From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>,
Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
"James E . J . Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>, Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>,
Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page mechanism
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 20:35:25 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2647d37b-3482-4fc9-8da2-1158ebdc919e@lucifer.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez3WS3EH9DuhE1b+7AX3+1=dVtd1M7y_5Ev4Shp2YxiYWg@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Oct 22, 2024 at 09:08:53PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 10:46 PM Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> wrote:
> > On 10/21/24 22:27, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 10:11:29PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > >> On 10/20/24 18:20, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > >> > + while (true) {
> > >> > + /* Returns < 0 on error, == 0 if success, > 0 if zap needed. */
> > >> > + err = walk_page_range_mm(vma->vm_mm, start, end,
> > >> > + &guard_poison_walk_ops, NULL);
> > >> > + if (err <= 0)
> > >> > + return err;
> > >> > +
> > >> > + /*
> > >> > + * OK some of the range have non-guard pages mapped, zap
> > >> > + * them. This leaves existing guard pages in place.
> > >> > + */
> > >> > + zap_page_range_single(vma, start, end - start, NULL);
> > >>
> > >> ... however the potentially endless loop doesn't seem great. Could a
> > >> malicious program keep refaulting the range (ignoring any segfaults if it
> > >> loses a race) with one thread while failing to make progress here with
> > >> another thread? Is that ok because it would only punish itself?
> > >
> > > Sigh. Again, I don't think you've read the previous series have you? Or
> > > even the changelog... I added this as Jann asked for it. Originally we'd
> > > -EAGAIN if we got raced. See the discussion over in v1 for details.
> > >
> > > I did it that way specifically to avoid such things, but Jann didn't appear
> > > to think it was a problem.
> >
> > If Jann is fine with this then it must be secure enough.
>
> My thinking there was:
>
> We can legitimately race with adjacent faults populating the area
> we're operating on with THP pages; as long as the zapping and
> poison-marker-setting are separate, *someone* will have to do the
> retry. Either we do it in the kernel, or we tell userspace to handle
> it, but having the kernel take care of it is preferable because it
> makes the stable UAPI less messy.
>
> One easy way to do it in the kernel would be to return -ERESTARTNOINTR
> after the zap_page_range_single() instead of jumping back up, which in
> terms of locking and signal handling and such would be equivalent to
> looping in userspace (because really that's what -ERESTARTNOINTR does
> - it returns out to userspace and moves the instruction pointer back
> to restart the syscall). Though if we do that immediately, it might
> make MADV_POISON unnecessarily slow, so we should probably retry once
> before doing that. The other easy way is to just loop here.
Yes we should definitely retry probably a few times to cover the rare
situation of a THP race as you describe under non-abusive circumstances.
>
> The cond_resched() and pending fatal signal check mean that (except on
> CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE) the only differences between the current
> implementation and looping in userspace are that we don't handle
> non-fatal signals in between iterations and that we keep hogging the
> mmap_lock in read mode. We do already have a bunch of codepaths that
> retry on concurrent page table changes, like when zap_pte_range()
> encounters a pte_offset_map_lock() failure; though I guess the
> difference is that the retry on those is just a couple instructions,
> which would be harder to race consistently, while here we redo walks
> across the entire range, which should be fairly easy to race
> repeatedly.
>
> So I guess you have a point that this might be the easiest way to
> stall other tasks that are trying to take mmap_lock for an extended
> amount of time, I did not fully consider that... and then I guess you
> could use that to slow down usercopy fault handling (once the lock
> switches to handoff mode because of a stalled writer?) or slow down
> other processes trying to read /proc/$pid/cmdline?
Hm does that need a write lock?
>
> You can already indefinitely hog the mmap_lock with FUSE, though that
> requires that you can mount a FUSE filesystem (which you wouldn't be
> able in reasonably sandboxed code) and that you can find something
> like a pin_user_pages() call that can't drop the mmap lock in between,
> and there aren't actually that many of those...
>
> So I guess you have a point and the -ERESTARTNOINTR approach would be
> a little bit nicer, as long as it's easy to implement.
I can go ahead and do it that way if nobody objects, with a few loops
before we do it... which hopefully covers off all the concerns?
Thanks
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-22 19:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-20 16:20 [PATCH v2 0/5] implement lightweight guard pages Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 13:27 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-21 13:50 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] mm: add PTE_MARKER_GUARD PTE marker Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 13:45 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-21 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 20:42 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 21:13 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 21:20 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-21 14:13 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-21 14:33 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 14:54 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-21 15:33 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 15:41 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 16:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 16:23 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 16:44 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 16:51 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 17:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 17:14 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 17:21 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 17:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-22 19:13 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page mechanism Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 17:05 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 17:15 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 17:23 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 19:25 ` John Hubbard
2024-10-21 19:39 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 20:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 20:11 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-21 20:17 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 20:25 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-21 20:30 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 20:37 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 20:49 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 21:20 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 21:33 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 21:35 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-21 21:46 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-22 19:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-21 20:27 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 20:45 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-22 19:08 ` Jann Horn
2024-10-22 19:35 ` Lorenzo Stoakes [this message]
2024-10-22 19:57 ` Jann Horn
2024-10-22 20:45 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] tools: testing: update tools UAPI header for mman-common.h Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] selftests/mm: add self tests for guard page feature Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-21 21:31 ` Shuah Khan
2024-10-22 10:25 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-20 17:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] implement lightweight guard pages Florian Weimer
2024-10-20 19:45 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-23 6:24 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2024-10-23 7:19 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-23 8:11 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-23 8:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2024-10-23 9:06 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-10-23 9:13 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-23 9:18 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-23 9:29 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-23 11:31 ` Marco Elver
2024-10-23 11:36 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-23 11:40 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-10-23 9:17 ` Dmitry Vyukov
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