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Tue, 29 Apr 2025 17:17:48 -0700 (PDT) From: Deepak Gupta Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2025 17:16:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v14 26/27] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20250429-v5_user_cfi_series-v14-26-5239410d012a@rivosinc.com> References: <20250429-v5_user_cfi_series-v14-0-5239410d012a@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20250429-v5_user_cfi_series-v14-0-5239410d012a@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. 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Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 180 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst index be7237b69682..e240eb0ceb70 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ RISC-V architecture vector cmodx zicfilp + zicfiss features diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b50089e6a52b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +:Author: Deepak Gupta +:Date: 12 January 2024 + +========================================================= +Shadow stack to protect function returns on RISC-V Linux +========================================================= + +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Linux +to enable shadow stack for user mode applications on RISC-V + +1. Feature Overview +-------------------- + +Memory corruption issues usually result into crashes, however when in hands of +an adversary and if used creatively can result into a variety security issues. + +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where +adversary can use corrupt return addresses present on stack and chain them +together to perform return oriented programming (ROP) and thus compromising +control flow integrity (CFI) of the program. + +Return addresses live on stack and thus in read-write memory and thus are +susceptible to corruption and which allows an adversary to reach any program +counter (PC) in address space. On RISC-V ``zicfiss`` extension provides an +alternate stack termed as shadow stack on which return addresses can be safely +placed in prolog of the function and retrieved in epilog. ``zicfiss`` extension +makes following changes: + +- PTE encodings for shadow stack virtual memory + An earlier reserved encoding in first stage translation i.e. + PTE.R=0, PTE.W=1, PTE.X=0 becomes PTE encoding for shadow stack pages. + +- ``sspush x1/x5`` instruction pushes (stores) ``x1/x5`` to shadow stack. + +- ``sspopchk x1/x5`` instruction pops (loads) from shadow stack and compares + with ``x1/x5`` and if un-equal, CPU raises ``software check exception`` with + ``*tval = 3`` + +Compiler toolchain makes sure that function prologue have ``sspush x1/x5`` to +save return address on shadow stack in addition to regular stack. Similarly +function epilogs have ``ld x5, offset(x2)`` followed by ``sspopchk x5`` to +ensure that popped value from regular stack matches with popped value from +shadow stack. + +2. Shadow stack protections and linux memory manager +----------------------------------------------------- + +As mentioned earlier, shadow stacks get new page table encodings and thus have +some special properties assigned to them and instructions that operate on them +as below: + +- Regular stores to shadow stack memory raises access store faults. This way + shadow stack memory is protected from stray inadvertent writes. + +- Regular loads to shadow stack memory are allowed. This allows stack trace + utilities or backtrace functions to read true callstack (not tampered). + +- Only shadow stack instructions can generate shadow stack load or shadow stack + store. + +- Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-only memory raises AMO/store + page fault. Thus both ``sspush x1/x5`` and ``sspopchk x1/x5`` will raise AMO/ + store page fault. This simplies COW handling in kernel during fork, kernel + can convert shadow stack pages into read-only memory (as it does for regular + read-write memory) and as soon as subsequent ``sspush`` or ``sspopchk`` in + userspace is encountered, then kernel can perform COW. + +- Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-write, read-write-execute + memory raises an access fault. This is a fatal condition because shadow stack + should never be operating on read-write, read-write-execute memory. + +3. ELF and psABI +----------------- + +Toolchain sets up :c:macro:`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_BCFI` for property +:c:macro:`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object file. + +4. Linux enabling +------------------ + +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address space +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been compiled +with support of shadow stack. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable +shadow stack for the program. + +5. prctl() enabling +-------------------- + +:c:macro:`PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` / :c:macro:`PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` / +:c:macro:`PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage shadow +stack enabling for tasks. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other +arches. + +* prctl(PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, unsigned long arg) + +If arg1 :c:macro:`PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` and if CPU supports ``zicfiss`` then +kernel will enable shadow stack for the task. Dynamic loader can issue this +:c:macro:`prctl` once it has determined that all the objects loaded in address +space have support for shadow stack. Additionally if there is a +:c:macro:`dlopen` to an object which wasn't compiled with ``zicfiss``, dynamic +loader can issue this prctl with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. +:c:macro:`PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` being clear) + +* prctl(PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, unsigned long *arg) + +Returns current status of indirect branch tracking. If enabled it'll return +:c:macro:`PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE`. + +* prctl(PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, unsigned long arg) + +Locks current status of shadow stack enabling on the task. User space may want +to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want loading of objects +without ``zicfiss`` support in it and thus would want to disallow disabling of +shadow stack on current task. In that case user space can use this prctl to +lock current settings. + +5. violations related to returns with shadow stack enabled +----------------------------------------------------------- + +Pertaining to shadow stack, CPU raises software check exception in following +condition: + +- On execution of ``sspopchk x1/x5``, ``x1/x5`` didn't match top of shadow + stack. If mismatch happens then cpu does ``*tval = 3`` and raise software + check exception. + +Linux kernel will treat this as :c:macro:`SIGSEV`` with code = +:c:macro:`SEGV_CPERR` and follow normal course of signal delivery. + +6. Shadow stack tokens +----------------------- +Regular stores on shadow stacks are not allowed and thus can't be tampered +with via arbitrary stray writes due to bugs. However method of pivoting / +switching to shadow stack is simply writing to csr ``CSR_SSP`` and that will +change active shadow stack for the program. Instances of writes to ``CSR_SSP`` +in the address space of the program should be mostly limited to context +switching, stack unwind, longjmp or similar mechanisms (like context switching +of green threads) in languages like go, rust. This can be problematic because +an attacker can use memory corruption bugs and eventually use such context +switching routines to pivot to any shadow stack. Shadow stack tokens can help +mitigate this problem by making sure that: + +- When software is switching away from a shadow stack, shadow stack pointer + should be saved on shadow stack itself and call it ``shadow stack token`` + +- When software is switching to a shadow stack, it should read the + ``shadow stack token`` from shadow stack pointer and verify that + ``shadow stack token`` itself is pointer to shadow stack itself. + +- Once the token verification is done, software can perform the write to + ``CSR_SSP`` to switch shadow stack. + +Here software can be user mode task runtime itself which is managing various +contexts as part of single thread. Software can be kernel as well when kernel +has to deliver a signal to user task and must save shadow stack pointer. Kernel +can perform similar procedure by saving a token on user shadow stack itself. +This way whenever :c:macro:`sigreturn` happens, kernel can read the token and +verify the token and then switch to shadow stack. Using this mechanism, kernel +helps user task so that any corruption issue in user task is not exploited by +adversary by arbitrarily using :c:macro:`sigreturn`. Adversary will have to +make sure that there is a ``shadow stack token`` in addition to invoking +:c:macro:`sigreturn` + +7. Signal shadow stack +----------------------- +Following structure has been added to sigcontext for RISC-V:: + + struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state { + unsigned long ss_ptr; + }; + +As part of signal delivery, shadow stack token is saved on current shadow stack +itself and updated pointer is saved away in :c:macro:`ss_ptr` field in +:c:macro:`__sc_riscv_cfi_state` under :c:macro:`sigcontext`. Existing shadow +stack allocation is used for signal delivery. During :c:macro:`sigreturn`, +kernel will obtain :c:macro:`ss_ptr` from :c:macro:`sigcontext` and verify the +saved token on shadow stack itself and switch shadow stack. -- 2.43.0