From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "pasha.tatashin@soleen.com" <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>,
"Huang, Shaoqin" <shaoqin.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: Check writable zero page in page table check
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 16:42:32 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20f231396dfcd9b5ac47e5ab5e5d177e1eaab3ec.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+CK2bCAC4uQr_nrJM=mbP8DSpR7Vz=OGF9q7wufU_i4Wk3GBw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2022-09-05 at 20:37 -0400, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> The idea behind page table check is to prevent some types of memory
> corruptions: i.e. prevent false page sharing, and memory leaking
> between address spaces. This is an optional security feature for
> setups where it is more dangerous to leak data than to crash the
> machine. Therefore, when page table check detects illegal page
> sharing
> it immediately crashes the kernel. I think we can have a
> page_table_check option that would change BUG_ON to WARN_ON() (or to
> WARN_ON_ONCE(), since once corruption is detected I believe it might
> show up many times again)
Do you think there are a lot of people that would want to set page
table check to BUG_ON mode, that wouldn't already be setting
panic_on_warn?
I didn't realize page table check was meant to be a security feature as
well. I thought it was more of a debug time checker.
Looking through more related discussions, there seems to be a strong
aversion to "crash the kernel" features. Especially if they are meant
to run in a non-testing context.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-06 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-02 23:27 Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-03 2:13 ` Huang, Shaoqin
2022-09-05 18:50 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-06 0:24 ` Huang, Shaoqin
2022-09-06 0:49 ` John Hubbard
2022-09-06 0:37 ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-09-06 1:01 ` Huang, Shaoqin
2022-09-06 16:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2022-09-06 0:38 ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-09-06 0:39 ` Pasha Tatashin
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