From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: elver@google.com, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>,
Chris Li <sparse@chrisli.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Joel Fernandes <joelagnelf@nvidia.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev, rcu@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 28/36] kfence: Enable context analysis
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 16:40:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251219154418.3592607-29-elver@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251219154418.3592607-1-elver@google.com>
Enable context analysis for the KFENCE subsystem.
Notable, kfence_handle_page_fault() required minor restructure, which
also fixed a subtle race; arguably that function is more readable now.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v4:
* Rename capability -> context analysis.
v2:
* Remove disable/enable_context_analysis() around headers.
* Use __context_unsafe() instead of __no_context_analysis.
---
mm/kfence/Makefile | 2 ++
mm/kfence/core.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
mm/kfence/kfence.h | 14 ++++++++------
mm/kfence/report.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kfence/Makefile b/mm/kfence/Makefile
index 2de2a58d11a1..a503e83e74d9 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/Makefile
+++ b/mm/kfence/Makefile
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+CONTEXT_ANALYSIS := y
+
obj-y := core.o report.o
CFLAGS_kfence_test.o := -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 577a1699c553..ebf442fb2c2b 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata __read_mostly;
static struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata_init __read_mostly;
/* Freelist with available objects. */
-static struct list_head kfence_freelist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist);
-static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */
+DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */
+static struct list_head kfence_freelist __guarded_by(&kfence_freelist_lock) = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist);
/*
* The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation; or if static keys are not used
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr)
}
static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+ __must_hold(&meta->lock)
{
unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2;
unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset];
@@ -289,6 +290,7 @@ static inline bool kfence_obj_allocated(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
static noinline void
metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state next,
unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries)
+ __must_hold(&meta->lock)
{
struct kfence_track *track =
next == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track;
@@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1);
/* Set required slab fields. */
- slab = virt_to_slab((void *)meta->addr);
+ slab = virt_to_slab(addr);
slab->slab_cache = cache;
slab->objects = 1;
@@ -515,6 +517,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie)
{
struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive;
+ u32 alloc_stack_hash;
unsigned long flags;
bool init;
@@ -547,9 +550,10 @@ static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool z
/* Mark the object as freed. */
metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0);
init = slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache);
+ alloc_stack_hash = meta->alloc_stack_hash;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
- alloc_covered_add(meta->alloc_stack_hash, -1);
+ alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, -1);
/* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */
check_canary(meta);
@@ -594,6 +598,7 @@ static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h)
* which partial initialization succeeded.
*/
static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
+ __context_unsafe(/* constructor */)
{
unsigned long addr, start_pfn;
int i;
@@ -1220,6 +1225,7 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
{
const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE;
struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL;
+ unsigned long unprotected_page = 0;
enum kfence_error_type error_type;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -1253,9 +1259,8 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
if (!to_report)
goto out;
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
- to_report->unprotected_page = addr;
error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB;
+ unprotected_page = addr;
/*
* If the object was freed before we took the look we can still
@@ -1267,7 +1272,6 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
if (!to_report)
goto out;
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF;
/*
* We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a
@@ -1279,6 +1283,8 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
out:
if (to_report) {
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
+ to_report->unprotected_page = unprotected_page;
kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, to_report, error_type);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags);
} else {
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
index dfba5ea06b01..f9caea007246 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/kfence.h
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
/* Maximum stack depth for reports. */
#define KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH 64
+extern raw_spinlock_t kfence_freelist_lock;
+
/* KFENCE object states. */
enum kfence_object_state {
KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED, /* Object is unused. */
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ struct kfence_track {
/* KFENCE metadata per guarded allocation. */
struct kfence_metadata {
- struct list_head list; /* Freelist node; access under kfence_freelist_lock. */
+ struct list_head list __guarded_by(&kfence_freelist_lock); /* Freelist node. */
struct rcu_head rcu_head; /* For delayed freeing. */
/*
@@ -91,13 +93,13 @@ struct kfence_metadata {
* In case of an invalid access, the page that was unprotected; we
* optimistically only store one address.
