From: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>,
Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 07/11] mm/vmalloc: Warn on improper use of vunmap_range()
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 09:18:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250422081822.1836315-8-ryan.roberts@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250422081822.1836315-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com>
A call to vmalloc_huge() may cause memory blocks to be mapped at pmd or
pud level. But it is possible to subsequently call vunmap_range() on a
sub-range of the mapped memory, which partially overlaps a pmd or pud.
In this case, vmalloc unmaps the entire pmd or pud so that the
no-overlapping portion is also unmapped. Clearly that would have a bad
outcome, but it's not something that any callers do today as far as I
can tell. So I guess it's just expected that callers will not do this.
However, it would be useful to know if this happened in future; let's
add a warning to cover the eventuality.
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
---
mm/vmalloc.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
index 3ed720a787ec..d60d3a29d149 100644
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -374,8 +374,10 @@ static void vunmap_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
if (cleared || pmd_bad(*pmd))
*mask |= PGTBL_PMD_MODIFIED;
- if (cleared)
+ if (cleared) {
+ WARN_ON(next - addr < PMD_SIZE);
continue;
+ }
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
vunmap_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, mask);
@@ -399,8 +401,10 @@ static void vunmap_pud_range(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
if (cleared || pud_bad(*pud))
*mask |= PGTBL_PUD_MODIFIED;
- if (cleared)
+ if (cleared) {
+ WARN_ON(next - addr < PUD_SIZE);
continue;
+ }
if (pud_none_or_clear_bad(pud))
continue;
vunmap_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, mask);
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-22 8:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-22 8:18 [PATCH v4 00/11] Perf improvements for hugetlb and vmalloc on arm64 Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] arm64: hugetlb: Cleanup huge_pte size discovery mechanisms Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] arm64: hugetlb: Refine tlb maintenance scope Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] mm/page_table_check: Batch-check pmds/puds just like ptes Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] arm64/mm: Refactor __set_ptes() and __ptep_get_and_clear() Ryan Roberts
2025-04-24 9:26 ` Anshuman Khandual
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] arm64: hugetlb: Use __set_ptes_anysz() and __ptep_get_and_clear_anysz() Ryan Roberts
2025-04-24 9:40 ` Anshuman Khandual
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] arm64/mm: Hoist barriers out of set_ptes_anysz() loop Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` Ryan Roberts [this message]
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] mm/vmalloc: Gracefully unmap huge ptes Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] arm64/mm: Support huge pte-mapped pages in vmap Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] mm/vmalloc: Enter lazy mmu mode while manipulating vmalloc ptes Ryan Roberts
2025-04-22 8:18 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] arm64/mm: Batch barriers when updating kernel mappings Ryan Roberts
2025-04-24 9:13 ` Anshuman Khandual
2025-04-23 19:18 ` [PATCH v4 00/11] Perf improvements for hugetlb and vmalloc on arm64 Luiz Capitulino
2025-05-08 14:00 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-05-09 13:55 ` Will Deacon
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