From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 17/18] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 10:16:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250411091631.954228-18-kevin.brodsky@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250411091631.954228-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Add basic tests for the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature: try to
perform a direct write to kernel and user page table entries and
ensure it fails.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
mm/Makefile | 1 +
mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++
security/Kconfig.hardening | 12 +++
3 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index 0f30cc85c6f1..778df78c65d5 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -149,3 +149,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EXECMEM) += execmem.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TMPFS_QUOTA) += shmem_quota.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PT_RECLAIM) += pt_reclaim.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES) += kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES_KUNIT_TEST) += tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.o
diff --git a/mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c b/mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6e29721262b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+KUNIT_DEFINE_ACTION_WRAPPER(vfree_wrapper, vfree, const void *);
+
+static void write_linear_map_pte(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ pte_t *ptep;
+ pte_t pte;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!arch_kpkeys_enabled())
+ kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+ /*
+ * The choice of address is mostly arbitrary - we just need something
+ * that falls in the linear mapping, such as the address of a global
+ * variable.
+ */
+ ptep = virt_to_kpte((unsigned long)&init_mm);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, ptep, "Failed to get PTE");
+
+ pte = ptep_get(ptep);
+ pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_WRITE));
+ ret = copy_to_kernel_nofault(ptep, &pte, sizeof(pte));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, ret, -EFAULT,
+ "Direct PTE write wasn't prevented");
+}
+
+static void write_kernel_vmalloc_pte(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ void *mem;
+ pte_t *ptep;
+ pte_t pte;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!arch_kpkeys_enabled())
+ kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+ mem = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, mem);
+ ret = kunit_add_action_or_reset(test, vfree_wrapper, mem);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, 0);
+
+ ptep = virt_to_kpte((unsigned long)mem);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, ptep, "Failed to get PTE");
+
+ pte = ptep_get(ptep);
+ pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_WRITE));
+ ret = copy_to_kernel_nofault(ptep, &pte, sizeof(pte));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, ret, -EFAULT,
+ "Direct PTE write wasn't prevented");
+}
+
+static void write_user_pmd(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ pmd_t *pmdp;
+ pmd_t pmd;
+ unsigned long uaddr;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!arch_kpkeys_enabled())
+ kunit_skip(test, "kpkeys are not supported");
+
+ uaddr = kunit_vm_mmap(test, NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_POPULATE, 0);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NE_MSG(test, uaddr, 0, "Could not create userspace mm");
+
+ /* We passed MAP_POPULATE so a PMD should already be allocated */
+ pmdp = pmd_off(current->mm, uaddr);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL_MSG(test, pmdp, "Failed to get PMD");
+
+ pmd = pmdp_get(pmdp);
+ pmd = set_pmd_bit(pmd, __pgprot(PROT_SECT_NORMAL));
+ ret = copy_to_kernel_nofault(pmdp, &pmd, sizeof(pmd));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, ret, -EFAULT,
+ "Direct PMD write wasn't prevented");
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_cases[] = {
+ KUNIT_CASE(write_linear_map_pte),
+ KUNIT_CASE(write_kernel_vmalloc_pte),
+ KUNIT_CASE(write_user_pmd),
+ {}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_suite = {
+ .name = "Hardened pgtables using kpkeys",
+ .test_cases = kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_cases,
+};
+kunit_test_suite(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_test_suite);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Tests for the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index c2b0987768ca..cc3458510e97 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -346,6 +346,18 @@ config KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
This option has no effect if the system does not support
kernel pkeys.
+config KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES_KUNIT_TEST
+ tristate "KUnit tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+ depends on KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+ depends on KUNIT
+ default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+ help
+ Enable this option to check that the kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature
+ functions as intended, i.e. prevents arbitrary writes to user and
+ kernel page tables.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
endmenu
config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
--
2.47.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-11 9:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-11 9:16 [RFC PATCH v4 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/18] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/18] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/18] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/18] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/18] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/18] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/18] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/18] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/18] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/18] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/18] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/18] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:16 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2025-04-11 9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/18] arm64: mm: Batch kpkeys level switches Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11 9:21 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Ingo Molnar
2025-04-11 12:37 ` Kevin Brodsky
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250411091631.954228-18-kevin.brodsky@arm.com \
--to=kevin.brodsky@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=broonie@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=david@redhat.com \
--cc=ira.weiny@intel.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jeffxu@chromium.org \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=pierre.langlois@arm.com \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=ryan.roberts@arm.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox