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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "bsingharora@gmail.com" <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
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	"Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 27/39] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 22:08:17 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56095eac64e95b79ea04e84909d8ba0ab49d9246.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202210031347.6DBE61199@keescook>

Kees, sorry for the delayed response. There was so much feedback, I
missed responding to some.

On Mon, 2022-10-03 at 13:52 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:29:24PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> > From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > 
> > When a signal is handled normally the context is pushed to the
> > stack
> > before handling it. For shadow stacks, since the shadow stack only
> > track's
> > return addresses, there isn't any state that needs to be pushed.
> > However,
> > there are still a few things that need to be done. These things are
> > userspace visible and which will be kernel ABI for shadow stacks.
> > 
> > One is to make sure the restorer address is written to shadow
> > stack, since
> > the signal handler (if not changing ucontext) returns to the
> > restorer, and
> > the restorer calls sigreturn. So add the restorer on the shadow
> > stack
> > before handling the signal, so there is not a conflict when the
> > signal
> > handler returns to the restorer.
> > 
> > The other thing to do is to place some type of checkable token on
> > the
> > thread's shadow stack before handling the signal and check it
> > during
> > sigreturn. This is an extra layer of protection to hamper attackers
> > calling sigreturn manually as in SROP-like attacks.
> > 
> > For this token we can use the shadow stack data format defined
> > earlier.
> > Have the data pushed be the previous SSP. In the future the
> > sigreturn
> > might want to return back to a different stack. Storing the SSP
> > (instead
> > of a restore offset or something) allows for future functionality
> > that
> > may want to restore to a different stack.
> > 
> > So, when handling a signal push
> >  - the SSP pointing in the shadow stack data format
> >  - the restorer address below the restore token.
> > 
> > In sigreturn, verify SSP is stored in the data format and pop the
> > shadow
> > stack.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
> > Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > 
> > ---
> > 
> > v2:
> >  - Switch to new shstk signal format
> > 
> > v1:
> >  - Use xsave helpers.
> >  - Expand commit log.
> > 
> > Yu-cheng v27:
> >  - Eliminate saving shadow stack pointer to signal context.
> > 
> > Yu-cheng v25:
> >  - Update commit log/comments for the sc_ext struct.
> >  - Use restorer address already calculated.
> >  - Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.
> >  - Change X86_FEATURE_CET to X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.
> >  - Eliminate writing to MSR_IA32_U_CET for shadow stack.
> >  - Change wrmsrl() to wrmsrl_safe() and handle error.
> > 
> >  arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c |   1 +
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h  |   5 ++
> >  arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c     | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > ------
> >  arch/x86/kernel/signal.c    |  10 +++
> >  4 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
> > b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
> > index c9c3859322fa..88d71b9de616 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
> > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> >  #include <asm/sigframe.h>
> >  #include <asm/sighandling.h>
> >  #include <asm/smap.h>
> > +#include <asm/cet.h>
> >  
> >  static inline void reload_segments(struct sigcontext_32 *sc)
> >  {
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > index 924de99e0c61..8c6fab9f402a 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/types.h>
> >  
> >  struct task_struct;
> > +struct ksignal;
> >  
> >  struct thread_shstk {
> >  	u64	base;
> > @@ -22,6 +23,8 @@ int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct
> > *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
> >  void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
> >  int shstk_disable(void);
> >  void reset_thread_shstk(void);
> > +int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
> > +int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
> >  #else
> >  static inline long cet_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
> >  		      unsigned long features) { return -EINVAL; }
> > @@ -33,6 +36,8 @@ static inline int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct
> > task_struct *p,
> >  static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
> >  static inline int shstk_disable(void) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> >  static inline void reset_thread_shstk(void) {}
> > +static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig)
> > { return 0; }
> > +static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
> >  #endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
> >  
> >  #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> > index 8904aef487bf..04442134aadd 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> > @@ -227,41 +227,129 @@ static int get_shstk_data(unsigned long
> > *data, unsigned long __user *addr)
> >  }
> >  
> >  /*
> > - * Verify the user shadow stack has a valid token on it, and then
> > set
> > - * *new_ssp according to the token.
> > + * Create a restore token on shadow stack, and then push the user-
> > mode
> > + * function return address.
> >   */
> > -static int shstk_check_rstor_token(unsigned long *new_ssp)
> > +static int shstk_setup_rstor_token(unsigned long ret_addr,
> > unsigned long *new_ssp)
> 
> Oh, hrm. Prior patch defines shstk_check_rstor_token() and
> doesn't call it. This patch removes it. :P Can you please remove
> shstk_check_rstor_token() from the prior patch?

Yes, this function is not needed until the alt shadow stack stuff. It
got all mangled across earlier patches. I removed it all together now.
Thanks.

> 
> >  {
> > -	unsigned long token_addr;
> > -	unsigned long token;
> > +	unsigned long ssp, token_addr;
> > +	int err;
> > +
> > +	if (!ret_addr)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
> > +	if (!ssp)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	err = create_rstor_token(ssp, &token_addr);
> > +	if (err)
> > +		return err;
> > +
> > +	ssp = token_addr - sizeof(u64);
> > +	err = write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)ret_addr);
> > +
> > +	if (!err)
> > +		*new_ssp = ssp;
> > +
> > +	return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int shstk_push_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned long target_ssp = *ssp;
> > +
> > +	/* Token must be aligned */
> > +	if (!IS_ALIGNED(*ssp, 8))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> >  
> > -	token_addr = get_user_shstk_addr();
> > -	if (!token_addr)
> > +	if (!IS_ALIGNED(target_ssp, 8))
> >  		return -EINVAL;
> >  
> > -	if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)token_addr))
> > +	*ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
> > +	if (put_shstk_data((void *__user)*ssp, target_ssp))
> >  		return -EFAULT;
> >  
> > -	/* Is mode flag correct? */
> > -	if (!(token & BIT(0)))
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +static int shstk_pop_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned long token_addr;
> > +	int err;
> > +
> > +	err = get_shstk_data(&token_addr, (unsigned long __user
> > *)*ssp);
> > +	if (unlikely(err))
> > +		return err;
> > +
> > +	/* Restore SSP aligned? */
> > +	if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(token_addr, 8)))
> >  		return -EINVAL;
> 
> Why doesn't this always fail, given BIT(0) being set? I don't see it
> getting cleared until the end of this function.

Because it isn't a normal token, it was an address in the "data format"
that had bit 63 set. Then bit 63 was cleared, making it a normal
address.

> 
> >  
> > -	/* Is busy flag set? */
> > -	if (token & BIT(1))
> > +	/* SSP in userspace? */
> > +	if (unlikely(token_addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX))
> >  		return -EINVAL;
> 
> BIT(63) already got cleared by here (in get_shstk_data(), but yes,
> this is still a reasonable check.

Good point. I guess I can leave it. Thanks.

> 
> >  
> > -	/* Mask out flags */
> > -	token &= ~3UL;
> > +	*ssp = token_addr;
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-20 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 240+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-29 22:28 [PATCH v2 00/39] Shadowstacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30  3:41   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-09-30 13:33     ` Jonathan Corbet
2022-09-30 13:41       ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-03 16:56         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  2:16           ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-05  9:10           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05  9:25             ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-05  9:46               ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-03 19:35     ` John Hubbard
2022-10-03 19:39       ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04  2:13       ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-03 17:18   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 19:46     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  0:02   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 12:19   ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 16:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-10 16:51       ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-12 12:29       ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-12 15:59         ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-12 16:54           ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-13 21:28         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-13 22:15           ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-26 21:59           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 02/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 13:40   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 19:53     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 17:25   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 19:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 19:42   ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-03 19:50     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-12 20:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-13  0:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-13  9:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:26   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 16:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14 19:35     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05  0:55   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-14 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14 18:15     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14 19:44       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:40   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-15  9:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-17 18:57     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-17 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:48   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:05     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  4:05       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 14:18       ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04 16:13         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 07/39] x86/cet: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 14:01   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 18:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:04   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:33     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 22:51   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-03 23:09     ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-10-03 23:11     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  1:20   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 22:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  9:39   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05 22:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 14:17   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-05  1:31   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 11:16     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05 12:34       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:06   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30 15:16   ` Jann Horn
2022-10-06 16:10     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 16:26   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 21:36     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 21:54       ` Jann Horn
2022-10-03 22:14       ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-05  2:17   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 14:08     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-05 23:06       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 23:01     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 11:33   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14  9:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14  9:42   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 18:06     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:43   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 18:11   ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 18:51     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-03 22:28     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 23:17       ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:20         ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:25           ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:38             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  0:40               ` Nadav Amit
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 13/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:11   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 18:24   ` Peter Xu
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 14/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:47   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04  0:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:17   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 15/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:20   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 10:07   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:51     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 16/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:22   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:53   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-14 15:32   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 17/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:24   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:56   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04 16:15     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  1:56   ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-04 16:21     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14 15:52   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:56     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 18/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:30   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05  2:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 12:33       ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 13:32         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 13:40           ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 13:56             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 19/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  0:03   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04  0:32     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 20/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 21/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 22/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30 19:16   ` Dave Hansen
2022-09-30 20:30     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-30 20:37       ` Dave Hansen
2022-09-30 23:00     ` Jann Horn
2022-09-30 23:02       ` Jann Horn
2022-09-30 23:04       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:39   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:49     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04  4:21       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 23/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for CET enabling Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:01   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:51     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-06 18:50       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-10 10:56   ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 16:28     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-12 12:18       ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-12 17:30         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 24/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:43   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:04     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04  4:04       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 16:25         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 10:17       ` David Laight
2022-10-04 19:32         ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05 13:32           ` David Laight
2022-10-20 21:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-20 22:54       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 25/39] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 10:36   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-03 16:57     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 20:29   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:09     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 26/39] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 20:44   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:13     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  2:43   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 22:47     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 22:58       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-20 21:51         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 27/39] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 20:52   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 22:08     ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2022-10-20 22:57       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 28/39] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:23   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:56     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 23:16       ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-10 11:13   ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 14:19     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 29/39] x86/cet/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04  4:37       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-06  0:38         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-06  3:11           ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  8:30     ` Mike Rapoport
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 30/39] x86: Expose thread features status in /proc/$PID/arch_status Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:37   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:45     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04  4:18       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 31/39] x86/cet/shstk: Wire in CET interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:41   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 32/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:56   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 33/39] x86/cpufeatures: Limit shadow stack to Intel CPUs Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:57   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  0:09     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04  4:54       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 15:47         ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-04 19:43           ` John Allen
2022-10-04 20:34             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 20:50               ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-04 21:17                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-10-04 23:24                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-03 17:39                     ` John Allen
2022-10-20 21:22                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  8:36       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/CLEANUP v2 34/39] x86: Separate out x86_regset for 32 and 64 bit Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/CLEANUP v2 35/39] x86: Improve formatting of user_regset arrays Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:07   ` Chang S. Bae
2022-10-04 23:05     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 37/39] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:59   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  8:44     ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-04 19:24       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 38/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add ARCH_CET_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-04  0:00   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 39/39] x86: Add alt shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:21   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 16:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 17:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 18:04         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 00/39] Shadowstacks for userspace Kees Cook
2022-10-03 17:25   ` Jann Horn
2022-10-04  5:01     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  9:57       ` David Laight
2022-10-04 19:28         ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 18:33   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  3:59     ` Kees Cook

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