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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 16:46:15 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <409ec9f1-896d-a9f0-0e4c-4d102cbf86cf@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170222185215.atbntnyw7252kkbk@pd.tnic>

On 2/22/2017 12:52 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:45:35AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more
>> memory pages.
>
> "This will be useful when we, ...., for example."

Yup, will expand on the "why".

>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h |    3 ++
>>  arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c            |   66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  2 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
>> index 872877d..33ae60a 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
>> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>>   * Executability : eXeutable, NoteXecutable
>>   * Read/Write    : ReadOnly, ReadWrite
>>   * Presence      : NotPresent
>> + * Encryption    : Encrypted, Decrypted
>>   *
>>   * Within a category, the attributes are mutually exclusive.
>>   *
>> @@ -47,6 +48,8 @@
>>  int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
>>  int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
>>  int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
>> +int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
>> +int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
>>
>>  int set_memory_array_uc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
>>  int set_memory_array_wc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
>> index 91c5c63..9710f5c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
>> @@ -1742,6 +1742,72 @@ int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
>>  					__pgprot(0), 1, 0, NULL);
>>  }
>>
>> +static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>> +{
>> +	struct cpa_data cpa;
>> +	unsigned long start;
>> +	int ret;
>> +
>> +	/* Nothing to do if the _PAGE_ENC attribute is zero */
>> +	if (_PAGE_ENC == 0)
>
> Why not:
>
> 	if (!sme_active())
>
> ?

Yup, it would be more clear.

>
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	/* Save original start address since it will be modified */
>
> That's obvious - it is a small-enough function to fit on the screen. No
> need for the comment.

Ok.

>
>> +	start = addr;
>> +
>> +	memset(&cpa, 0, sizeof(cpa));
>> +	cpa.vaddr = &addr;
>> +	cpa.numpages = numpages;
>> +	cpa.mask_set = enc ? __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC) : __pgprot(0);
>> +	cpa.mask_clr = enc ? __pgprot(0) : __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC);
>> +	cpa.pgd = init_mm.pgd;
>> +
>> +	/* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
>> +	if (WARN_ONCE(*cpa.vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK,
>> +		      "misaligned address: %#lx\n", *cpa.vaddr))
>
> Use addr here so that you don't have to deref. gcc is probably smart
> enough but the code should look more readable this way too.
>

Ok.

>> +		*cpa.vaddr &= PAGE_MASK;
>
> I know, you must use cpa.vaddr here but if you move that alignment check
> over the cpa assignment, you can use addr solely.

Ok.

>
>> +
>> +	/* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */
>> +	kmap_flush_unused();
>> +	vm_unmap_aliases();
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Before changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush caches.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
>> +		cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 1);
>> +	else
>> +		cpa_flush_all(1);
>
> I guess we don't really need the distinction since a SME CPU most
> definitely implies CLFLUSH support but ok, let's be careful.
>
>> +
>> +	ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs
>> +	 * again in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need
>> +	 * to flush caches again).  We could just use cpa_flush_all(), but
>> +	 * in case TLB flushing gets optimized in the cpa_flush_range()
>> +	 * path use the same logic as above.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
>> +		cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 0);
>> +	else
>> +		cpa_flush_all(0);
>> +
>> +	return ret;
>> +}
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-02-28 22:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-16 15:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/28] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154211.19244.76656.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 17:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/28] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154225.19244.96438.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-17 11:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/28] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154236.19244.7580.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 18:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <a1a6a6d7-3aac-3138-1e75-6160f0427a6b-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 20:06           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/28] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/28] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 12:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:01     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/28] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154319.19244.7863.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 12:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <a23be4fa-d7ef-4e7a-5b6b-73e120a5ca80-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 15:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/28] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154332.19244.55451.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 15:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 12:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-23 23:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/28] x86: Extend the early_memremap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154348.19244.11884.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 15:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154358.19244.6082.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 18:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154411.19244.99258.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 19:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/28] x86: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154430.19244.95519.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-20 20:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/28] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/28] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return defined EFI mem types Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 12:05   ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-23 17:27     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154508.19244.58580.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 10:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  6:55   ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/28] Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 22:58   ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-23 21:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:46     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/28] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/28] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-25 17:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 17:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/28] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:59   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 17:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-02-27 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/28] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/28] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154647.19244.18733.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-27 18:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <5f461d57-9232-1cb3-d4d9-9b8a39d00b12-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-01 11:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/28] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/28] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/28] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:04   ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:09   ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 20:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/28] x86: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:57   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01  9:25       ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27         ` Dave Young
2017-03-06 17:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  8:12           ` Dave Young
2017-02-28 10:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 15:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/28] x86: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170216154808.19244.475.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-01 17:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 16:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 17:42       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found] ` <20170216154158.19244.66630.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-18 18:12   ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:42     ` Rik van Riel
     [not found]       ` <1487698965.17158.8.camel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-21 17:53         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01  9:17 ` Dave Young
2017-03-01 17:51   ` Tom Lendacky

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