[PATCH bpf-next 2/2] bpf: mark vma->{vm_mm,vm_file} as __safe_trusted_or_null

[Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>]

The vma->vm_mm might be NULL and it can be accessed outside of RCU. Thus,
we can mark it as trusted_or_null. With this change, BPF helpers can safely
access vma->vm_mm to retrieve the associated mm_struct from the VMA.
Then we can make policy decision from the VMA.

The "trusted" annotation enables direct access to vma->vm_mm within kfuncs
marked with KF_TRUSTED_ARGS or KF_RCU, such as bpf_task_get_cgroup1() and
bpf_task_under_cgroup(). Conversely, "null" enforcement requires all
callsites using vma->vm_mm to perform NULL checks.

The lsm selftest must be modified because it directly accesses vma->vm_mm
without a NULL pointer check; otherwise it will break due to this
change.

For the VMA based THP policy, the use case is as follows,

  @mm = @vma->vm_mm; // vm_area_struct::vm_mm is trusted or null
  if (!@mm)
      return;
  bpf_rcu_read_lock(); // rcu lock must be held to dereference the owner
  @owner = @mm->owner; // mm_struct::owner is rcu trusted or null
  if (!@owner)
    goto out;
  @cgroup1 = bpf_task_get_cgroup1(@owner, MEMCG_HIERARCHY_ID);

  /* make the decision based on the @cgroup1 attribute */

  bpf_cgroup_release(@cgroup1); // release the associated cgroup
out:
  bpf_rcu_read_unlock();

PSI memory information can be obtained from the associated cgroup to inform
policy decisions. Since upstream PSI support is currently limited to cgroup
v2, the following example demonstrates cgroup v2 implementation:

  @owner = @mm->owner;
  if (@owner) {
      // @ancestor_cgid is user-configured
      @ancestor = bpf_cgroup_from_id(@ancestor_cgid);
      if (bpf_task_under_cgroup(@owner, @ancestor)) {
          @psi_group = @ancestor->psi;

          /* Extract PSI metrics from @psi_group and
           * implement policy logic based on the values
           */

      }
  }

The vma::vm_file can also be marked with __safe_trusted_or_null.

No additional selftests are required since vma->vm_file and vma->vm_mm are
already validated in the existing selftest suite.

Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                   | 6 ++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d0adf5600c4d..9b4f6920f79b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7096,6 +7096,11 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) {
 	struct sock *sk;
 };
 
+BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) {
+	struct mm_struct *vm_mm;
+	struct file *vm_file;
+};
+
 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 			const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
@@ -7137,6 +7142,7 @@ static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 {
 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket));
 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry));
+	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct));
 
 	return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id,
 					  "__safe_trusted_or_null");
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
index 0c13b7409947..7de173daf27b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
@@ -89,14 +89,16 @@ SEC("lsm/file_mprotect")
 int BPF_PROG(test_int_hook, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	     unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, int ret)
 {
-	if (ret != 0)
+	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+
+	if (ret != 0 || !mm)
 		return ret;
 
 	__s32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
 	int is_stack = 0;
 
-	is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
-		    vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack);
+	is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
+		    vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack);
 
 	if (is_stack && monitored_pid == pid) {
 		mprotect_count++;
-- 
2.47.3