*/
- unsigned long unprotected_page;
+ unsigned long unprotected_page __guarded_by(&lock);
/* Allocation and free stack information. */
- struct kfence_track alloc_track;
- struct kfence_track free_track;
+ struct kfence_track alloc_track __guarded_by(&lock);
+ struct kfence_track free_track __guarded_by(&lock);
/* For updating alloc_covered on frees. */
- u32 alloc_stack_hash;
+ u32 alloc_stack_hash __guarded_by(&lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
struct slabobj_ext obj_exts;
#endif
@@ -141,6 +143,6 @@ enum kfence_error_type {
void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs,
const struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_error_type type);
-void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta);
+void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta) __must_hold(&meta->lock);
#endif /* MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
index 10e6802a2edf..787e87c26926 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/report.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ static int get_stack_skipnr(const unsigned long stack_entries[], int num_entries
static void kfence_print_stack(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta,
bool show_alloc)
+ __must_hold(&meta->lock)
{
const struct kfence_track *track = show_alloc ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track;
u64 ts_sec = track->ts_nsec;
@@ -207,8 +208,6 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
if (WARN_ON(type != KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID && !meta))
return;
- if (meta)
- lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
/*
* Because we may generate reports in printk-unfriendly parts of the
* kernel, such as scheduler code, the use of printk() could deadlock.
@@ -263,6 +262,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
stack_trace_print(stack_entries + skipnr, num_stack_entries - skipnr, 0);
if (meta) {
+ lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
pr_err("\n");
kfence_print_object(NULL, meta);
}
--
2.52.0.322.g1dd061c0dc-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-19 15:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-19 15:39 [PATCH v5 00/36] Compiler-Based Context- and Locking-Analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 01/36] compiler_types: Move lock checking attributes to compiler-context-analysis.h Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 02/36] compiler-context-analysis: Add infrastructure for Context Analysis with Clang Marco Elver
2025-12-19 18:38 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 18:59 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 19:04 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 19:11 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-20 13:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 03/36] compiler-context-analysis: Add test stub Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 04/36] Documentation: Add documentation for Compiler-Based Context Analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 18:51 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 05/36] checkpatch: Warn about context_unsafe() without comment Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 06/36] cleanup: Basic compatibility with context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 19:16 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 07/36] lockdep: Annotate lockdep assertions for " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 20:53 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 21:16 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 21:28 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 21:47 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 08/36] locking/rwlock, spinlock: Support Clang's " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 20:26 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 21:02 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 21:34 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 21:48 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 21:45 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 09/36] compiler-context-analysis: Change __cond_acquires to take return value Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:39 ` [PATCH v5 10/36] locking/mutex: Support Clang's context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 11/36] locking/seqlock: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 12/36] bit_spinlock: Include missing <asm/processor.h> Marco Elver
2025-12-19 20:38 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 13/36] bit_spinlock: Support Clang's context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 20:47 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 21:09 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 14/36] rcu: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 15/36] srcu: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 16/36] kref: Add context-analysis annotations Marco Elver
2025-12-19 20:49 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 17/36] locking/rwsem: Support Clang's context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 20:55 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-20 12:52 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 18/36] locking/local_lock: Include missing headers Marco Elver
2025-12-19 20:56 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 19/36] locking/local_lock: Support Clang's context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 20/36] locking/ww_mutex: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 21/36] debugfs: Make debugfs_cancellation a context lock struct Marco Elver
2025-12-19 21:01 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 22/36] um: Fix incorrect __acquires/__releases annotations Marco Elver
2025-12-19 21:05 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 23/36] compiler-context-analysis: Remove Sparse support Marco Elver
2025-12-19 21:38 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 24/36] compiler-context-analysis: Remove __cond_lock() function-like helper Marco Elver
2025-12-19 21:42 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-12-20 12:51 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 25/36] compiler-context-analysis: Introduce header suppressions Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 26/36] compiler: Let data_race() imply disabled context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 27/36] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Context Analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` Marco Elver [this message]
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 29/36] kcov: Enable context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 30/36] kcsan: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 31/36] stackdepot: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 32/36] rhashtable: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 33/36] printk: Move locking annotation to printk.c Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 34/36] security/tomoyo: Enable context analysis Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 35/36] crypto: " Marco Elver
2025-12-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v5 36/36] sched: Enable context analysis for core.c and fair.c Marco Elver
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