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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 13/18] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2025 17:28:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <48ed62b1-cceb-4bce-923c-25c11dbccc37@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250815085512.2182322-14-kevin.brodsky@arm.com>

On 15.08.25 10:55, Kevin Brodsky wrote:

Just wondering, should the patch subject be:

"mm: protect page tables with privileged pkey" ?

At least patch #2 tells me that set_memory_pkey() will set the 
protection key, and the function is called "kpkeys_protect_pgtable_memory"?

Just trying to connect the dots here :)

> If CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is enabled, map allocated page
> table pages using a privileged pkey (KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES), so that
> page tables can only be written under guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables).
> 
> This patch is a no-op if CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is disabled
> (default).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
> ---
>   include/linux/mm.h | 4 ++++
>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index d9371d992033..4880cb7a4cb9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
>   #include <linux/slab.h>
>   #include <linux/cacheinfo.h>
>   #include <linux/rcuwait.h>
> +#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
>   
>   struct mempolicy;
>   struct anon_vma;
> @@ -2979,6 +2980,8 @@ static inline bool __pagetable_ctor(struct ptdesc *ptdesc)
>   
>   	__folio_set_pgtable(folio);
>   	lruvec_stat_add_folio(folio, NR_PAGETABLE);
> +	if (kpkeys_protect_pgtable_memory(folio))
> +		return false;
>   	return true;
>   }
>   
> @@ -2989,6 +2992,7 @@ static inline void pagetable_dtor(struct ptdesc *ptdesc)
>   	ptlock_free(ptdesc);
>   	__folio_clear_pgtable(folio);
>   	lruvec_stat_sub_folio(folio, NR_PAGETABLE);
> +	kpkeys_unprotect_pgtable_memory(folio);

This is all rather nasty. Not your fault.

In the near future page tables will not be folios, and the whole 
ptdesc_folio() conversion will not make any sense.

Likely you should make kpkeys_protect_pgtable_memory() etc. consume an 
address range, or a page range right from the start.

-- 
Cheers

David / dhildenb



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-01 15:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-15  8:54 [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/18] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/18] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/18] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/18] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/18] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/18] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/18] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/18] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-11-28 16:44   ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-12-01  9:19     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/18] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/18] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 16:37   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-18 16:02     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-18 17:01       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-19  9:35         ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-10-01 15:28   ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2025-10-01 17:22     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/18] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/18] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/18] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/18] arm64: mm: Batch kpkeys level switches Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:01   ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:18     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-21  7:23       ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-21 17:29 ` Yang Shi
2025-08-25  7:31   ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-26 19:18     ` Yang Shi
2025-08-27 16:09       ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-29 22:31         ` Yang Shi
2025-09-18 14:15     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 14:57       ` Will Deacon
2025-10-01 12:22         ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 17:31       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-01 12:41         ` Kevin Brodsky

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