From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com, andreyknvl@gmail.com, ashok.raj@intel.com,
bharata@amd.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, dvyukov@google.com,
glider@google.com, hjl.tools@gmail.com,
jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com, kcc@google.com,
kirill@shutemov.name, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, peterz@infradead.org,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com,
tarasmadan@google.com, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv11.1 04/16] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 19:54:35 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6782d309-5e4b-580c-fbbb-4388bda69bf3@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221107213558.27807-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
On 11/7/22 13:35, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Linear Address Masking mode for userspace pointers encoded in CR3 bits.
> The mode is selected per-process and stored in mm_context_t.
>
> switch_mm_irqs_off() now respects selected LAM mode and constructs CR3
> accordingly.
>
> The active LAM mode gets recorded in the tlb_state.
>
> +static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> + return mm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
READ_ONCE -- otherwise this has a data race and might generate sanitizer
complaints.
> +}
> @@ -491,6 +496,8 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> {
> struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
> u16 prev_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
> + unsigned long prev_lam = tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask();
> + unsigned long new_lam = mm_lam_cr3_mask(next);
So I'm reading this again after drinking a cup of coffee. new_lam is
next's LAM mask according to mm_struct (and thus can change
asynchronously due to a remote CPU). prev_lam is based on tlbstate and
can't change asynchronously, at least not with IRQs off.
> bool was_lazy = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate_shared.is_lazy);
> unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
> u64 next_tlb_gen;
> @@ -520,7 +527,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> * isn't free.
> */
> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid))) {
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid, prev_lam))) {
So is the only purpose of tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask() to enable this warning
to work?
> /*
> * If we were to BUG here, we'd be very likely to kill
> * the system so hard that we don't see the call trace.
> @@ -552,9 +559,15 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> * instruction.
> */
> if (real_prev == next) {
> + /* Not actually switching mm's */
> VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
> next->context.ctx_id);
>
> + /*
> + * If this races with another thread that enables lam, 'new_lam'
> + * might not match 'prev_lam'.
> + */
> +
Indeed.
> /*
> * Even in lazy TLB mode, the CPU should stay set in the
> * mm_cpumask. The TLB shootdown code can figure out from
> @@ -622,15 +635,16 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> barrier();
> }
> @@ -691,6 +705,10 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
> /* Assert that CR3 already references the right mm. */
> WARN_ON((cr3 & CR3_ADDR_MASK) != __pa(mm->pgd));
>
> + /* LAM expected to be disabled in CR3 and init_mm */
> + WARN_ON(cr3 & (X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57));
> + WARN_ON(mm_lam_cr3_mask(&init_mm));
> +
I think the callers all have init_mm selected, but the rest of this
function is not really written with this assumption. (But it does force
ASID 0, which is at least a bizarre thing to do for non-init-mm.)
What's the purpose of this warning? I'm okay with keeping it, but maybe
also add a warning that fires if mm != &init_mm.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-09 3:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-25 0:17 [PATCHv11 00/16] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 01/16] x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 02/16] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 03/16] mm: Pass down mm_struct to untagged_addr() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 04/16] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-11-07 17:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 18:02 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 21:35 ` [PATCHv11.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-09 3:54 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2022-11-09 9:17 ` kirill
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 05/16] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-11-07 17:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 06/16] KVM: Serialize tagged address check against tagging enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 07/16] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 21:37 ` [PATCHv11.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 08/16] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 09/16] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 14:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 10/16] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 11/16] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 12/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 13/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 14/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 15/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 16/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 11:25 ` [PATCHv11 00/16] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
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