From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>,
Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com,
baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
npache@redhat.com, ryan.roberts@arm.com, dev.jain@arm.com,
baohua@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
michael.roth@amd.com, vannapurve@google.com, ziy@nvidia.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
Fangrui Song <i@maskray.me>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: thp: Deny THP for guest_memfd and secretmem in file_thp_enabled()
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2026 17:45:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5eb7aae7-f642-43d2-810b-d7afd867d665@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEvNRgH6yfFtOK3E3__hCjkNTQr55y-_N=SpBBr0i9_q6E2_8g@mail.gmail.com>
On 2/11/26 16:38, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org> writes:
>
>> On 2/11/26 00:00, Ackerley Tng wrote:
>>> "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org> writes:
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems like on 5.15.199 there's a hugepage_vma_check(), which will return
>>> false since secretmem has vma->vm_ops defined [1], so secretmem VMAs are
>>> skipped.
>>
>> Are you sure? We check for CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS before that:
>>
>
> Ah... I was working on a reproducer then I realized 5.15 doesn't have
> MADV_COLLAPSE, then I tried to hack in an ioctl to trigger
> khugepaged. That turned out to be awkward but it got me to look at
> hugepage_vma_check(), and then I went down the rabbit hole to keep
> looking for the similar check function throughout the other stable
> kernels... and amongst all of that forgot that
> CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS was unset :(
>
> You're probably right about VM_EXEC.
>
> Here's the reproducer for 6.12, I put this in
> tools/testing/selftests/mm/memfd_secret.c and called repro() from
> main(). This time I enabled CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS :).
>
> void repro(void)
> {
> uint8_t *mem;
> int ret;
> int fd;
> int i;
>
> printf("%d triggering secretmem\n", __LINE__);
>
> fd = memfd_secret(0);
> if (fd < 0) {
> if (errno == ENOSYS)
> ksft_exit_skip("memfd_secret is not supported\n");
> else
> ksft_exit_fail_msg("memfd_secret failed: %s\n",
> strerror(errno));
> }
>
> if (ftruncate(fd, SZ_2M))
> ksft_exit_fail_msg("ftruncate failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
>
> #define ALIGNED_ADDRESS ((void*)0x400000000UL)
>
> mem = mmap(ALIGNED_ADDRESS, SZ_2M, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED
> | MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> if (mem != ALIGNED_ADDRESS)
> ksft_exit_fail_msg("Couldn't allocate memory\n");
>
> ret = madvise(mem, SZ_2M, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
> if (ret)
> ksft_exit_fail_msg("MADV_HUGEPAGE failed mem=%p ret=%d errno=%d\n",
> mem, ret, errno);
>
> #define READ_ONCE(x) (*(volatile typeof(x) *) &(x))
> for (i = 0; i < SZ_2M; i += getpagesize())
> READ_ONCE(mem[i]);
>
> ret = madvise(mem, SZ_2M, MADV_COLLAPSE);
> if (ret)
> ksft_exit_fail_msg("MADV_COLLAPSE failed ret=%d errno=%d\n", ret, errno);
>
> munmap(mem, SZ_2M);
> close(fd);
> }
>
> This reproducer gets us to madvise_collapse() ->
> hpage_collapse_scan_file() -> collapse_file(), and copy_mc_highpage()
> fails because copy_mc_to_kernel() returns 4096.
>
> memory_failure_queue() causes this to be printed on the console
>
> [ 1068.322578] Memory failure: 0x106d96f: recovery action for clean
> unevictable LRU page: Recovered
>
> No crash :) Is a crash the requirement for a backport to stable kernels?
I'd say being able to trigger that is sufficient. There is no real
memory failure :)
--
Cheers,
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-11 16:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-09 3:35 Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 10:24 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 10:41 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 13:06 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 18:22 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-09 19:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 20:13 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 21:31 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-10 23:00 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 0:58 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 2:01 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:29 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:16 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:35 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:44 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 1:59 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:28 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 14:50 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 15:38 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-02-12 22:19 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-13 5:02 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-13 9:06 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-21 4:37 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 1:51 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 23:37 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-10 17:51 ` kernel test robot
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