From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: protect suid binaries against rowhammer with copy-on-read mappings
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 14:41:00 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5509644C.40502@yandex-team.ru> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150318095702.GA2479@node.dhcp.inet.fi>
On 18.03.2015 12:57, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 11:30:40AM +0300, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
>> From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
>>
>> Each user gets private copy of the code thus nobody will be able to exploit
>> pages in the page cache. This works for statically-linked binaries. Shared
>> libraries are still vulnerable, but setting suid bit will protect them too.
>
> Hm. Do we have suid/sgid semantic defiend for non-executables?
>
> To me we should do this for all file private mappings of the suid process
> or don't do it at all.
Yeah, this patch doesn't provide full protection.
That's just a proof-of-concept.
>
> And what about forked suid process which dropped privilages. We still have
> code pages shared.
User can get access to that private copy later but new suid
applications will get their own copy at exec.
Original page-cache pages are never exposed in pte.
>
> I don't think it worth it. The only right way to fix the problem is ECC
> memory.
>
ECC seems good protection until somebody figure out how to break it too.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-03-18 11:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-03-18 8:30 Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 9:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-03-18 11:41 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov [this message]
2015-03-19 13:04 ` Vlastimil Babka
2015-03-19 13:24 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 14:11 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-18 15:08 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-18 15:45 ` Dave Hansen
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