From: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, david@kernel.org,
lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, ziy@nvidia.com,
baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
npache@redhat.com, ryan.roberts@arm.com, dev.jain@arm.com,
baohua@kernel.org, lance.yang@linux.dev, i@maskray.me,
shy828301@gmail.com, ackerleytng@google.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>,
syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Deepanshu Kartikey <Kartikey406@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] mm: thp: deny THP for files on anonymous inodes
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2026 05:45:35 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260214001535.435626-1-kartikey406@gmail.com> (raw)
file_thp_enabled() incorrectly allows THP for files on anonymous inodes
(e.g. guest_memfd and secretmem). These files are created via
alloc_file_pseudo(), which does not call get_write_access() and leaves
inode->i_writecount at 0. Combined with S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) being
true, they appear as read-only regular files when
CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, making them eligible for THP
collapse.
Anonymous inodes can never pass the inode_is_open_for_write() check
since their i_writecount is never incremented through the normal VFS
open path. The right thing to do is to exclude them from THP eligibility
altogether, since CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS was designed for real
filesystem files (e.g. shared libraries), not for pseudo-filesystem
inodes.
For guest_memfd, this allows khugepaged and MADV_COLLAPSE to create
large folios in the page cache via the collapse path, but the
guest_memfd fault handler does not support large folios. This triggers
WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio)) in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping().
For secretmem, collapse_file() tries to copy page contents through the
direct map, but secretmem pages are removed from the direct map. This
can result in a kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88810284d000
RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0x16/0x130
Call Trace:
collapse_file
hpage_collapse_scan_file
madvise_collapse
Secretmem is not affected by the crash on upstream as the memory failure
recovery handles the failed copy gracefully, but it still triggers
confusing false memory failure reports:
Memory failure: 0x106d96f: recovery action for clean unevictable
LRU page: Recovered
Check IS_ANON_FILE(inode) in file_thp_enabled() to deny THP for all
anonymous inode files.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAEvNRgHegcz3ro35ixkDw39ES8=U6rs6S7iP0gkR9enr7HoGtA@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
Fixes: 7fbb5e188248 ("mm: remove VM_EXEC requirement for THP eligibility")
Tested-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <Kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
v2:
- Use IS_ANON_FILE(inode) to deny THP for all anonymous inode files
instead of checking for specific subsystems (David Hildenbrand)
- Updated Fixes tag to 7fbb5e188248 which removed the VM_EXEC
requirement that accidentally protected secretmem
- Expanded commit message with implications for both guest_memfd
and secretmem
---
mm/huge_memory.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 40cf59301c21..d3beddd8cc30 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ static inline bool file_thp_enabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
+ if (IS_ANON_FILE(inode))
+ return false;
+
return !inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode);
}
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-02-14 0:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-14 0:15 Deepanshu Kartikey [this message]
2026-02-14 11:27 ` Lance Yang
2026-02-15 22:48 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-15 12:41 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-15 20:29 ` Barry Song
2026-02-16 6:47 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-16 15:01 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-02-17 1:44 ` [PATCH] KVM: selftests: Test MADV_COLLAPSE on GUEST_MEMFD Ackerley Tng
2026-02-17 15:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-20 23:59 ` Ackerley Tng
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