From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 31/31] x86, pkeys: execute-only support
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 14:25:23 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <568EE5D3.1080006@sr71.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJx=EMnnGX4k8ZQSnsPV+4zQXGfC+3KF_qAWJVArt8M2Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 01/07/2016 01:02 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this
>> > facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it
>> > eventually.
> And the magic benefit here is that linker/loaders can switch to just
> PROT_EXEC without PROT_READ, and everything that doesn't support this
> protection will silently include PROT_READ, so no runtime detection by
> the loader is needed.
Yep, completely agree.
I'll update the description.
>> > The security provided by this approach is not comprehensive. The
> Perhaps specifically mention what it does provide, which would be
> protection against leaking executable memory contents, as generally
> done by attackers who are attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly.
Good point.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-07 22:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-07 0:01 [PATCH 00/31] x86: Memory Protection Keys (v8) Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 01/31] mm, gup: introduce concept of "foreign" get_user_pages() Dave Hansen
2016-01-13 19:00 ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-13 19:16 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 02/31] x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 03/31] x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 04/31] x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 05/31] x86, pkeys: define new CR4 bit Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 06/31] x86, pkeys: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s) Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 07/31] x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 08/31] x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 09/31] x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 10/31] x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits Dave Hansen
2016-01-08 19:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 11/31] x86, pkeys: pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 12/31] signals, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 13/31] x86, pkeys: fill in pkey field in siginfo Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 14/31] x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU Dave Hansen
2016-01-08 19:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 15/31] mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 16/31] x86, mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 17/31] x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 18/31] mm: add gup flag to indicate "foreign" mm access Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 19/31] x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error() Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 20/31] x86, pkeys: differentiate instruction fetches Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 21/31] x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 22/31] x86, pkeys: dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 23/31] x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 24/31] x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 25/31] mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 26/31] x86, pkeys: add arch_validate_pkey() Dave Hansen
2016-01-08 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 27/31] x86: separate out LDT init from context init Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 28/31] x86, fpu: allow setting of XSAVE state Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 29/31] x86, pkeys: allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register Dave Hansen
2016-01-08 19:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 30/31] x86, pkeys: create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags Dave Hansen
2016-01-08 19:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-01-07 0:01 ` [PATCH 31/31] x86, pkeys: execute-only support Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-07 22:25 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2016-01-07 21:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-07 22:13 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-07 22:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 19:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-01-29 18:16 [PATCH 00/31] x86: Memory Protection Keys (v9) Dave Hansen
2016-01-29 18:17 ` [PATCH 31/31] x86, pkeys: execute-only support Dave Hansen
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