From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C9E0C433FE for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2022 22:19:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 6540F6B0075; Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:19:56 -0500 (EST) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 603836B007B; Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:19:56 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 4CAFE6B007D; Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:19:56 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0073.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.73]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CB616B0075 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:19:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpin28.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay04.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0322598C3E for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2022 22:19:56 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 79131917550.28.B61D8D5 Received: from mga14.intel.com (mga14.intel.com [192.55.52.115]) by imf14.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8BA110000F for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2022 22:19:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1644617995; x=1676153995; h=message-id:date:mime-version:to:references:from:subject: in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=QhwemLJz6XJr4WABSGeGJItc6/s04gnX8fKaV4emL8o=; b=SebITLlqsbeO16aQx54AUxmvuuSjy68f1/3SiKPj7QfkEwM9tKlmTIo8 JQ+Izvn9HSlEJU4gt1fJAwIxzvfm1iiF67llHgt+yr8sYtuE4PN50aTfu r9q/25lOh1Ehv64zCqOA2qJSccuF8dWCE7eIzdVN0S5lqskRjK28lY5SW lhENoBJX8oSm8gdMZuXGJOzKBCyZJES2zp3bJCCPStY8zWcPswEI7302W 0rnXwuXZXPBANdLNmXnvjNhk/EfnW3ExqIiKALI8f/uOVuBm0gBi30UHL MElQKnxgTESziUV4XAKPx7XCApvrxf/wkZwZ3eo+WcxlGmZPElZZpWuZ7 w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10255"; a="250026948" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,361,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="250026948" Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 11 Feb 2022 14:19:53 -0800 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,361,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="542262078" Received: from nsmdimra-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.209.96.127]) ([10.209.96.127]) by orsmga008-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 11 Feb 2022 14:19:52 -0800 Message-ID: <3df8595d-46d9-aaee-dd33-3118102ef750@intel.com> Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 14:19:49 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.5.0 Content-Language: en-US To: Rick Edgecombe , x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V . Shankar" , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , joao.moreira@intel.com, John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com References: <20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> <20220130211838.8382-23-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Subject: Re: [PATCH 22/35] x86/mm: Prevent VM_WRITE shadow stacks In-Reply-To: <20220130211838.8382-23-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: E8BA110000F X-Rspam-User: Authentication-Results: imf14.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=intel.com header.s=Intel header.b=SebITLlq; spf=none (imf14.hostedemail.com: domain of dave.hansen@intel.com has no SPF policy when checking 192.55.52.115) smtp.mailfrom=dave.hansen@intel.com; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=intel.com X-Stat-Signature: 1ckqbh9ujsexwx78t6gyy7eudq75jjks X-Rspamd-Server: rspam11 X-HE-Tag: 1644617994-401079 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On 1/30/22 13:18, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > Shadow stack accesses are writes from handle_mm_fault() perspective. So to > generate the correct PTE, maybe_mkwrite() will rely on the presence of > VM_SHADOW_STACK or VM_WRITE in the vma. > > In future patches, when VM_SHADOW_STACK is actually creatable by > userspace, a problem could happen if a user calls > mprotect( , , PROT_WRITE) on VM_SHADOW_STACK shadow stack memory. The code > would then be confused in the event of shadow stack accesses, and create a > writable PTE for a shadow stack access. Then the process would fault in a > loop. > > Prevent this from happening by blocking this kind of memory (VM_WRITE and > VM_SHADOW_STACK) from being created, instead of complicating the fault > handler logic to handle it. > > Add an x86 arch_validate_flags() implementation to handle the check. > Rename the uapi/asm/mman.h header guard to be able to use it for > arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h where the arch_validate_flags() will be. It would be great if this also said: There is an existing arch_validate_flags() hook for mmap() and mprotect() which allows architectures to reject unwanted ->vm_flags combinations. Add an implementation for x86. That's somewhat implied from what is there already, but making it more clear would be nice. There's a much higher bar to add a new arch hook than to just implement an existing one. > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..b44fe31deb3a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H > +#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H > + > +#include > +#include > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK > +static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags) > +{ > + if ((vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) && (vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) > + return false; > + > + return true; > +} The design decision here seems to be that VM_SHADOW_STACK is itself a pseudo-VM_WRITE flag. Like you said: "Shadow stack accesses are writes from handle_mm_fault()". Very early on, this series seems to have made the decision that shadow stacks are writable and need lots of write handling behavior, *BUT* shouldn't have VM_WRITE set. As a whole, that seems odd. The alternative would be *requiring* VM_WRITE and VM_SHADOW_STACK be set together. I guess the downside is that pte_mkwrite() would need to be made to work on shadow stack PTEs. That particular design decision was never discussed. I think it has a really big impact on the rest of the series. What do you think? Was it a good idea? Or would the alternative be more complicated than what you have now?