From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
To: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, jeffxu@chromium.org,
oliver.sang@intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/7] mm/mremap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 07:53:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2c7a5fcb-198a-42b3-98ec-ab4e81259b52@lucifer.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240817-mseal-depessimize-v3-4-d8d2e037df30@gmail.com>
On Sat, Aug 17, 2024 at 01:18:31AM GMT, Pedro Falcato wrote:
> Delegate all can_modify checks to the proper places. Unmap checks are
> done in do_unmap (et al). The source VMA check is done purposefully
> before unmapping, to keep the original mseal semantics.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
> ---
> mm/mremap.c | 32 ++++++--------------------------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
> index e7ae140fc640..24712f8dbb6b 100644
> --- a/mm/mremap.c
> +++ b/mm/mremap.c
> @@ -902,19 +902,6 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
> if ((mm->map_count + 2) >= sysctl_max_map_count - 3)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - /*
> - * In mremap_to().
> - * Move a VMA to another location, check if src addr is sealed.
> - *
> - * Place can_modify_mm here because mremap_to()
> - * does its own checking for address range, and we only
> - * check the sealing after passing those checks.
> - *
> - * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
> - */
> - if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
> - return -EPERM;
> -
I'm honestly confused as to why the original implementation felt it
necessary to split the checks. I guess for the purposes of efficiency? But
doesn't seem efficient to me.
> if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
> /*
> * In mremap_to().
> @@ -1052,6 +1039,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + /* Don't allow remapping vmas when they have already been sealed */
> + if (!can_modify_vma(vma)) {
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
This is much better, and having it be a VMA check is so obviously correct
here. Again confused as to why this implemented at an mm granularity
anyway...
> if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
> struct hstate *h __maybe_unused = hstate_vma(vma);
>
> @@ -1079,19 +1072,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - /*
> - * Below is shrink/expand case (not mremap_to())
> - * Check if src address is sealed, if so, reject.
> - * In other words, prevent shrinking or expanding a sealed VMA.
> - *
> - * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
> - * shrink/expand together.
> - */
> - if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
> - ret = -EPERM;
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
> /*
> * Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps
> * the unnecessary pages..
>
> --
> 2.46.0
>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-21 6:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-17 0:18 [PATCH v3 0/7] mm: Optimize mseal checks Pedro Falcato
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] mm: Move can_modify_vma to mm/vma.h Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:15 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-19 21:00 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 6:31 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] mm/munmap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:22 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:40 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 16:15 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 16:23 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 16:33 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 17:02 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 18:25 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 17:00 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mm/mprotect: " Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:33 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:51 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] mm/mremap: " Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:34 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 6:53 ` Lorenzo Stoakes [this message]
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] mseal: Replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:32 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:41 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] mm: Remove can_modify_mm() Pedro Falcato
2024-08-19 20:32 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:42 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-17 0:18 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] selftests/mm: add more mseal traversal tests Pedro Falcato
2024-08-18 6:36 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-20 15:45 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-08-21 8:47 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-08-21 15:56 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 16:20 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 16:27 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-21 17:28 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 17:36 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-08-21 23:37 ` Pedro Falcato
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