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From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
	Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 13/15] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys
Date: Mon,  3 Feb 2025 10:18:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250203101839.1223008-14-kevin.brodsky@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250203101839.1223008-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com>

When CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is enabled, page tables (both
user and kernel) are mapped with a privileged pkey in the linear
mapping. As a result, they can only be written under the
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables guard, which sets POR_EL1 appropriately to
allow such writes.

Use this guard wherever page tables genuinely need to be written,
keeping its scope as small as possible (so that POR_EL1 is reset as
fast as possible). Where atomics are involved, the guard's scope
encompasses the whole loop to avoid switching POR_EL1 unnecessarily.

This patch is a no-op if CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is disabled
(default).

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c            |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 0b2a2ad1b9e8..37ce03a6ab70 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/page_table_check.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_FLUSH_PMD_TLB_RANGE
@@ -314,6 +315,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline void __set_pte_nosync(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
 {
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*ptep, pte);
 }
 
@@ -758,6 +760,7 @@ static inline void set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 	}
 #endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pmdp, pmd);
 
 	if (pmd_valid(pmd)) {
@@ -825,6 +828,7 @@ static inline void set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pudp, pud);
 
 	if (pud_valid(pud)) {
@@ -906,6 +910,7 @@ static inline void set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
 	dsb(ishst);
 	isb();
@@ -1033,6 +1038,7 @@ static inline void set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pgdp, pgd);
 	dsb(ishst);
 	isb();
@@ -1233,6 +1239,7 @@ static inline int __ptep_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte, pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
@@ -1279,7 +1286,10 @@ static inline int pmdp_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 static inline pte_t __ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				       unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep)
 {
-	pte_t pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
+	pte_t pte;
+
+	scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+		pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
 
 	page_table_check_pte_clear(mm, pte);
 
@@ -1322,7 +1332,10 @@ static inline pte_t __get_and_clear_full_ptes(struct mm_struct *mm,
 static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
 					    unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
-	pmd_t pmd = __pmd(xchg_relaxed(&pmd_val(*pmdp), 0));
+	pmd_t pmd;
+
+	scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+		pmd = __pmd(xchg_relaxed(&pmd_val(*pmdp), 0));
 
 	page_table_check_pmd_clear(mm, pmd);
 
@@ -1336,6 +1349,7 @@ static inline void ___ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
 		pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
@@ -1369,6 +1383,7 @@ static inline void __clear_young_dirty_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
 
@@ -1416,6 +1431,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 {
 	page_table_check_pmd_set(vma->vm_mm, pmdp, pmd);
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	return __pmd(xchg_relaxed(&pmd_val(*pmdp), pmd_val(pmd)));
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index ef63651099a9..ab45047155b9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ int __ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	if (pte_same(pte, entry))
 		return 0;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
+
 	/* only preserve the access flags and write permission */
 	pte_val(entry) &= PTE_RDONLY | PTE_AF | PTE_WRITE | PTE_DIRTY;
 
-- 
2.47.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-02-03 10:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-03 10:18 [RFC PATCH v3 00/15] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/15] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/15] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/15] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/15] arm64: Introduce por_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/15] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/15] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/15] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/15] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-06 19:01   ` Linus Walleij
2025-02-07 14:33     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/15] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/15] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/15] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/15] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/15] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-03 10:18 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/15] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-06 22:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/15] pkeys-based page table hardening Kees Cook
2025-02-10 14:23   ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-02-13 14:54     ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-03-06 16:23 ` Maxwell Bland
2025-03-13 12:32   ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-03-19 21:54     ` Maxwell Bland
2025-03-25 17:11       ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-03-28 16:15         ` Maxwell Bland
2025-04-04  7:57           ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-04-14 22:43             ` Maxwell Bland

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