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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	jack@suse.cz, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
	syzbot <syzbot+1c486d0b62032c82a968@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [fs?] [mm?] KCSAN: data-race in bprm_execve / copy_fs (4)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2025 19:14:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250323181419.GA14883@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250322185007.GI2023217@ZenIV>

On 03/22, Al Viro wrote:
>
> On Sat, Mar 22, 2025 at 04:55:39PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>
> > And this means that we just need to ensure that ->in_exec is cleared
> > before this mutex is dropped, no? Something like below?
>
> Probably should work, but I wonder if it would be cleaner to have
> ->in_exec replaced with pointer to task_struct responsible.  Not
> "somebody with that fs_struct for ->fs is trying to do execve(),
> has verified that nothing outside of their threads is using this
> and had been holding ->signal->cred_guard_mutex ever since then",
> but "this is the thread that..."

perhaps... or something else to make this "not immediately obvious"
fs->in_exec more clear.

But I guess we need something simple for -stable, so will you agree
with this fix for now? Apart from changelog/comments.

	retval = de_thread(me);
+	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
	if (retval)
		current->fs->in_exec = 0;

is correct but looks confusing. See "V2" below, it clears fs->in_exec
after the "if (retval)" check.

syzbot says:

	Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.

so I guess "#syz test: " is pointless right now...

Oleg.
---

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 506cd411f4ac..02e8824fc9cd 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1236,6 +1236,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	if (retval)
 		goto out;
 
+	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 	/*
 	 * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
 	 */
@@ -1497,6 +1498,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	}
 	free_arg_pages(bprm);
 	if (bprm->cred) {
+		// for the case exec fails before de_thread()
+		current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 		mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 		abort_creds(bprm->cred);
 	}
@@ -1862,7 +1865,6 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
 	/* execve succeeded */
-	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 	current->in_execve = 0;
 	rseq_execve(current);
 	user_events_execve(current);
@@ -1881,7 +1883,6 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV);
 
 	sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
-	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 	current->in_execve = 0;
 
 	return retval;



  reply	other threads:[~2025-03-23 18:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-20 19:09 syzbot
2025-03-20 20:09 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-21  1:44   ` Al Viro
2025-03-21  8:10     ` Kees Cook
2025-03-21  8:49       ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-21  8:45   ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-22  1:00     ` Al Viro
2025-03-22  6:26       ` Kees Cook
2025-03-22 10:15         ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-22 10:28           ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-22 10:23       ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-22 15:55       ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-22 18:50         ` Al Viro
2025-03-23 18:14           ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2025-03-23 20:57             ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-24 16:00 ` [PATCH] exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-24 17:01   ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-24 18:27     ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-24 18:37       ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-24 22:24       ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-25 10:09         ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-25 11:01           ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-25 13:21             ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-25 13:30               ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-25 14:15                 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-25 14:46                   ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-25 18:40                     ` Kees Cook
2025-04-29 15:49   ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-04-29 16:57     ` Kees Cook
2025-04-29 17:12     ` Mateusz Guzik

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