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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_mmap_shadow_stack() as a helper for VM_SHADOW_STACK mappings
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 17:57:53 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260224175800.2500729-2-catalin.marinas@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260224175800.2500729-1-catalin.marinas@arm.com>

arm64, riscv and x86 use a similar pattern for mapping the user shadow
stack (cloned from x86). Extract this into a helper to facilitate code
reuse.

The call to do_mmap() from the new helper uses PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE prot
bits instead of the PROT_READ with an explicit VM_WRITE vm_flag. The
x86 intent was to avoid PROT_WRITE implying normal write since the
shadow stack is not writable by normal stores. However, from a kernel
perspective, the vma is writeable. Functionally there is no difference.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/mm.h |  4 ++++
 mm/util.c          | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 5be3d8a8f806..1f28be975f86 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -3908,6 +3908,10 @@ extern int vm_munmap(unsigned long, size_t);
 extern unsigned long __must_check vm_mmap(struct file *, unsigned long,
         unsigned long, unsigned long,
         unsigned long, unsigned long);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+extern unsigned long __must_check vm_mmap_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr,
+	unsigned long len, unsigned long flags);
+#endif
 
 struct vm_unmapped_area_info {
 #define VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN 1
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index b05ab6f97e11..2592291948f0 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -618,6 +618,31 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_mmap);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+/*
+ * Perform a userland memory mapping for a shadow stack into the current
+ * process address space. This is intended to be used by architectures that
+ * support user shadow stacks.
+ */
+unsigned long vm_mmap_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
+				   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long ret, unused;
+
+	flags |= MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+	if (addr)
+		flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
+
+	mmap_write_lock(mm);
+	ret = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, flags,
+		      VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0, &unused, NULL);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
+
 /**
  * __vmalloc_array - allocate memory for a virtually contiguous array.
  * @n: number of elements.


  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-24 17:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-24 17:57 [PATCH 0/5] mm: arch/shstk: Common shadow stack mapping helper and VM_NOHUGEPAGE Catalin Marinas
2026-02-24 17:57 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2026-02-24 19:47   ` [PATCH 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_mmap_shadow_stack() as a helper for VM_SHADOW_STACK mappings Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-02-24 17:57 ` [PATCH 2/5] arm64: gcs: Use the new common vm_mmap_shadow_stack() helper Catalin Marinas
2026-02-24 17:57 ` [PATCH 3/5] riscv: shstk: " Catalin Marinas
2026-02-24 17:57 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86: " Catalin Marinas
2026-02-24 19:47   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-02-24 17:57 ` [PATCH 5/5] mm: Do not map the shadow stack as THP Catalin Marinas

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