From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
jack@suse.cz, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
syzbot <syzbot+1c486d0b62032c82a968@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [fs?] [mm?] KCSAN: data-race in bprm_execve / copy_fs (4)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 01:00:08 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250322010008.GG2023217@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250321-abdecken-infomaterial-2f373f8e3b3c@brauner>
On Fri, Mar 21, 2025 at 09:45:39AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> Afaict, the only way this data race can happen is if we jump to the
> cleanup label and then reset current->fs->in_exec. If the execve was
> successful there's no one to race us with CLONE_FS obviously because we
> took down all other threads.
Not really.
1) A enters check_unsafe_execve(), sets ->in_exec to 1
2) B enters check_unsafe_execve(), sets ->in_exec to 1
3) A calls exec_binprm(), fails (bad binary)
4) A clears ->in_exec
5) C calls clone(2) with CLONE_FS and spawns D - ->in_exec is 0
6) B gets through exec_binprm(), kills A and C, but not D.
7) B clears ->in_exec, returns
Result: B and D share ->fs, B runs suid binary.
Had (5) happened prior to (2), (2) wouldn't have set ->in_exec;
had (5) happened prior to (4), clone() would've failed; had
(5) been delayed past (6), there wouldn't have been a thread
to call clone().
But in the window between (4) and (6), clone() doesn't see
execve() in progress and check_unsafe_execve() has already
been done, so it hadn't seen the extra thread.
IOW, it really is racy. It's a counter, not a flag.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-22 1:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-20 19:09 syzbot
2025-03-20 20:09 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-21 1:44 ` Al Viro
2025-03-21 8:10 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-21 8:49 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-21 8:45 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-22 1:00 ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-03-22 6:26 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-22 10:15 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-22 10:28 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-22 10:23 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-22 15:55 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-22 18:50 ` Al Viro
2025-03-23 18:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-23 20:57 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-24 16:00 ` [PATCH] exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-24 17:01 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-24 18:27 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-24 18:37 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-24 22:24 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-25 10:09 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-25 11:01 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-25 13:21 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-03-25 13:30 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-25 14:15 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-03-25 14:46 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-25 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2025-04-29 15:49 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-04-29 16:57 ` Kees Cook
2025-04-29 17:12 ` Mateusz Guzik
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