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From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 04/18] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 09:54:58 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250815085512.2182322-5-kevin.brodsky@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250815085512.2182322-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com>

Introduce a helper that sets the permissions of a given pkey
(POIndex) in the POR_ELx format, and make use of it in
arch_set_user_pkey_access().

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h |  7 +++++++
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c          | 26 ++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
index d913d5b529e4..bffb4d2b1246 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
@@ -31,4 +31,11 @@ static inline bool por_elx_allows_exec(u64 por, u8 pkey)
 	return perm & POE_X;
 }
 
+static inline u64 por_elx_set_pkey_perms(u64 por, u8 pkey, u64 perms)
+{
+	u64 shift = POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey);
+
+	return (por & ~(POE_MASK << shift)) | (perms << shift);
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_ARM64_POR_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 34e5d78af076..e41ed9e0d799 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -1597,8 +1597,8 @@ void __cpu_replace_ttbr1(pgd_t *pgdp, bool cnp)
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, unsigned long init_val)
 {
-	u64 new_por;
-	u64 old_por;
+	u64 new_perms;
+	u64 por;
 
 	if (!system_supports_poe())
 		return -ENOSPC;
@@ -1612,25 +1612,19 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, unsigned long i
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Set the bits we need in POR:  */
-	new_por = POE_RWX;
+	new_perms = POE_RWX;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
-		new_por &= ~POE_W;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_W;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
-		new_por &= ~POE_RW;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_RW;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_READ)
-		new_por &= ~POE_R;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_R;
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
-		new_por &= ~POE_X;
+		new_perms &= ~POE_X;
 
-	/* Shift the bits in to the correct place in POR for pkey: */
-	new_por = POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(pkey, new_por);
-
-	/* Get old POR and mask off any old bits in place: */
-	old_por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
-	old_por &= ~(POE_MASK << POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey));
-
-	/* Write old part along with new part: */
-	write_sysreg_s(old_por | new_por, SYS_POR_EL0);
+	por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
+	por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, pkey, new_perms);
+	write_sysreg_s(por, SYS_POR_EL0);
 
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.47.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-15  8:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-15  8:54 [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/18] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/18] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:54 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2025-08-15  8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/18] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/18] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/18] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/18] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/18] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-11-28 16:44   ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-12-01  9:19     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/18] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/18] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 16:37   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-18 16:02     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-18 17:01       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-19  9:35         ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-10-01 15:28   ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-01 17:22     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/18] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/18] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/18] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/18] arm64: mm: Batch kpkeys level switches Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:01   ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:18     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-21  7:23       ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-21 17:29 ` Yang Shi
2025-08-25  7:31   ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-26 19:18     ` Yang Shi
2025-08-27 16:09       ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-29 22:31         ` Yang Shi
2025-09-18 14:15     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 14:57       ` Will Deacon
2025-10-01 12:22         ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 17:31       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-01 12:41         ` Kevin Brodsky

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