From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
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Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:14:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E8A22.5080807@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKRDuELqGY1F-D4+MD+dMXSbiPGzf1hXb7Kp8ACBjpw9g@mail.gmail.com>
On 07/19/2016 09:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 2:21 AM, Christian Borntraeger
> <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
>> On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
>>> + bool
>>> + help
>>> + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear
>>> + mapping of the kernel text. This is used to verify that kernel
>>> + text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>>
>> I have trouble parsing this. (What does secondary linear mapping mean?)
>
> I likely need help clarifying this language...
>
>> So let me give an example below
>>
>>> +
>> [...]
>>> +/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */
>>> +static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
>>> + unsigned long n)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
>>> + unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
>>> +
>>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
>>> + return "<kernel text>";
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
>>> + /* Check against linear mapping as well. */
>>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow)),
>>> + (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh))))
>>> + return "<linear kernel text>";
>>> +#endif
>>> +
>>> + return NULL;
>>> +}
>>
>> s390 has an address space for user (primary address space from 0..4TB/8PB) and a separate
>> address space (home space from 0..4TB/8PB) for the kernel. In this home space the kernel
>> mapping is virtual containing the physical memory as well as vmalloc memory (creating aliases
>> into the physical one). The kernel text is mapped from _stext to _etext in this mapping.
>> So I assume this would qualify for HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING ?
>
> If I understand your example, yes. In the home space you have two
> addresses that reference the kernel image?
No, there is only one address that points to the kernel.
As we have no kernel ASLR yet, and the kernel mapping is
a 1:1 mapping from 0 to memory end and the kernel is only
from _stext to _etext. The vmalloc area contains modules
and vmalloc but not a 2nd kernel mapping.
But thanks for your example, now I understood. If we have only
one address
>>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
>>> + return "<kernel text>";
This is just enough.
So what about for the CONFIG text:
An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-19 20:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-15 21:44 [PATCH v3 00/11] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:00 ` [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 10:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger [this message]
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <5790711f.2350420a.b4287.2cc0SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-18 8:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
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