From: syzbot <syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
hughd@google.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, serge@hallyn.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com
Subject: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2024 00:32:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.GAE@google.com> (raw)
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 97d8894b6f4c Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.12-mw1' of git:/..
git tree: upstream
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14138a80580000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=bc30a30374b0753
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1cd571a672400ef3a930
compiler: Debian clang version 15.0.6, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=118fd2a9980000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1038299f980000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/f181c147328d/disk-97d8894b.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/b8b0160d9b09/vmlinux-97d8894b.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/c5dab0d4f811/bzImage-97d8894b.xz
The issue was bisected to:
commit ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2
Author: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Sep 17 09:41:04 2024 +0000
mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1554a99f980000
final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=1754a99f980000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1354a99f980000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()")
mmap: syz-executor369 (5231) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.11.0-syzkaller-10045-g97d8894b6f4c #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor369/5231 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888072852370 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#12){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:815 [inline]
ffff888072852370 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#12){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: process_measurement+0x439/0x1fb0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:250
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88807ac9a798 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: mmap_write_lock_killable include/linux/mmap_lock.h:122 [inline]
ffff88807ac9a798 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:1649 [inline]
ffff88807ac9a798 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __se_sys_remap_file_pages+0x22d/0xa50 mm/mmap.c:1624
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5822
down_read_killable+0xca/0xd30 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1549
mmap_read_lock_killable+0x1d/0x70 include/linux/mmap_lock.h:153
get_mmap_lock_carefully mm/memory.c:6108 [inline]
lock_mm_and_find_vma+0x29c/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:6159
do_user_addr_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1361 [inline]
handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1481 [inline]
exc_page_fault+0x1bf/0x8c0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539
asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623
fault_in_readable+0x108/0x2b0 mm/gup.c:2227
fault_in_iov_iter_readable+0x229/0x280 lib/iov_iter.c:94
generic_perform_write+0x259/0x6d0 mm/filemap.c:4040
shmem_file_write_iter+0xf9/0x120 mm/shmem.c:3221
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:590 [inline]
vfs_write+0xa6d/0xc90 fs/read_write.c:683
ksys_write+0x183/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:736
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#12){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3158 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3277 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3901
__lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5199
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5822
down_write+0x99/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1579
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:815 [inline]
process_measurement+0x439/0x1fb0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:250
ima_file_mmap+0x13d/0x2b0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:455
security_mmap_file+0x7e7/0xa40 security/security.c:2977
__do_sys_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:1692 [inline]
__se_sys_remap_file_pages+0x6e6/0xa50 mm/mmap.c:1624
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#12);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#12);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor369/5231:
#0: ffff88807ac9a798 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: mmap_write_lock_killable include/linux/mmap_lock.h:122 [inline]
#0: ffff88807ac9a798 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:1649 [inline]
#0: ffff88807ac9a798 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __se_sys_remap_file_pages+0x22d/0xa50 mm/mmap.c:1624
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5231 Comm: syz-executor369 Not tainted 6.11.0-syzkaller-10045-g97d8894b6f4c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074
check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2203
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3158 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3277 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3901
__lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5199
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5822
down_write+0x99/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1579
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:815 [inline]
process_measurement+0x439/0x1fb0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:250
ima_file_mmap+0x13d/0x2b0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:455
security_mmap_file+0x7e7/0xa40 security/security.c:2977
__do_sys_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:1692 [inline]
__se_sys_remap_file_pages+0x6e6/0xa50 mm/mmap.c:1624
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff317efa919
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ff317e94238 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000d8
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff317f85318 RCX: 00007ff317efa919
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000800000 RDI: 0000000020800000
RBP: 00007ff317f85310 R08: 0000000000010000 R09: 00007ff317e946c0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ff317f8531c
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007ffd154a5180 R15: 00007ffd154a5268
</TASK>
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
If the report is already addressed, let syzbot know by replying with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title
If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.
If you want to overwrite report's subsystems, reply with:
#syz set subsystems: new-subsystem
(See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard)
If the report is a duplicate of another one, reply with:
#syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report
If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
#syz undup
next reply other threads:[~2024-09-28 7:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-28 7:32 syzbot [this message]
2024-09-28 13:56 ` Andrew Morton
2024-09-28 18:07 ` Shu Han
2024-10-03 3:09 ` Paul Moore
2024-10-03 7:35 ` Shu Han
2024-10-07 15:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-10-07 16:35 ` Paul Moore
2024-10-07 16:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-10-07 16:58 ` Paul Moore
2024-10-09 16:23 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-10-09 19:05 ` syzbot
2024-10-18 14:55 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-10-18 15:23 ` syzbot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.GAE@google.com \
--to=syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
--cc=ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com \
--cc=eric.snowberg@oracle.com \
--cc=hughd@google.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
--cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox