From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: prarit@redhat.com, mstevens@fedoraproject.org,
manfred@colorfullife.com, esandeen@redhat.com, wagi@monom.org,
hughd@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
eparis@redhat.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dave@stgolabs.net,
nyc@holomorphy.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] ipc: Use private shmem or hugetlbfs inodes for shm segments.
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 08:38:22 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55B231BE.6090304@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150724001157.GF3902@dastard>
On 07/23/2015 08:11 PM, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 12:28:33PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> The shm implementation internally uses shmem or hugetlbfs inodes
>> for shm segments. As these inodes are never directly exposed to
>> userspace and only accessed through the shm operations which are
>> already hooked by security modules, mark the inodes with the
>> S_PRIVATE flag so that inode security initialization and permission
>> checking is skipped.
>>
>> This was motivated by the following lockdep warning:
>> ===================================================
>> [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
>> 4.2.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc24.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G W
>> -------------------------------------------------------
>> httpd/1597 is trying to acquire lock:
>> (&ids->rwsem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff81385354>] shm_close+0x34/0x130
>> (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff81386bbb>] SyS_shmdt+0x4b/0x180
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff81217baa>] __might_fault+0x7a/0xa0
>> [<ffffffff81284a1e>] filldir+0x9e/0x130
>> [<ffffffffa019bb08>] xfs_dir2_block_getdents.isra.12+0x198/0x1c0 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa019c5b4>] xfs_readdir+0x1b4/0x330 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa019f38b>] xfs_file_readdir+0x2b/0x30 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffff812847e7>] iterate_dir+0x97/0x130
>> [<ffffffff81284d21>] SyS_getdents+0x91/0x120
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff81101e97>] down_read_nested+0x57/0xa0
>> [<ffffffffa01b0e57>] xfs_ilock+0x167/0x350 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa01b10b8>] xfs_ilock_attr_map_shared+0x38/0x50 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa014799d>] xfs_attr_get+0xbd/0x190 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa01c17ad>] xfs_xattr_get+0x3d/0x70 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffff8129962f>] generic_getxattr+0x4f/0x70
>> [<ffffffff8139ba52>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x162/0x670
>> [<ffffffff8139cf69>] sb_finish_set_opts+0xd9/0x230
>> [<ffffffff8139d66c>] selinux_set_mnt_opts+0x35c/0x660
>> [<ffffffff8139ff97>] superblock_doinit+0x77/0xf0
>> [<ffffffff813a0020>] delayed_superblock_init+0x10/0x20
>> [<ffffffff81272d23>] iterate_supers+0xb3/0x110
>> [<ffffffff813a4e5f>] selinux_complete_init+0x2f/0x40
>> [<ffffffff813b47a3>] security_load_policy+0x103/0x600
>> [<ffffffff813a6901>] sel_write_load+0xc1/0x750
>> [<ffffffff8126e817>] __vfs_write+0x37/0x100
>> [<ffffffff8126f229>] vfs_write+0xa9/0x1a0
>> [<ffffffff8126ff48>] SyS_write+0x58/0xd0
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff8186de8f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x7f/0x3e0
>> [<ffffffff8139b9a9>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0xb9/0x670
>> [<ffffffff8139bf7c>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x1c/0x20
>> [<ffffffff813955f6>] security_d_instantiate+0x36/0x60
>> [<ffffffff81287c34>] d_instantiate+0x54/0x70
>> [<ffffffff8120111c>] __shmem_file_setup+0xdc/0x240
>> [<ffffffff81201290>] shmem_file_setup+0x10/0x20
>> [<ffffffff813856e0>] newseg+0x290/0x3a0
>> [<ffffffff8137e278>] ipcget+0x208/0x2d0
>> [<ffffffff81386074>] SyS_shmget+0x54/0x70
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>> [<ffffffff81108df8>] __lock_acquire+0x1a78/0x1d00
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff8186efba>] down_write+0x5a/0xc0
>> [<ffffffff81385354>] shm_close+0x34/0x130
>> [<ffffffff812203a5>] remove_vma+0x45/0x80
>> [<ffffffff81222a30>] do_munmap+0x2b0/0x460
>> [<ffffffff81386c25>] SyS_shmdt+0xb5/0x180
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>
> That's a completely screwed up stack trace. There are *4* syscall
> entry points with 4 separate, unrelated syscall chains on that
> stack trace, all starting at the same address. How is this a valid
> stack trace and not a lockdep bug of some kind?
Sorry, I mangled it when I tried to reformat it from Morten Steven's
original report. Fixed in v2.
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-24 12:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-23 16:28 Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 21:59 ` Paul Moore
2015-07-24 0:11 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-24 12:38 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
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