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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kunit-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, dvhart@infradead.org, andy@infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael@kernel.org, rppt@kernel.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, daniel.gutson@eclypsium.com,
	hughsient@gmail.com, alex.bazhaniuk@eclypsium.com,
	alison.schofield@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/9] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 08:21:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6758af9b-1110-ad5a-3961-e256d5c8d576@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y1pH/DuYJeo7Kyo5@zn.tnic>

On 10/27/22 01:57, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> Well, I still think this is not going to work in all cases. SME/TME can
> be enabled but the kernel can go - and for whatever reason - map a bunch
> of memory unencrypted.

For TME on Intel systems, there's no way to make it unencrypted.  The
memory controller is doing all the encryption behind the back of the OS
and even devices that are doing DMA.  Nothing outside of the memory
controller really knows or cares that encryption is happening.


  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-27 15:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-04 13:58 Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 1/9] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 2/9] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t " Martin Fernandez
2022-10-07 15:53   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-11 13:28     ` Martin Fernandez
2022-10-11 15:27       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 3/9] x86/e820: Add infrastructure to refactor e820__range_{update,remove} Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 4/9] x86/e820: Refactor __e820__range_update Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 5/9] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 6/9] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 7/9] x86/e820: Add unit tests for e820_range_* functions Martin Fernandez
2022-07-05  2:04   ` David Gow
2022-07-05 17:24     ` Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 8/9] x86/efi: Mark e820_entries as crypto capable from EFI memmap Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 9/9] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 14:34   ` Greg KH
2022-07-05 17:35     ` Martin Fernandez
2022-07-06  6:38       ` Greg KH
2022-10-13 19:48 ` [PATCH v9 0/9] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption Borislav Petkov
2022-10-13 21:00   ` Martin Fernandez
2022-10-27  8:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-27 15:21       ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2022-10-27 15:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14  0:24   ` Dave Hansen

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