From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 27/30] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2026 17:55:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260227175518.3728055-28-kevin.brodsky@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260227175518.3728055-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
When CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is enabled, page tables (both
user and kernel) are mapped with a privileged pkey in the linear
mapping. As a result, they can only be written at an elevated kpkeys
level.
Introduce a kpkeys guard that sets POR_EL1 appropriately to allow
writing to page tables, and use this guard wherever necessary. The
scope is kept as small as possible, so that POR_EL1 is quickly reset
to its default value. Where atomics are involved, the guard's scope
encompasses the whole loop to avoid switching POR_EL1 unnecessarily.
This patch is a no-op if CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is disabled
(default).
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index b3e58735c49b..8c85e23223da 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/page_table_check.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+KPKEYS_GUARD_COND(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables, KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES,
+ kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+#else
+KPKEYS_GUARD_NOOP(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+#endif
static inline void emit_pte_barriers(void)
{
@@ -363,6 +371,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
static inline void __set_pte_nosync(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
{
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*ptep, pte);
}
@@ -830,6 +839,7 @@ static inline void set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
}
#endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*pmdp, pmd);
if (pmd_valid(pmd))
@@ -890,6 +900,7 @@ static inline void set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
return;
}
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*pudp, pud);
if (pud_valid(pud))
@@ -971,6 +982,7 @@ static inline void set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
return;
}
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
queue_pte_barriers();
}
@@ -1099,6 +1111,7 @@ static inline void set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
return;
}
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*pgdp, pgd);
queue_pte_barriers();
}
@@ -1295,6 +1308,7 @@ static inline int __ptep_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
pte_t old_pte, pte;
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
do {
old_pte = pte;
@@ -1343,7 +1357,10 @@ static inline pte_t __ptep_get_and_clear_anysz(struct mm_struct *mm,
pte_t *ptep,
unsigned long pgsize)
{
- pte_t pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
+ pte_t pte;
+
+ scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+ pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
switch (pgsize) {
case PAGE_SIZE:
@@ -1416,6 +1433,7 @@ static inline void ___ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
{
pte_t old_pte;
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
do {
old_pte = pte;
pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
@@ -1449,6 +1467,7 @@ static inline void __clear_young_dirty_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
pte_t old_pte;
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
do {
old_pte = pte;
@@ -1496,6 +1515,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
{
page_table_check_pmd_set(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd);
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
return __pmd(xchg_relaxed(&pmd_val(*pmdp), pmd_val(pmd)));
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index be9dab2c7d6a..7e230499f7fe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -214,6 +214,8 @@ int __ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (pte_same(pte, entry))
return 0;
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
+
/* only preserve the access flags and write permission */
pte_val(entry) &= PTE_RDONLY | PTE_AF | PTE_WRITE | PTE_DIRTY;
--
2.51.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-27 17:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-27 17:54 [PATCH v6 00/30] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 01/30] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 02/30] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 03/30] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 04/30] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 05/30] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 06/30] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 07/30] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 08/30] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 09/30] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 10/30] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:54 ` [PATCH v6 11/30] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 12/30] set_memory: Introduce arch_has_pte_only_direct_map() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 13/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 14/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce block-based page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 15/30] mm: kpkeys: Handle splitting of linear map Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 16/30] mm: kpkeys: Defer early call to set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 17/30] mm: kpkeys: Add shrinker for block pgtable allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 18/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 19/30] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 20/30] arm64: cpufeature: Add helper to directly probe CPU for POE support Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 21/30] arm64: set_memory: Implement arch_has_pte_only_direct_map() Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 22/30] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 23/30] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 20:28 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 24/30] arm64: kpkeys: Handle splitting of linear map Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 25/30] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 26/30] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 28/30] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 29/30] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-02-27 17:55 ` [PATCH v6 30/30] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
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