From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com,
vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com,
peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com,
rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com,
bp@alien8.de, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 23/29] KVM: x86: Implement gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level
Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 22:35:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4e89479a-e170-403a-b2eb-ce7b895e55a3@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240329225835.400662-24-michael.roth@amd.com>
On 3/29/24 23:58, Michael Roth wrote:
> In the case of SEV-SNP, whether or not a 2MB page can be mapped via a
> 2MB mapping in the guest's nested page table depends on whether or not
> any subpages within the range have already been initialized as private
> in the RMP table. The existing mixed-attribute tracking in KVM is
> insufficient here, for instance:
>
> - gmem allocates 2MB page
> - guest issues PVALIDATE on 2MB page
> - guest later converts a subpage to shared
> - SNP host code issues PSMASH to split 2MB RMP mapping to 4K
> - KVM MMU splits NPT mapping to 4K
> - guest later converts that shared page back to private
>
> At this point there are no mixed attributes, and KVM would normally
> allow for 2MB NPT mappings again, but this is actually not allowed
> because the RMP table mappings are 4K and cannot be promoted on the
> hypervisor side, so the NPT mappings must still be limited to 4K to
> match this.
>
> Implement a kvm_x86_ops.gmem_validate_fault() hook for SEV that checks
> for this condition and adjusts the mapping level accordingly.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 7 +++++++
> 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 87d621d013a4..31f6f4786503 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -4443,3 +4443,35 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end)
> pfn += use_2m_update ? PTRS_PER_PMD : 1;
> }
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * Re-check whether an #NPF for a private/gmem page can still be serviced, and
> + * adjust maximum mapping level if needed.
> + */
> +int sev_gmem_validate_fault(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, bool is_private,
> + u8 *max_level)
> +{
> + int level, rc;
> + bool assigned;
> +
> + if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &assigned, &level);
> + if (rc) {
> + pr_err_ratelimited("SEV: RMP entry not found: GFN %llx PFN %llx level %d error %d\n",
> + gfn, pfn, level, rc);
> + return -ENOENT;
> + }
> +
> + if (!assigned) {
> + pr_err_ratelimited("SEV: RMP entry is not assigned: GFN %llx PFN %llx level %d\n",
> + gfn, pfn, level);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (level < *max_level)
> + *max_level = level;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index b456906f2670..298b4ce77a5f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -5081,6 +5081,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>
> .gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare,
> .gmem_invalidate = sev_gmem_invalidate,
> + .gmem_validate_fault = sev_gmem_validate_fault,
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 3f1f6d3d3ade..746f819a6de4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -732,6 +732,8 @@ void sev_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
> void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
> +int sev_gmem_validate_fault(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, bool is_private,
> + u8 *max_level);
> #else
> static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {
> return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> @@ -753,6 +755,11 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, in
> return 0;
> }
> static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) {}
> +static inline int sev_gmem_validate_fault(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn,
> + bool is_private, u8 *max_level)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
>
> #endif
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-30 21:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-29 22:58 [PATCH v12 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 01/29] [TEMP] x86/kvm/Kconfig: Have KVM_AMD_SEV select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 02/29] [TEMP] x86/cc: Add cc_platform_set/_clear() helpers Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 03/29] [TEMP] x86/CPU/AMD: Track SNP host status with cc_platform_*() Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 04/29] [TEMP] fixup! KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 05/29] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2024-03-30 19:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 06/29] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 07/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 08/29] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 09/29] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-03-30 19:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 10/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 11/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
[not found] ` <8c3685a6-833c-4b3c-83f4-c0bd78bba36e@redhat.com>
2024-04-01 22:22 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-02 22:58 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-04-03 12:51 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-03 15:37 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 12/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
[not found] ` <40382494-7253-442b-91a8-e80c38fb4f2c@redhat.com>
2024-04-01 23:17 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-03 12:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 13/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 14/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 15/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 16/29] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 17/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-03-30 20:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 18/29] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 11:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 14:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 17:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 20:57 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 19/29] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 20/29] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 21/29] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 22/29] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 19:57 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 23/29] KVM: x86: Implement gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:35 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 24/29] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 25/29] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 26/29] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-04-10 22:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 27/29] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-04-10 22:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 28/29] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION commands Michael Roth
2024-04-10 22:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 29/29] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-04-11 13:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-30 21:44 ` [PATCH v12 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
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