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Mon, 13 Oct 2025 14:56:20 -0700 (PDT) From: Deepak Gupta Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 14:56:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v20 10/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20251013-v5_user_cfi_series-v20-10-b9de4be9912e@rivosinc.com> References: <20251013-v5_user_cfi_series-v20-0-b9de4be9912e@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251013-v5_user_cfi_series-v20-0-b9de4be9912e@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Rspam-User: X-Stat-Signature: aq1iwqy7cbzrq8mg76nuroc7q1swjirc X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 85121A000C X-Rspamd-Server: rspam09 X-HE-Tag: 1760392582-521017 X-HE-Meta: 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 7grOQ7ts 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 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the security requirements for shadow stack memory since they lead to windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a shadow stack page. This patch implements this syscall for riscv. riscv doesn't require token to be setup by kernel because user mode can do that by itself. However to provide compatibility and portability with other architectues, user mode can specify token set flag. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 144 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile index f60fce69b725..2d0e0dcedbd3 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile @@ -125,3 +125,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) += acpi_numa.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += bugs.o +obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) += usercfi.o diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0b3bbb41490a --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos, Inc. + * Deepak Gupta + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *) + +/* + * Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` can happen + * implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` takes pointer to + * shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform writes on shadow + * stack. + */ +static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long *addr, unsigned long val) +{ + /* + * Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero + */ + unsigned long swap = -1; + + __enable_user_access(); + asm goto( + ".option push\n" + ".option arch, +zicfiss\n" + "1: ssamoswap.d %[swap], %[val], %[addr]\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault]) + ".option pop\n" + : [swap] "=r" (swap), [addr] "+A" (*addr) + : [val] "r" (val) + : "memory" + : fault + ); + __disable_user_access(); + return swap; +fault: + __disable_user_access(); + return -1; +} + +/* + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always XLEN wide + * and aligned to XLEN. + */ +static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr) +{ + unsigned long addr; + + /* Token must be aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */ + addr = ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE; + + if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long)ssp) == -1) + return -EFAULT; + + if (token_addr) + *token_addr = addr; + + return 0; +} + +static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, + unsigned long token_offset, bool set_tok) +{ + int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + unsigned long populate, tok_loc = 0; + + if (addr) + flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE; + + mmap_write_lock(mm); + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_READ, flags, + VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE, 0, &populate, NULL); + mmap_write_unlock(mm); + + if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) + goto out; + + if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, &tok_loc)) { + vm_munmap(addr, size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + addr = tok_loc; + +out: + return addr; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags) +{ + bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN; + unsigned long aligned_size = 0; + + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */ + if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP and is available + * CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index programmed in instruction + * itself. This provides static property on register programming and writes to CSR can't + * be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer has guarded areas + * which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not possible. Since + * CSR_SSP is writeable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack token subsequent + * to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other architecture (because + * `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expectation of a token + * flag in flags and if provided in flags, setup a token at the base. + */ + + /* If there isn't space for a token */ + if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE) + return -ENOSPC; + + if (addr && (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))) + return -EINVAL; + + aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); + if (aligned_size < size) + return -EOVERFLOW; + + return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok); +} -- 2.43.0