From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dvyukov@google.com,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 16:56:59 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260320155659.GDab1uSxYFWCUGcvbN@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260317220319.788561-1-nogikh@google.com>
On Tue, Mar 17, 2026 at 11:03:19PM +0100, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote:
> The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating
> GS base (which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is
> enabled, any subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g.
> native_gdt_invalidate()) begins crashing the kernel in an endless
> loop.
>
> To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a
> KCOV-instrumented kernel:
> $ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel
> $ kexec -e
>
> The real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump
> collection in syzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel
> before fuzzing and then calls makedumpfile after the panic. This
> workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC and CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled
> simultaneously.
>
> Adding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path
> (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()) is also undesirable as it would
> introduce an extra performance overhead.
>
> Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too
> fragile, so let's fix the bug by disabling KCOV instrumentation for
> the entire machine_kexec_64.c and physaddr.c. If coverage-guided
> fuzzing ever needs these components in the future, we should consider
^^
Please use passive voice in your commit message: no "we" or "I", etc,
and describe your changes in imperative mood.
Also in the comments below.
> other approaches.
>
> The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not
> supported there.
>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> v2:
> Updated the comments to explain the underlying context.
>
> v1:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260216173716.2279847-1-nogikh@google.com/
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++
> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
./scripts/checkpatch.pl /tmp/current.patch
...
WARNING: The commit message has 'stable@', perhaps it also needs a 'Fixes:' tag?
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index e9aeeeafad173..41b1333907ded 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -43,6 +43,16 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dumpstack_$(BITS).o := n
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_orc.o := n
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_frame.o := n
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_guess.o := n
> +# Disable KCOV to prevent crashes during kexec: load_segments() invalidates
> +# the GS base, which KCOV relies on for per-CPU data.
> +# As KCOV && KEXEC compatibility should be preserved (e.g. syzkaller is
> +# using it to collect crash dumps during kernel fuzzing), we could either
> +# selectively disable KCOV instrumentation, which can be fragile, or add
> +# more checks to KCOV, which would slow it down.
> +# As a compromise solution, let's disable KCOV instrumentation for the
> +# whole file. If its coverage is ever needed, we should consider other
> +# approaches.
> +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_machine_kexec_64.o := n
>
> CFLAGS_head32.o := -fno-stack-protector
> CFLAGS_head64.o := -fno-stack-protector
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
> index 5b9908f13dcfd..ea3a31b54e49e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
> @@ -4,6 +4,16 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o := n
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_pgprot.o := n
> +# Disable KCOV to prevent crashes during kexec: load_segments() invalidates
> +# the GS base, which KCOV relies on for per-CPU data.
> +# As KCOV && KEXEC compatibility should be preserved (e.g. syzkaller is
> +# using it to collect crash dumps during kernel fuzzing), we could either
> +# selectively disable KCOV instrumentation, which can be fragile, or add
> +# more checks to KCOV, which would slow it down.
> +# As a compromise solution, let's disable KCOV instrumentation for the
> +# whole file. If its coverage is ever needed, we should consider other
> +# approaches.
Instead of repeating this big comment block, just say something along the
lines of:
# See "Disable KCOV" comment in arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_physaddr.o := n
>
> KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o := n
> KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n
>
> base-commit: f338e77383789c0cae23ca3d48adcc5e9e137e3c
> --
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-20 15:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-17 22:03 Aleksandr Nogikh
2026-03-20 15:56 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2026-03-22 0:08 ` Andrew Morton
2026-03-23 10:46 ` Aleksandr Nogikh
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