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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: jeffxu@chromium.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org, keescook@chromium.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com,
	dverkamp@chromium.org, hughd@google.com, jeffxu@google.com,
	jorgelo@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	jannh@google.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 6/6] mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 09:02:51 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <27c63309-4a36-74d5-42e0-d4a2e9e02db4@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221209160453.3246150-7-jeffxu@google.com>

On 12/9/2022 8:04 AM, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
>
> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> memfd_create.
>
> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> being created.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
>  include/linux/security.h      | 6 ++++++
>  mm/memfd.c                    | 5 +++++
>  security/security.c           | 5 +++++
>  5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index ec119da1d89b..fd40840927c8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
>  	 unsigned long arg)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, memfd_create, char *name, unsigned int flags)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>  	 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 4ec80b96c22e..5a18a6552278 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -543,6 +543,10 @@
>   *	simple integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
>   *	should never be used by the security module.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @memfd_create:
> + *	@name is the name of memfd file.
> + *	@flags is the flags used in memfd_create.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @mmap_addr :
>   *	Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
>   *	@addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ca1b7109c0db..5b87a780822a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
>  int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
>  void security_file_free(struct file *file);
>  int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
> +int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags);
>  int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
>  			unsigned long flags);
>  int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
> @@ -963,6 +964,11 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +

Add a proper kernel doc comment for this function.

>  static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
>  				     unsigned long flags)
>  {
> diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
> index 92f0a5765f7c..f04ed5f0474f 100644
> --- a/mm/memfd.c
> +++ b/mm/memfd.c
> @@ -356,6 +356,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
>  		goto err_name;
>  	}
>  
> +	/* security hook for memfd_create */
> +	error = security_memfd_create(name, flags);
> +	if (error)
> +		return error;
> +
>  	if (flags & MFD_HUGETLB) {
>  		file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE,
>  					HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 79d82cb6e469..57788cf94075 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1010,6 +1010,11 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
>  
> +int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(memfd_create, 0, name, flags);
> +}
> +
>  int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
>  {
>  	return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);


       reply	other threads:[~2022-12-09 17:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20221209160453.3246150-1-jeffxu@google.com>
     [not found] ` <20221209160453.3246150-7-jeffxu@google.com>
2022-12-09 17:02   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2022-12-09 18:29   ` Paul Moore
2022-12-13 15:00     ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-13 15:37       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-12-13 19:22       ` Paul Moore
2022-12-13 23:05         ` Jeff Xu
2025-09-20  5:54         ` Abhinav Saxena
2025-09-20 18:58           ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-09 18:15 ` [PATCH v7 0/6] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC Paul Moore
     [not found] ` <20221209160453.3246150-3-jeffxu@google.com>
2022-12-14 18:52   ` [PATCH v7 2/6] selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC Kees Cook
     [not found] ` <20221209160453.3246150-4-jeffxu@google.com>
2022-12-14 18:53   ` [PATCH v7 3/6] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC Kees Cook
2022-12-16 18:39   ` SeongJae Park
2022-12-16 19:03     ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-16 19:21       ` Andrew Morton
2022-12-16 19:31         ` SeongJae Park
2022-12-14 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 0/6] mm/memfd: introduce " Kees Cook
2022-12-14 23:32   ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-15  0:08     ` Kees Cook
2022-12-15 16:55       ` Jeff Xu

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