From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: omosnace@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH] vfs,shmem,kernfs: fix listxattr to include security.* xattrs
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 08:46:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250424124644.4413-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> (raw)
The vfs has long had a fallback to obtain the security.* xattrs from the
LSM when the filesystem does not implement its own listxattr, but
shmem/tmpfs and kernfs later gained their own xattr handlers to support
other xattrs. Unfortunately, as a side effect, tmpfs and kernfs-based
filesystems like sysfs no longer return the synthetic security.* xattr
names via listxattr unless they are explicitly set by userspace or
initially set upon inode creation after policy load. coreutils has
recently switched from unconditionally invoking getxattr for security.*
for ls -Z via libselinux to only doing so if listxattr returns the xattr
name, breaking ls -Z of such inodes.
Before:
$ getfattr -m.* /run/initramfs
<no output>
$ getfattr -m.* /sys/kernel/fscaps
<no output>
After:
$ getfattr -m.* /run/initramfs
security.selinux
$ getfattr -m.* /sys/kernel/fscaps
security.selinux
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNtF8wDyQajPCdGn=iOawX4y77ph0EcfcqcUUj+T87FKyA@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20250423175728.3185-2-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/xattr.c | 13 +++++++++++++
mm/shmem.c | 8 +++++++-
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index b83054da68b3..8fd69e48d32d 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -140,12 +140,18 @@ ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size)
{
struct kernfs_node *kn = kernfs_dentry_node(dentry);
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
+ ssize_t sz;
attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
if (!attrs)
return -ENOMEM;
- return simple_xattr_list(d_inode(dentry), &attrs->xattrs, buf, size);
+ sz = simple_xattr_list(d_inode(dentry), &attrs->xattrs, buf, size);
+ if (sz >= 0 && sz <= size)
+ sz += security_inode_listsecurity(d_inode(dentry),
+ buf ? buf + sz : NULL,
+ size - sz);
+ return sz;
}
static inline void set_default_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 02bee149ad96..68ac91d0dbc3 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -1428,6 +1428,15 @@ static bool xattr_is_trusted(const char *name)
return !strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN);
}
+static bool xattr_is_maclabel(const char *name)
+{
+ const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
+
+ return !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) &&
+ security_ismaclabel(suffix);
+}
+
/**
* simple_xattr_list - list all xattr objects
* @inode: inode from which to get the xattrs
@@ -1468,6 +1477,10 @@ ssize_t simple_xattr_list(struct inode *inode, struct simple_xattrs *xattrs,
if (!trusted && xattr_is_trusted(xattr->name))
continue;
+ /* skip MAC labels; these are provided by LSM separately */
+ if (xattr_is_maclabel(xattr->name))
+ continue;
+
err = xattr_list_one(&buffer, &remaining_size, xattr->name);
if (err)
break;
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index 99327c30507c..69f664668a3a 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -4372,7 +4372,13 @@ static const struct xattr_handler * const shmem_xattr_handlers[] = {
static ssize_t shmem_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(d_inode(dentry));
- return simple_xattr_list(d_inode(dentry), &info->xattrs, buffer, size);
+ ssize_t sz = simple_xattr_list(d_inode(dentry), &info->xattrs, buffer,
+ size);
+ if (sz >= 0 && sz <= size)
+ sz += security_inode_listsecurity(d_inode(dentry),
+ buffer ? buffer + sz : NULL,
+ size - sz);
+ return sz;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR */
--
2.49.0
next reply other threads:[~2025-04-24 12:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-24 12:46 Stephen Smalley [this message]
2025-04-24 13:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-04-24 13:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-04-24 14:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-04-24 15:43 ` Stephen Smalley
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