From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>, linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>,
qiuguorui1@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [Question] pfn_valid_within(page_to_pfn(buddy)) vs pfn_valid_within(buddy_pfn) in __free_one_page()
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2019 11:12:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <67e418a0-d56b-8b2b-13da-c777e67f7013@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b08df705-8ffc-7486-5126-154062a72dd8@huawei.com>
On 10/8/19 10:35 AM, Kefeng Wang wrote:
> Hi Vlastimil and all,
>
> We met a Null pointer when do page_to_pfn() in __free_one_page() in older kernel, __nr_to_section(__sec) return NULL,
>
> #define __page_to_pfn(pg) \
> ({ const struct page *__pg = (pg); \
> int __sec = page_to_section(__pg); \
> (unsigned long)(__pg - __section_mem_map_addr(__nr_to_section(__sec))); \
> })
>
> Before v4.11, __free_one_page() use pfn_valid_within(page_to_pfn(buddy)) to check pfn, after the
Hmm, looks like the code before v4.11 was wrong. pfn_valid_(within)
should be checked first, before obtaining and working with the struct
page. Here we already have a struct page obtained by pointer arithmetics,
and are calling page_to_pfn() on it, which means accessing its flags.
The pfn_valid_within() then comes too late.
> following patches, it use buddy_pfn directly.
>
> b4fb8f66f1ae mm, page_alloc: Add missing check for memory holes
> 13ad59df67f1 mm, page_alloc: avoid page_to_pfn() when merging buddies // NOTE: directly use buddy_pfn
> 76741e776a37 mm, page_alloc: don't convert pfn to idx when merging
Looks like my patches fixed that code without realizing there was
the bug. Commit b4fb8f66f1ae shows I've also introduced it elsewhere.
> If use page_to_pfn(buddy) back in mainline 5.4-rc2, the same issue will occur,
No surprise, we must validate pfn first before touching the page.
> diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
> index c0b2e0306720..fbbfe8e8b4ca 100644
> --- a/mm/page_alloc.c
> +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
> @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static inline void __free_one_page(struct page *page,
> buddy_pfn = __find_buddy_pfn(pfn, order);
> buddy = page + (buddy_pfn - pfn);
>
> - if (!pfn_valid_within(buddy_pfn))
> + if (!pfn_valid_within(page_to_pfn(buddy)))
> goto done_merging;
> if (!page_is_buddy(page, buddy, order))
> goto done_merging;
>
> It shows the buddy->flags is wrong, that is, buddy is bad, we find the buddy by page + (buddy_pfn - pfn),
> so there is some issue in __find_buddy_pfn(pfn, order)?
No, result of __find_buddy_pfn has to be validated first.
> The following is the debug print and CallTrace, any comment?
>
> Thanks,
> Kefeng
>
> 1) MEMBLOCK configuration:
> memory size = 0x0000000036800000 reserved size = 0x0000000004ca7fbc
> memory.cnt = 0x4
> memory[0x0] [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000013ffffff], 0x0000000014000000 bytes flags: 0x0
> memory[0x1] [0x000000002d600000-0x0000000033ffffff], 0x0000000006a00000 bytes flags: 0x0
> memory[0x2] [0x0000000034800000-0x00000000445fffff], 0x000000000fe00000 bytes flags: 0x0
> memory[0x3] [0x0000000044a00000-0x00000000509fffff], 0x000000000c000000 bytes flags: 0x0
> reserved.cnt = 0x6
> reserved[0x0] [0x000000002d680000-0x000000002e7c8fff], 0x0000000001149000 bytes flags: 0x0
> reserved[0x1] [0x0000000030b00000-0x000000003239cfff], 0x000000000189d000 bytes flags: 0x0
> reserved[0x2] [0x0000000032400000-0x00000000324fffff], 0x0000000000100000 bytes flags: 0x0
> reserved[0x3] [0x000000004e000000-0x000000004fffffff], 0x0000000002000000 bytes flags: 0x0
> reserved[0x4] [0x000000005083e040-0x0000000050849ffb], 0x000000000000bfbc bytes flags: 0x0
> reserved[0x5] [0x000000005084a000-0x00000000509fffff], 0x00000000001b6000 bytes flags: 0x0
These might be holes in the zones, right.
> 2) CONFIG
> CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_MANUAL=y
> CONFIG_SPARSEMEM=y
> CONFIG_HAVE_MEMORY_PRESENT=y
> CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y
> CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP_ENABLE=y
> # CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is not set
Is CONFIG_HOLES_IN_ZONE enabled? Probably yes as that's arm64.
> 3) debug print and CallTrace
> __free_one_page , order = 9, max_order = 11, page = ffffff804e128000, buddy = ffffff804e120000, sec = 42623, mem_section = 0000000000000000
I would assume buddy is in one of the holes, but you'd have to print the pfn's to be sure.
> buddy = ffffff804e120000, __sec = 42623, buddy->flags = 299fcc27aebc552f, SECTIONS_PGSHIFT = 46, SECTIONS_MASK = 3ffff
> __section_mem_map_addr, section = 0000000000000000
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> Ignoring spurious kernel translation fault at virtual address 0000000000000000
> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 29 at ../arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:302 __do_kernel_fault+0xb8/0x130
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 29 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2+ #16
> Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
> Workqueue: events delayed_fput
> pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO)
> pc : __do_kernel_fault+0xb8/0x130
> lr : __do_kernel_fault+0xb8/0x130
> sp : ffffffc011273560
> x29: ffffffc011273560 x28: ffffff805020ce00
> x27: ffffff804e128000 x26: ffffff804e120000
> x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000025
> x23: 0000000096000005 x22: 0000000000000025
> x21: 0000000096000005 x20: ffffffc011273650
> x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
> x17: 00000000f06e9c14 x16: 0000000000000014
> x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 7320303030303030
> x13: 6c20616464726573 x12: 7420766972747561
> x11: 206661756c742061 x10: 6e736c6174696f6e
> x9 : 726e656c20747261 x8 : 72696f7573206b65
> x7 : 72696e6720737075 x6 : 0000000000000000
> x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000000
> x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000
> x1 : 0095a39d527dc9a0 x0 : 0000000000000000
> Call trace:
> __do_kernel_fault+0xb8/0x130
> do_page_fault+0x60/0x3ec
> do_translation_fault+0x40/0x78
> do_mem_abort+0x50/0xa8
> el1_da+0x20/0x94
> __free_one_page+0x1d8/0x31c
> free_pcppages_bulk+0x1dc/0x258
> free_unref_page_commit.isra.114+0xb0/0xc0
> free_unref_page_list+0x144/0x198
> release_pages+0x8c/0x2bc
> __pagevec_release+0x38/0x48
> pagevec_release+0x14/0x20
> shmem_undo_range+0x23c/0x49c
> shmem_truncate_range+0x38/0x58
> shmem_evict_inode+0xd4/0x1e8
> evict+0xb8/0x174
> iput+0x178/0x1c0
> dentry_unlink_inode+0x120/0x124
> __dentry_kill+0x98/0x170
> dput+0x88/0x140
> __fput+0x184/0x1e8
> delayed_fput+0x40/0x54
> process_one_work+0x1a4/0x294
> worker_thread+0x1ec/0x284
> kthread+0xf0/0x100
> ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
> ---[ end trace ebdfde5c0fdc7511 ]---
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-08 9:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-08 8:35 Kefeng Wang
2019-10-08 9:12 ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2019-10-09 1:07 ` Kefeng Wang
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