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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: mhocko@kernel.org, kirill@shutemov.name,
	kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	will.deacon@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] mm: Introduce lazy exec permission setting on a page
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 08:55:34 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <35b14038-379f-12fb-d943-5a083a2a7056@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <413d74d1-7d74-435c-70c0-91b8a642bf99@arm.com>

On 2/13/19 8:12 PM, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
> On 02/13/2019 09:14 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 2/13/19 12:06 AM, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
>>> Setting an exec permission on a page normally triggers I-cache invalidation
>>> which might be expensive. I-cache invalidation is not mandatory on a given
>>> page if there is no immediate exec access on it. Non-fault modification of
>>> user page table from generic memory paths like migration can be improved if
>>> setting of the exec permission on the page can be deferred till actual use.
>>> There was a performance report [1] which highlighted the problem.
>>
>> How does this happen?  If the page was not executed, then it'll
>> (presumably) be non-present which won't require icache invalidation.
>> So, this would only be for pages that have been executed (and won't
>> again before the next migration), *or* for pages that were mapped
>> executable but never executed.
> I-cache invalidation happens while migrating a 'mapped and executable' page
> irrespective whether that page was really executed for being mapped there
> in the first place.

Ahh, got it.  I also assume that the Accessed bit on these platforms is
also managed similar to how we do it on x86 such that it can't be used
to drive invalidation decisions?

>> Any idea which one it is?
> 
> I am not sure about this particular reported case. But was able to reproduce
> the problem through a test case where a buffer was mapped with R|W|X, get it
> faulted/mapped through write, migrate and then execute from it.

Could you make sure, please?

Write and Execute at the same time are generally a "bad idea".  Given
the hardware, I'm not surprised that this problem pops up, but it would
be great to find out if this is a real application, or a "doctor it
hurts when I do this."

>> If it's pages that got mapped in but were never executed, how did that
>> happen?  Was it fault-around?  If so, maybe it would just be simpler to
>> not do fault-around for executable pages on these platforms.
> Page can get mapped through a different access (write) without being executed.
> Even if it got mapped through execution and subsequent invalidation, the
> invalidation does not have to be repeated again after migration without first
> getting an exec access subsequently. This series just tries to hold off the
> invalidation after migration till subsequent exec access.

This set generally seems to be assuming an environment with "lots of
migration, and not much execution".  That seems like a kinda odd
situation to me.


  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-14 16:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-13  8:06 Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-13  8:06 ` [RFC 1/4] " Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-13 13:17   ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-02-13 13:53     ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-14  9:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2019-02-15  8:11         ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-15  9:49           ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-13  8:06 ` [RFC 2/4] arm64/mm: Identify user level instruction faults Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-13  8:06 ` [RFC 3/4] arm64/mm: Allow non-exec to exec transition in ptep_set_access_flags() Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-13  8:06 ` [RFC 4/4] arm64/mm: Enable ARCH_SUPPORTS_LAZY_EXEC Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-13 11:21 ` [RFC 0/4] mm: Introduce lazy exec permission setting on a page Catalin Marinas
2019-02-13 15:38   ` Michal Hocko
2019-02-14  6:04     ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-14  8:38       ` Michal Hocko
2019-02-14 10:19         ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-14 12:28           ` Michal Hocko
2019-02-15  8:45             ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-15  9:27               ` Michal Hocko
2019-02-18  3:07                 ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-14 15:38       ` Dave Hansen
2019-02-18  3:19         ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-13 15:44 ` Dave Hansen
2019-02-14  4:12   ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-14 16:55     ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2019-02-18  8:31       ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-18  9:04         ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-18  9:16           ` Anshuman Khandual
2019-02-18 18:20         ` Dave Hansen

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