From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/3] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 17:33:28 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A6CCE8.5030600@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJCrNMuE9JgqsBeuL1UFyp-z+erWVPOK_FGT+vum7X5Wg@mail.gmail.com>
On 01/25/2016 02:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>> Thanks for doing this! It all looks pretty straightforward.
>>
>> On 01/25/2016 08:55 AM, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>> By default, page poisoning uses a poison value (0xaa) on free. If this
>>> is changed to 0, the page is not only sanitized but zeroing on alloc
>>> with __GFP_ZERO can be skipped as well. The tradeoff is that detecting
>>> corruption from the poisoning is harder to detect. This feature also
>>> cannot be used with hibernation since pages are not guaranteed to be
>>> zeroed after hibernation.
>>
>> Ugh, that's a good point about hibernation. I'm not sure how widely it
>> gets used but it does look pretty widely enabled in distribution kernels.
>>
>> Is this something that's fixable? It seems like we could have the
>> hibernation code run through and zero all the free lists. Or, we could
>> just disable the optimization at runtime when a hibernation is done.
>
> We can also make hibernation run-time disabled when poisoning is used
> (similar to how kASLR disables it).
>
I'll look into the approach kASLR uses to disable hibernation although
having the hibernation code zero the memory could be useful as well.
We can see if there are actual complaints.
>> Not that we _have_ to do any of this now, but if a runtime knob (like a
>> sysctl) could be fun too. I would be nice for folks to turn it on and
>> off if they wanted the added security of "real" poisoning vs. the
>> potential performance boost from this optimization.
>>
>>> +static inline bool should_zero(void)
>>> +{
>>> + return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) ||
>>> + !page_poisoning_enabled();
>>> +}
>>
>> I wonder if calling this "free_pages_prezeroed()" would make things a
>> bit more clear when we use it in prep_new_page().
>>
Yes that sounds much better
>>> static int prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags,
>>> int alloc_flags)
>>> {
>>> @@ -1401,7 +1407,7 @@ static int prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags,
>>> kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 1);
>>> kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);
>>>
>>> - if (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)
>>> + if (should_zero() && gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)
>>> for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
>>> clear_highpage(page + i);
>>
>> It's probably also worth pointing out that this can be a really nice
>> feature to have in virtual machines where memory is being deduplicated.
>> As it stands now, the free lists end up with gunk in them and tend not
>> to be easy to deduplicate. This patch would fix that.
Interesting, do you have any benchmarks I could test?
>
> Oh, good point!
>
> -Kees
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-26 1:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-25 16:55 [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/3] mm/debug-pagealloc.c: Split out page poisoning from debug page_alloc Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 6:26 ` Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 20:25 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/3] mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 6:39 ` Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 20:27 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/3] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 20:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2016-01-25 22:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-26 1:33 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2016-01-26 6:05 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages Sasha Levin
2016-01-26 20:34 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 9:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
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