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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 18/28] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 11:47:15 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <65461175-6b79-fd79-8c4b-3e7f28e707ae@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170225171024.xzlfox56rbbflxfo@pd.tnic>

On 2/25/2017 11:10 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:46:04AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
>> memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
>> device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
>> initialized to create decrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>
> Just nitpicks below...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index ec548e9..a46bcf4 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -13,11 +13,14 @@
>>  #include <linux/linkage.h>
>>  #include <linux/init.h>
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
>> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>>  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
>>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>>  #include <asm/bootparam.h>
>> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
>>
>>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>>  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
>> @@ -192,3 +195,22 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
>>  	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
>>  		protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
>>  }
>> +
>> +/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
>> +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
>> +{
>> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
>
> 	    !sme_active()
>
> no?

I was probably looking ahead to SEV on this one. Basically if the
sme_me_mask is non-zero we will want to make SWIOTLB decrypted.

>
> Unless we're going to be switching SME dynamically at run time?
>
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
>> +	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
>> +}
>> +
>> +void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	WARN(PAGE_ALIGN(size) != size,
>> +	     "size is not page aligned (%#lx)\n", size);
>
> "page-aligned" I guess.

Ok.

>
>> +
>> +	/* Make the SWIOTLB buffer area decrypted */
>> +	set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
>> +}
>> diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
>> index 4ee479f..15e7160 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
>> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ enum swiotlb_force {
>>  extern unsigned long swiotlb_nr_tbl(void);
>>  unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void);
>>  extern int swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs);
>> +extern void __init swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(void);
>>
>>  /*
>>   * Enumeration for sync targets
>> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
>> index 8222caa..ba13f8f 100644
>> --- a/init/main.c
>> +++ b/init/main.c
>> @@ -466,6 +466,10 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void)
>>  }
>>  #endif
>>
>> +void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * Set up kernel memory allocators
>>   */
>> @@ -614,6 +618,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
>>  	 */
>>  	locking_selftest();
>>
>> +	/*
>> +	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
>> +	 * operations that might use the swiotlb bounce buffers.
>
> 					 SWIOTLB

Ok.

>
>> +	 * This call will mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so
>> +	 * that their usage will not cause "plain-text" data to be
>> +	 * decrypted when accessed.
>> +	 */
>> +	mem_encrypt_init();
>> +
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
>>  	if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&
>>  	    page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
>> diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
>> index a8d74a7..c463067 100644
>> --- a/lib/swiotlb.c
>> +++ b/lib/swiotlb.c
>> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>>  #include <linux/highmem.h>
>>  #include <linux/gfp.h>
>>  #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
>> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/io.h>
>>  #include <asm/dma.h>
>> @@ -155,6 +156,17 @@ unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void)
>>  	return size ? size : (IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE);
>>  }
>>
>> +void __weak swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* For swiotlb, clear memory encryption mask from dma addresses */
>> +static dma_addr_t swiotlb_phys_to_dma(struct device *hwdev,
>> +				      phys_addr_t address)
>> +{
>> +	return phys_to_dma(hwdev, address) & ~sme_me_mask;
>> +}
>> +
>>  /* Note that this doesn't work with highmem page */
>>  static dma_addr_t swiotlb_virt_to_bus(struct device *hwdev,
>>  				      volatile void *address)
>> @@ -183,6 +195,31 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void)
>>  	       bytes >> 20, vstart, vend - 1);
>>  }
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Early SWIOTLB allocation may be to early to allow an architecture to
>
> 				      too

Yup.

>
>> + * perform the desired operations.  This function allows the architecture to
>> + * call SWIOTLB when the operations are possible.  This function needs to be
>
> s/This function/It/

Ok.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>> + * called before the SWIOTLB memory is used.
>> + */
>> +void __init swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(void)
>> +{
>> +	void *vaddr;
>> +	unsigned long bytes;
>> +
>> +	if (no_iotlb_memory || late_alloc)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start);
>> +	bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
>> +	swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(vaddr, bytes);
>> +	memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
>> +
>> +	vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
>> +	bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow);
>> +	swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(vaddr, bytes);
>> +	memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
>> +}
>> +
>>  int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose)
>>  {
>>  	void *v_overflow_buffer;
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-06 17:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-16 15:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/28] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154211.19244.76656.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 17:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/28] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154225.19244.96438.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-17 11:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/28] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154236.19244.7580.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 18:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <a1a6a6d7-3aac-3138-1e75-6160f0427a6b-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 20:06           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/28] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/28] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 12:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:01     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/28] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154319.19244.7863.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 12:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <a23be4fa-d7ef-4e7a-5b6b-73e120a5ca80-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 15:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/28] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154332.19244.55451.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 15:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 12:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-23 23:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/28] x86: Extend the early_memremap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154348.19244.11884.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 15:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154358.19244.6082.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 18:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154411.19244.99258.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 19:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/28] x86: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154430.19244.95519.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 20:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/28] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/28] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return defined EFI mem types Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 12:05   ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-23 17:27     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154508.19244.58580.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 10:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  6:55   ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/28] Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 22:58   ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-23 21:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/28] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/28] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-25 17:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 17:47     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/28] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:59   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 17:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-02-27 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/28] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/28] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154647.19244.18733.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-27 18:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <5f461d57-9232-1cb3-d4d9-9b8a39d00b12-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-01 11:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/28] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/28] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/28] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:04   ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:09   ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 20:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/28] x86: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:57   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01  9:25       ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27         ` Dave Young
2017-03-06 17:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  8:12           ` Dave Young
2017-02-28 10:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 15:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/28] x86: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154808.19244.475.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-01 17:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 16:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 17:42       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found] ` <20170216154158.19244.66630.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-18 18:12   ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:42     ` Rik van Riel
     [not found]       ` <1487698965.17158.8.camel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 17:53         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01  9:17 ` Dave Young
2017-03-01 17:51   ` Tom Lendacky

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