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From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
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	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 10/18] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey()
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 10:16:23 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250411091631.954228-11-kevin.brodsky@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250411091631.954228-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com>

kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() allows setting the pkey of all page table
pages in swapper_pg_dir, recursively. This will be needed by
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables, as it relies on all PTPs being mapped with
a non-default pkey. Those initial kernel page tables cannot
practically be assigned a non-default pkey right when they are
allocated, so mutating them during (early) boot is required.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/mm.h |   2 +
 mm/memory.c        | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 139 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index ef420f4dc72c..dd1b918dc294 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -4240,6 +4240,8 @@ int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *st
 int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
 int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
 
+int kernel_pgtables_set_pkey(int pkey);
+
 
 /*
  * mseal of userspace process's system mappings.
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 2d8c265fc7d6..37c2bb35faea 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/sched/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/kmem.h>
 
@@ -7376,3 +7378,138 @@ void vma_pgtable_walk_end(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
 		hugetlb_vma_unlock_read(vma);
 }
+
+static int __init set_page_pkey(void *p, int pkey)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)p;
+
+	/*
+	 * swapper_pg_dir itself will be made read-only by mark_rodata_ro()
+	 * so there is no point in changing its pkey.
+	 */
+	if (p == swapper_pg_dir)
+		return 0;
+
+	return set_memory_pkey(addr, 1, pkey);
+}
+
+static int __init set_pkey_pte(pmd_t *pmd, int pkey)
+{
+	pte_t *pte;
+	int err;
+
+	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0);
+	err = set_page_pkey(pte, pkey);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int __init set_pkey_pmd(pud_t *pud, int pkey)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	int i, err = 0;
+
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
+
+	err = set_page_pkey(pmd, pkey);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+		if (pmd_none(pmd[i]) || pmd_bad(pmd[i]) || pmd_leaf(pmd[i]))
+			continue;
+		err = set_pkey_pte(&pmd[i], pkey);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int __init set_pkey_pud(p4d_t *p4d, int pkey)
+{
+	pud_t *pud;
+	int i, err = 0;
+
+	if (mm_pmd_folded(&init_mm))
+		return set_pkey_pmd((pud_t *)p4d, pkey);
+
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
+
+	err = set_page_pkey(pud, pkey);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
+		if (pud_none(pud[i]) || pud_bad(pud[i]) || pud_leaf(pud[i]))
+			continue;
+		err = set_pkey_pmd(&pud[i], pkey);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int __init set_pkey_p4d(pgd_t *pgd, int pkey)
+{
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	int i, err = 0;
+
+	if (mm_pud_folded(&init_mm))
+		return set_pkey_pud((p4d_t *)pgd, pkey);
+
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, 0);
+
+	err = set_page_pkey(p4d, pkey);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
+		if (p4d_none(p4d[i]) || p4d_bad(p4d[i]) || p4d_leaf(p4d[i]))
+			continue;
+		err = set_pkey_pud(&p4d[i], pkey);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kernel_pgtables_set_pkey - set pkey for all kernel page table pages
+ * @pkey: pkey to set the page table pages to
+ *
+ * Walks swapper_pg_dir setting the protection key of every page table page (at
+ * all levels) to @pkey. swapper_pg_dir itself is left untouched as it is
+ * expected to be mapped read-only by mark_rodata_ro().
+ *
+ * No-op if the architecture does not support kpkeys.
+ */
+int __init kernel_pgtables_set_pkey(int pkey)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd = swapper_pg_dir;
+	int i, err = 0;
+
+	if (!arch_kpkeys_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
+
+	if (mm_p4d_folded(&init_mm)) {
+		err = set_pkey_p4d(pgd, pkey);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++) {
+		if (pgd_none(pgd[i]) || pgd_bad(pgd[i]) || pgd_leaf(pgd[i]))
+			continue;
+		err = set_pkey_p4d(&pgd[i], pkey);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+	}
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
+	return err;
+}
-- 
2.47.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-11  9:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-11  9:16 [RFC PATCH v4 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/18] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/18] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/18] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/18] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/18] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/18] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/18] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/18] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/18] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/18] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/18] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/18] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/18] arm64: mm: Batch kpkeys level switches Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-11  9:21 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Ingo Molnar
2025-04-11 12:37   ` Kevin Brodsky

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