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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de,
	dyoung@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de,
	keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.or
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2016 12:45:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6a6e6a1a-eec8-c547-553d-7746d65fc182@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190849706.9523.17127624683768628621.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>



On 23/08/2016 01:28, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The ioctl will be used by qemu to issue the Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization (SEV) guest commands to transition a guest into
> into SEV-enabled mode.
> 
> a typical usage:
> 
> struct kvm_sev_launch_start start;
> struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd data;
> 
> data.cmd = KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START;
> data.opaque = &start;
> 
> ret = ioctl(fd, KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &data);
> 
> On SEV command failure, data.ret_code will contain the firmware error code.

Please modify the ioctl to require the file descriptor for the PSP.  A
program without access to /dev/psp should not be able to use SEV.

> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    3 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |   13 ++++
>  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h        |  125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 9b885fc..a94e37d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1040,6 +1040,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>  	void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  
>  	void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +
> +	int (*sev_issue_cmd)(struct kvm *kvm,
> +			     struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd __user *argp);
>  };
>  
>  struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index d6f2f4b..0c0adad 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -3820,6 +3820,15 @@ split_irqchip_unlock:
>  	return r;
>  }
>  
> +static int kvm_vm_ioctl_sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm,
> +				      struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd __user *argp)
> +{
> +	if (kvm_x86_ops->sev_issue_cmd)
> +		return kvm_x86_ops->sev_issue_cmd(kvm, argp);
> +
> +	return -ENOTTY;
> +}

Please make a more generic vm_ioctl callback.

>  long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
>  		       unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
>  {
> @@ -4085,6 +4094,10 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
>  		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(kvm, &cap);
>  		break;
>  	}
> +	case KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD: {
> +		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_sev_issue_cmd(kvm, argp);
> +		break;
> +	}
>  	default:
>  		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_assigned_device(kvm, ioctl, arg);
>  	}
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 300ef25..72c18c3 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -1274,6 +1274,131 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
>  /* Available with KVM_CAP_X86_SMM */
>  #define KVM_SMI                   _IO(KVMIO,   0xb7)
>  
> +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */
> +enum sev_cmd {
> +	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START = 0,
> +	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
> +	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH,
> +	KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS,
> +	KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT,
> +	KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT,
> +	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START,
> +	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE,
> +	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH,
> +	KVM_SEV_SEND_START,
> +	KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE,
> +	KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH,
> +	KVM_SEV_API_VERSION,
> +	KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd {
> +	__u32 cmd;
> +	__u64 opaque;
> +	__u32 ret_code;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
> +	__u32 handle;
> +	__u32 flags;
> +	__u32 policy;
> +	__u8 nonce[16];
> +	__u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
> +	__u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_launch_update {
> +	__u64	address;
> +	__u32	length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_launch_finish {
> +	__u32 vcpu_count;
> +	__u32 vcpu_length;
> +	__u64 vcpu_mask_addr;
> +	__u32 vcpu_mask_length;
> +	__u8  measurement[32];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
> +	__u32 policy;
> +	__u32 state;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_dbg_decrypt {
> +	__u64 src_addr;
> +	__u64 dst_addr;
> +	__u32 length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_dbg_encrypt {
> +	__u64 src_addr;
> +	__u64 dst_addr;
> +	__u32 length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
> +	__u32 handle;
> +	__u32 flags;
> +	__u32 policy;
> +	__u8 policy_meas[32];
> +	__u8 wrapped_tek[24];
> +	__u8 wrapped_tik[24];
> +	__u8 ten[16];
> +	__u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
> +	__u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
> +	__u8 nonce[16];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_receive_update {
> +	__u8 iv[16];
> +	__u64 address;
> +	__u32 length;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_receive_finish {
> +	__u8 measurement[32];
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_send_start {
> +	__u8 nonce[16];
> +	__u32 policy;
> +	__u8 policy_meas[32];
> +	__u8 wrapped_tek[24];
> +	__u8 wrapped_tik[24];
> +	__u8 ten[16];
> +	__u8 iv[16];
> +	__u32 flags;
> +	__u8 api_major;
> +	__u8 api_minor;
> +	__u32 serial;
> +	__u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
> +	__u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
> +	__u8 pek_sig_r[32];
> +	__u8 pek_sig_s[32];
> +	__u8 cek_sig_r[32];
> +	__u8 cek_sig_s[32];
> +	__u8 cek_pub_qx[32];
> +	__u8 cek_pub_qy[32];
> +	__u8 ask_sig_r[32];
> +	__u8 ask_sig_s[32];
> +	__u32 ncerts;
> +	__u32 cert_length;
> +	__u64 certs_addr;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_send_update {
> +	__u32 length;
> +	__u64 src_addr;
> +	__u64 dst_addr;
> +};
> +
> +struct kvm_sev_send_finish {
> +	__u8 measurement[32];
> +};
> +
> +#define KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD	_IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd)
> +
>  #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
>  #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
>  #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)
> 
> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-13 10:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13  9:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10                   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23  9:33           ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:50             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23  7:14   ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2016-10-17 17:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51   ` Brijesh Singh

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