u8 policy_meas[32];
> + __u8 wrapped_tek[24];
> + __u8 wrapped_tik[24];
> + __u8 ten[16];
> + __u8 iv[16];
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u8 api_major;
> + __u8 api_minor;
> + __u32 serial;
> + __u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
> + __u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
> + __u8 pek_sig_r[32];
> + __u8 pek_sig_s[32];
> + __u8 cek_sig_r[32];
> + __u8 cek_sig_s[32];
> + __u8 cek_pub_qx[32];
> + __u8 cek_pub_qy[32];
> + __u8 ask_sig_r[32];
> + __u8 ask_sig_s[32];
> + __u32 ncerts;
> + __u32 cert_length;
> + __u64 certs_addr;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_send_update {
> + __u32 length;
> + __u64 src_addr;
> + __u64 dst_addr;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_send_finish {
> + __u8 measurement[32];
> +};
> +
> +#define KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd)
> +
> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
>
>
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-13 10:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23 9:33 ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23 9:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23 7:14 ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2016-10-17 17:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=6a6e6a1a-eec8-c547-553d-7746d65fc182@redhat.com \
--to=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
--cc=bhe@redhat.com \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=devel@linuxdriverproject.org \
--cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=jroedel@suse.de \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
--cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
--cc=mchehab@kernel.or \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=msalter@redhat.com \
--cc=paul.gortmaker@windriver.com \
--cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
--cc=ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com \
--cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
--cc=simon.guinot@sequanux.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=xemul@parallels.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox