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From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
To: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: jglisse@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, mhocko@kernel.org,
	labbott@redhat.com, hch@infradead.org, willy@infradead.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 14:42:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <48fde114-d063-cfbf-e1b6-262411fcd963@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801311758340.21272@nuc-kabylake>



On 01/02/18 02:00, Christopher Lameter wrote:
> On Tue, 30 Jan 2018, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> 
>> @@ -1769,6 +1774,9 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
>>
>>  	kmemleak_vmalloc(area, size, gfp_mask);
>>
>> +	for (page_counter = 0; page_counter < area->nr_pages; page_counter++)
>> +		area->pages[page_counter]->area = area;
>> +
>>  	return addr;
> 
> Well this introduces significant overhead for large sized allocation. Does
> this not matter because the areas are small?

Relatively significant?
I do not object to your comment, but in practice i see that:

- vmalloc is used relatively little
- allocations do not seem to be huge
- there seem to be way larger overheads in the handling of virtual pages
  (see my proposal for the LFS/m summit, about collapsing struct
   vm_struct and struct vmap_area)


> Would it not be better to use compound page allocations here?
> page_head(whatever) gets you the head page where you can store all sorts
> of information about the chunk of memory.

Can you please point me to this function/macro? I don't seem to be able
to find it, at least not in 4.15

During hardened user copy permission check, I need to confirm if the
memory range that would be exposed to userspace is a legitimate
sub-range of a pmalloc allocation.


So, I start with the pair (address, size) and I must end up to something
I can compare it against.
The idea here is to pass through struct_page and then the related
vm_struct/vmap_area, which already has the information about the
specific chunk of virtual memory.

I cannot comment on your proposal because I do not know where to find
the reference you made, or maybe I do not understand what you mean :-(

--
igor

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-01 12:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-30 15:14 [RFC PATCH v12 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-01  0:00   ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-01 12:42     ` Igor Stoppa [this message]
2018-02-01 21:11       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-02 16:01         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02 18:43       ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-03 16:13         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-05 15:33           ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-09 11:34             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-06 12:37   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-09 13:45     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02  5:41   ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-02  5:53   ` kbuild test robot
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-01-30 17:08   ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-02-02 15:56     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-10  3:37       ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-12 15:28         ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-30 15:14 ` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02  6:14   ` kbuild test robot
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-02-12 16:52 [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-11  3:19 [RFC PATCH v15 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-11  3:19 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-11 21:16   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-12 16:24     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 19:53       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 20:54         ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-21 12:01           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22 14:20             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-04 16:47 [RFC PATCH v14 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-04 16:47 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:42 [RFC PATCH v13 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:42 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa

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