linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, will@kernel.org,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, bigeasy@linutronix.de,
	rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	brauner@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, hch@lst.de,
	jack@suse.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, pangliyuan1@huawei.com,
	wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, wozizhi@huaweicloud.com,
	yangerkun@huawei.com, lilinjie8@huawei.com, liaohua4@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger
Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2025 09:08:13 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251129090813.GK3538@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251129040817.65356-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>

On Sat, Nov 29, 2025 at 12:08:17PM +0800, Xie Yuanbin wrote:

> I think the `user_mode(regs)` check is necessary because the label
> no_context actually jumps to __do_kernel_fault(), whereas page fault
> from user mode should jump to `__do_user_fault()`.
> 
> Alternatively, we would need to change `goto no_context` to
> `goto bad_area`. Or perhaps I misunderstood something, please point it out.

FWIW, goto bad_area has an obvious problem: uses of 'fault' value, which
contains garbage.

The cause of problem is the heuristics in get_mmap_lock_carefully():
	if (regs && !user_mode(regs)) {
		unsigned long ip = exception_ip(regs);
		if (!search_exception_tables(ip))
			return false;
	}
trylock has failed and we are trying to decide whether it's safe to block.
The assumption (inherited from old logics in assorted page fault handlers)
is "by that point we know that fault in kernel mode is either an oops
or #PF on uaccess; in the latter case we should be OK with locking mm,
in the former we should just get to oopsing without risking deadlocks".

load_unaligned_zeropad() is where that assumption breaks - there is
an exception handler and it's not an uaccess attempt; the address is
not going to match any VMA and we really don't want to do anything
blocking.

Note that VMA lookup will return NULL there anyway - there won't be a VMA
for that address.  What we get is exactly the same thing we'd get from
do_bad_area(), whether we get a kernel or userland insn faulting.

The minimal fix would be something like
	if (unlikely(addr >= TASK_SIZE) && !(flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER))
		goto no_context;

right before
	if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER))
		goto lock_mmap;

in do_page_fault().  Alternatively,
	if (unlikely(addr >= TASK_SIZE)) {
		do_bad_area(addr, fsr, regs);
		return 0;
	}
or
	if (unlikely(addr >= TASK_SIZE)) {
		fault = 0;
		code = SEGV_MAPERR;
		goto bad_area;
	}
at the same place.  Incidentally, making do_bad_area() return 0 would
seem to make all callers happier...


  reply	other threads:[~2025-11-29  9:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-26  9:05 [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger sleep in RCU context Zizhi Wo
2025-11-26 10:19 ` [RFC PATCH] vfs: Fix might sleep in load_unaligned_zeropad() with rcu read lock held Xie Yuanbin
2025-11-26 18:10   ` Al Viro
2025-11-26 18:48     ` Al Viro
2025-11-26 19:05       ` Russell King (Oracle)
2025-11-26 19:26         ` Al Viro
2025-11-26 19:51           ` Russell King (Oracle)
2025-11-26 20:02             ` Al Viro
2025-11-26 22:25               ` david laight
2025-11-26 23:51                 ` Al Viro
2025-11-26 23:31               ` Russell King (Oracle)
2025-11-27  3:03                 ` Xie Yuanbin
2025-11-27  7:20                   ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2025-11-27 11:20                     ` Xie Yuanbin
2025-11-28  1:39           ` Xie Yuanbin
2025-11-26 20:42   ` Al Viro
2025-11-26 10:27 ` [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger sleep in RCU context Zizhi Wo
2025-11-26 21:12   ` Linus Torvalds
2025-11-27 10:27     ` Will Deacon
2025-11-27 10:57     ` Russell King (Oracle)
2025-11-28 17:06       ` Linus Torvalds
2025-11-29  1:01         ` Zizhi Wo
2025-11-29  1:35           ` Linus Torvalds
2025-11-29  4:08             ` [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger Xie Yuanbin
2025-11-29  9:08               ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-11-29  9:25                 ` Xie Yuanbin
2025-11-29  9:44                   ` Al Viro
2025-11-29 10:05                     ` Xie Yuanbin
2025-11-29 10:45                 ` david laight
2025-11-29  8:54             ` [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger sleep in RCU context Al Viro
2025-12-01  2:08             ` Zizhi Wo
2025-11-29  2:18         ` [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger Xie Yuanbin
2025-12-01 13:28         ` [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger sleep in RCU context Will Deacon
2025-12-02 12:43         ` Russell King (Oracle)
2025-12-02 13:02           ` Xie Yuanbin
2025-12-02 22:07           ` Linus Torvalds
2025-12-03  1:48             ` Xie Yuanbin
2025-12-05 12:08               ` Russell King (Oracle)
2025-11-26 18:55 ` Al Viro
2025-11-27  2:24   ` Zizhi Wo
2025-11-29  3:37     ` Al Viro
2025-11-30  3:01       ` [RFC][alpha] saner vmalloc handling (was Re: [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger sleep in RCU context) Al Viro
2025-11-30 11:32         ` david laight
2025-11-30 16:43           ` Al Viro
2025-11-30 18:14             ` Magnus Lindholm
2025-11-30 19:03             ` david laight
2025-11-30 20:31               ` Al Viro
2025-11-30 20:32                 ` Al Viro
2025-11-30 22:16         ` Linus Torvalds
2025-11-30 23:37           ` Al Viro
2025-12-01  2:03       ` [Bug report] hash_name() may cross page boundary and trigger sleep in RCU context Zizhi Wo
2025-11-27 12:59 ` Will Deacon
2025-11-28  1:17   ` Zizhi Wo
2025-11-28  1:18     ` Zizhi Wo
2025-11-28  1:39       ` Zizhi Wo
2025-11-28 12:25         ` Will Deacon
2025-11-29  1:02           ` Zizhi Wo
2025-11-29  3:55             ` Al Viro
2025-12-01  2:38               ` Zizhi Wo

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20251129090813.GK3538@ZenIV \
    --to=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=bigeasy@linutronix.de \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=hch@lst.de \
    --cc=jack@suse.com \
    --cc=liaohua4@huawei.com \
    --cc=lilinjie8@huawei.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=pangliyuan1@huawei.com \
    --cc=rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=wozizhi@huaweicloud.com \
    --cc=xieyuanbin1@huawei.com \
    --cc=yangerkun@huawei.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox