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[2003:cb:c705:df00:67e8:5c3d:de72:4929]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-43d43f58ab6sm21011405e9.23.2025.03.19.07.52.59 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 19 Mar 2025 07:53:01 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <278393de-2729-4ed0-822c-87f33c7ce27e@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2025 15:52:56 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] implement lightweight guard pages To: Alexander Mikhalitsyn , Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, arnd@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org, chris@zankel.net, deller@gmx.de, hch@infradead.org, jannh@google.com, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, jeffxu@chromium.org, jhubbard@nvidia.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, mattst88@gmail.com, muchun.song@linux.dev, paulmck@kernel.org, richard.henderson@linaro.org, shuah@kernel.org, sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com, surenb@google.com, tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, vbabka@suse.cz, willy@infradead.org, criu@lists.linux.dev, Andrei Vagin , Pavel Tikhomirov References: From: David Hildenbrand Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; 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charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam11 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 7FE8F140013 X-Stat-Signature: ac4ndxus38n6a3q9jf74k1fxjwby1ps1 X-HE-Tag: 1742395986-570872 X-HE-Meta: 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 N/WzDPaX 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 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000004, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: On 19.03.25 15:50, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote: > On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 02:13:26PM +0000, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote: >> Userland library functions such as allocators and threading implementations >> often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' - mappings which, >> when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the accessing >> process. >> >> The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap() >> mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead of >> a VMA for each such region. >> >> With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur >> a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing >> merges that might otherwise be permitted. >> >> This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlasimil >> Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the >> provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please forgive >> any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA layer, >> instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges. >> >> Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times >> speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of >> process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android >> system and unoptimised code. >> >> We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of >> guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these >> numbers are encouraging. >> >> This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a >> range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of >> memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be >> 'guarded'. >> >> After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should >> result in a fatal signal when accessed. >> >> By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by >> existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the >> mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the >> memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs. >> >> This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory >> poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning. >> >> The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL >> which installs page table-level guard page markers - and >> MADV_GUARD_REMOVE - which clears them. >> >> Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing >> mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page >> markers in the page tables. >> >> There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to install >> guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no effect. >> >> Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard >> markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard >> markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely >> remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact. >> >> The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes >> use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd >> UFFDIO_POISON mechanism. >> >> Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page >> mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault >> handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing >> logic to handle it. >> >> We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation of >> PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent >> unwanted abuse). >> >> We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not >> remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is >> specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory >> characteristics). >> >> It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically >> NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We >> simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising >> behaviour. >> >> An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as >> expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard >> ranges. > > Dear Lorenzo, > Dear colleagues, > > sorry about raising an old thread. > > It looks like this feature is now used in glibc [1]. And we noticed failures in CRIU [2] > CI on Fedora Rawhide userspace. Now a question is how we can properly detect such > "guarded" pages from user space. As I can see from MADV_GUARD_INSTALL implementation, > it does not modify VMA flags anyhow, but only page tables. It means that /proc//maps > and /proc//smaps interfaces are useless in this case. (Please, correct me if I'm missing > anything here.) > > I wonder if you have any ideas / suggestions regarding Checkpoint/Restore here. We (CRIU devs) are happy > to develop some patches to bring some uAPI to expose MADV_GUARDs, but before going into this we decided > to raise this question in LKML. See [1] and [2] [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1740139449.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/1011366/ -- Cheers, David / dhildenb