From: Oren Laadan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>
To: Mike Waychison <mikew@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
mpm@selenic.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
xemul@openvz.org
Subject: Re: How much of a mess does OpenVZ make? ;) Was: What can OpenVZ do?
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 15:04:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <49C145A1.3000506@cs.columbia.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <49C1435B.1090809@google.com>
Mike Waychison wrote:
> Oren Laadan wrote:
>>
>> Mike Waychison wrote:
>>> Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 12 Mar 2009, Sukadev Bhattiprolu wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Ying Han [yinghan@google.com] wrote:
>>>>> | Hi Serge:
>>>>> | I made a patch based on Oren's tree recently which implement a new
>>>>> | syscall clone_with_pid. I tested with checkpoint/restart process
>>>>> tree
>>>>> | and it works as expected.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, I think we had a version of clone() with pid a while ago.
>>>> Are people _at_all_ thinking about security?
>>>>
>>>> Obviously not.
>>>>
>>>> There's no way we can do anything like this. Sure, it's trivial to
>>>> do inside the kernel. But it also sounds like a _wonderful_ attack
>>>> vector against badly written user-land software that sends signals
>>>> and has small races.
>>> I'm not really sure how this is different than a malicious app going
>>> off and spawning thousands of threads in an attempt to hit a target
>>> pid from a security pov. Sure, it makes it easier, but it's not like
>>> there is anything in place to close the attack vector.
>>>
>>>> Quite frankly, from having followed the discussion(s) over the last
>>>> few weeks about checkpoint/restart in various forms, my reaction to
>>>> just about _all_ of this is that people pushing this are pretty damn
>>>> borderline.
>>>> I think you guys are working on all the wrong problems.
>>>> Let's face it, we're not going to _ever_ checkpoint any kind of
>>>> general case process. Just TCP makes that fundamentally impossible
>>>> in the general case, and there are lots and lots of other cases too
>>>> (just something as totally _trivial_ as all the files in the
>>>> filesystem that don't get rolled back).
>>> In some instances such as ours, TCP is probably the easiest thing to
>>> migrate. In an rpc-based cluster application, TCP is nothing more
>>> than an RPC channel and applications already have to handle RPC
>>> channel failure and re-establishment.
>>>
>>> I agree that this is not the 'general case' as you mention above
>>> however. This is the bit that sorta bothers me with the way the
>>> implementation has been going so far on this list. The
>>> implementation that folks are building on top of Oren's patchset
>>> tries to be everything to everybody. For our purposes, we need to
>>> have the flexibility of choosing *how* we checkpoint. The line seems
>>> to be arbitrarily drawn at the kernel being responsible for
>>> checkpointing and restoring all resources associated with a task, and
>>> leaving userland with nothing more than transporting filesystem
>>> bits. This approach isn't flexible enough: Consider the case where
>>> we want to stub out most of the TCP file descriptors with
>>> ECONNRESETed sockets because we know that they are RPC sockets and
>>> can re-establish themselves, but we want to use some other mechanism
>>> for TCP sockets we don't know much about. The current monolithic
>>> approach has zero flexibility for doing anything like this, and I
>>> figure out how we could even fit anything like this in.
>>
>> The flexibility exists, but wasn't spelled out, so here it is:
>>
>> 1) Similar to madvice(), I envision a cradvice() that could tell the c/r
>> something about specific resources, e.g.:
>> * cradvice(CR_ADV_MEM, ptr, len) -> don't save that memory, it's
>> scratch
>> * cradvice(CR_ADV_SOCK, fd, CR_ADV_SOCK_RESET) -> reset connection
>> on restart
>> etc .. (nevermind the exact interface right now)
>>
>> 2) Tasks can ask to be notified (e.g. register a signal) when a
>> checkpoint
>> or a restart complete successfully. At that time they can do their
>> private
>> house-keeping if they know better.
>>
>> 3) If restoring some resource is significantly easier in user space
>> (e.g. a
>> file-descriptor of some special device which user space knows how to
>> re-initialize), then the restarting task can prepare it ahead of time,
>> and, call:
>> * cradvice(CR_ADV_USERFD, fd, 0) -> use the fd in place instead of
>> trying
>> to restore it yourself.
>
> This would be called by the embryo process (mktree.c?) before calling
> sys_restart?
Yes.
>
>>
>> Method #3 is what I used in Zap to implement distributed checkpoints,
>> where
>> it is so much easier to recreate all network connections in user space
>> then
>> putting that logic into the kernel.
>>
>> Now, on the other hand, doing the c/r from userland is much less flexible
>> than in the kernel (e.g. epollfd, futex state and much more) and requires
>> exposing tremendous amount of in-kernel data to user space. And we all
>> know
>> than exposing internals is always a one-way ticket :(
>>
>> [...]
>>
>> Oren.
>>
>>
>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-03-18 19:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 121+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-01-27 17:07 [RFC v13][PATCH 00/14] Kernel based checkpoint/restart Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:07 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 01/14] Create syscalls: sys_checkpoint, sys_restart Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 02/14] Checkpoint/restart: initial documentation Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 03/14] Make file_pos_read/write() public Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 04/14] General infrastructure for checkpoint restart Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 05/14] x86 support for checkpoint/restart Oren Laadan
2009-02-24 7:47 ` Nathan Lynch
2009-02-24 16:06 ` Dave Hansen
2009-03-18 7:21 ` Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 06/14] Dump memory address space Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 07/14] Restore " Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 08/14] Infrastructure for shared objects Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 09/14] Dump open file descriptors Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 10/14] Restore open file descriprtors Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 11/14] External checkpoint of a task other than ourself Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 12/14] Track in-kernel when we expect checkpoint/restart to work Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 13/14] Checkpoint multiple processes Oren Laadan
2009-01-27 17:08 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 14/14] Restart " Oren Laadan
2009-02-10 17:05 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 00/14] Kernel based checkpoint/restart Dave Hansen
2009-02-11 22:14 ` Andrew Morton
2009-02-12 9:17 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-12 18:11 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-12 20:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-02-13 10:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-12 18:11 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-12 19:30 ` Matt Mackall
2009-02-12 19:42 ` Andrew Morton
2009-02-12 21:51 ` What can OpenVZ do? Dave Hansen
2009-02-12 22:10 ` Andrew Morton
2009-02-12 23:04 ` How much of a mess does OpenVZ make? ;) Was: " Dave Hansen
2009-02-26 15:57 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-10 21:53 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-10 23:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-11 8:26 ` Cedric Le Goater
2009-03-12 14:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-12 21:01 ` Greg Kurz
2009-03-12 21:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-13 4:29 ` Ying Han
2009-03-13 5:34 ` Sukadev Bhattiprolu
2009-03-13 6:19 ` Ying Han
2009-03-13 17:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-03-13 19:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-13 19:35 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-13 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-03-13 21:51 ` Dave Hansen
2009-03-13 22:15 ` Oren Laadan
2009-03-14 0:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-03-14 8:12 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-03-16 22:33 ` Kevin Fox
2009-03-19 21:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-03-14 0:20 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-14 8:25 ` Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <20090314082532.GB16436-X9Un+BFzKDI@public.gmane.org>
2009-03-14 17:11 ` Joseph Ruscio
2009-03-16 6:01 ` Oren Laadan
2009-03-13 20:48 ` Mike Waychison
2009-03-13 22:35 ` Oren Laadan
2009-03-18 18:54 ` Mike Waychison
2009-03-18 19:04 ` Oren Laadan [this message]
2009-03-13 15:27 ` Cedric Le Goater
2009-03-13 17:11 ` Greg Kurz
2009-03-13 17:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-13 15:47 ` Cedric Le Goater
2009-03-13 16:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-13 16:53 ` Cedric Le Goater
2009-02-26 16:27 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-26 17:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-26 18:30 ` Greg Kurz
2009-02-26 22:17 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-27 9:19 ` Greg Kurz
2009-02-27 10:53 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-27 14:33 ` Cedric Le Goater
2009-02-27 9:36 ` Cedric Le Goater
2009-02-26 22:31 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-27 9:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-27 9:19 ` Andrew Morton
2009-02-27 10:57 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-27 9:22 ` Andrew Morton
2009-02-27 10:59 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-27 16:14 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-27 21:57 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-27 21:54 ` Dave Hansen
2009-03-01 1:33 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-01 20:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-01 20:56 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-01 22:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-03 16:17 ` Cedric Le Goater
2009-03-03 18:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-02-13 10:53 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-16 20:51 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-17 22:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-17 22:30 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-18 0:32 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-18 0:40 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-18 5:11 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-18 18:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-18 21:27 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-18 23:15 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-19 19:06 ` Banning checkpoint (was: Re: What can OpenVZ do?) Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-19 19:11 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-24 4:47 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-24 5:11 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-24 15:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-02-24 20:09 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-12 22:17 ` What can OpenVZ do? Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-13 10:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-13 11:32 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-02-13 11:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-13 22:28 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-14 0:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-03-14 0:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-02-12 22:57 ` [RFC v13][PATCH 00/14] Kernel based checkpoint/restart Dave Hansen
2009-02-12 23:05 ` Matt Mackall
2009-02-12 23:13 ` Dave Hansen
2009-02-13 23:28 ` Andrew Morton
2009-02-14 23:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-14 23:31 ` Andrew Morton
2009-02-14 23:50 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-16 17:37 ` Dave Hansen
2009-03-13 2:45 ` Oren Laadan
2009-03-13 3:57 ` Oren Laadan
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