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From: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
To: jeffxu@chromium.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	 torvalds@linux-foundation.org, usama.anjum@collabora.com,
	corbet@lwn.net,  Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
	lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, jeffxu@google.com,
	 jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com,
	 linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, willy@infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,  deraadt@openbsd.org,
	surenb@google.com, merimus@google.com, rdunlap@infradead.org,
	 stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] mseal: Two fixes for madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) when sealed
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 20:37:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5svaztlptf4gs4sp6zyzycwjm2fnpd2xw3oirsls67sq7gq7wv@pwcktbixrzdo> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241017005105.3047458-2-jeffxu@chromium.org>

On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 12:51:04AM +0000, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> 
> Two fixes for madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) when sealed.
>

Please separate these fixes into two separate patches.

> For PROT_NONE mappings, the previous blocking of
> madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) is unnecessary. As PROT_NONE already prohibits
> memory access, madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) should be allowed to proceed in
> order to free the page.

I don't get it. Is there an actual use case for this?

> For file-backed, private, read-only memory mappings, we previously did
> not block the madvise(MADV_DONTNEED). This was based on
> the assumption that the memory's content, being file-backed, could be
> retrieved from the file if accessed again. However, this assumption
> failed to consider scenarios where a mapping is initially created as
> read-write, modified, and subsequently changed to read-only. The newly
> introduced VM_WASWRITE flag addresses this oversight.

We *do not* need this. It's sufficient to just block discard operations on read-only
private mappings. Sending a possible (fully untested) fix. If you like this approach
I can resend properly, or Andrew can pick it up, whatever floats people's boats.

----8<----

From dc5ec662dcb79156f4bdc1cba2a2575dce905ffa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 20:21:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mm/mseal: Disallow madvise discard on file-private sealed
 mappings

Doing an operation such as MADV_DONTNEED on a file-private mapping may
forcibly alter data by discarding CoW'd, anon pages and replacing them
with page cache pages fresh from the filesystem.

As such, this somewhat bypasses the mseal of a read-only mapping, and
should be disallowed.

Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8be7258aad44 ("mseal: add mseal syscall")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.11.y
---
 mm/mseal.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
index 28cd17d7aaf2..d053303c5542 100644
--- a/mm/mseal.c
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -36,10 +36,15 @@ static bool is_madv_discard(int behavior)
        return false;
 }
 
-static bool is_ro_anon(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+static bool is_ro_private(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-       /* check anonymous mapping. */
-       if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
+       /*
+        * If shared, allow discard operations - it shouldn't
+        * affect the underlying data. Discard on private VMAs may
+        * forcibly alter data by replacing CoW'd anonymous pages
+        * with ones fresh from the page cache.
+        */
+       if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
                return false;
 
        /*
@@ -61,7 +66,7 @@ bool can_modify_vma_madv(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int behavior)
        if (!is_madv_discard(behavior))
                return true;
 
-       if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma) && is_ro_anon(vma)))
+       if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma) && is_ro_private(vma)))
                return false;
 
        /* Allow by default. */
-- 
2.47.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-17 19:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-17  0:51 [PATCH v1 0/2] mseal: fixing madvise for file-backed mapping and PROT_NONE jeffxu
2024-10-17  0:51 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] mseal: Two fixes for madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) when sealed jeffxu
2024-10-17  8:32   ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-17 19:37   ` Pedro Falcato [this message]
2024-10-17 20:34     ` Jeff Xu
2024-10-17 20:49       ` Pedro Falcato
2024-10-17 20:57         ` Jeff Xu
2024-10-22 15:55           ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-22 22:54             ` Theo de Raadt
2024-10-23 18:33             ` Jeff Xu
2024-10-20  9:20   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-20  9:20   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-17  0:51 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] selftest/mseal: Add tests for madvise fixes jeffxu
2024-10-17  8:35   ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-17  8:38 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] mseal: fixing madvise for file-backed mapping and PROT_NONE Lorenzo Stoakes

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