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Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/13] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME)
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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
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Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 17:11:58 -0800
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To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, kai.huang@intel.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>

On 12/7/18 3:53 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> The third problem is the real show-stopper, though: this scheme
> requires that the ciphertext go into predetermined physical
> addresses, which would be a giant mess.

There's a more fundamental problem than that.  The tweak fed into the
actual AES-XTS operation is determined by the firmware, programmed into
the memory controller, and is not visible to software.  So, not only
would you need to put stuff at a fixed physical address, the tweaks can
change from boot-to-boot, so whatever you did would only be good for one
boot.