From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Isaac Manjarres <isaacmanjarres@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>,
Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
kernel-team@android.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>,
John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/2] mm/memfd: Add support for F_SEAL_FUTURE_EXEC to memfd
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 13:29:44 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202501141326.E81023D@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z4bC1I1GTlXiJhvS@google.com>
On Tue, Jan 14, 2025 at 12:02:28PM -0800, Isaac Manjarres wrote:
> I think the main issue in the threat model that I described is that
> an attacking process can gain control of a more priveleged process.
I understood it to be about an attacker gaining execution control through
a rewritten function pointer, not that they already have arbitrary
execution control. (i.e. taking a "jump anywhere" primitive and
upgrading it to "execute anything".) Is the expectation that existing
ROP/JOP techniques make protecting memfd irrelevant?
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-14 21:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-06 1:09 [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Add file seal to prevent future exec mappings Isaac J. Manjarres
2024-12-06 1:09 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/2] mm/memfd: Add support for F_SEAL_FUTURE_EXEC to memfd Isaac J. Manjarres
2024-12-06 17:49 ` Kalesh Singh
2024-12-06 20:50 ` Isaac Manjarres
2024-12-06 18:19 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-06 20:48 ` Isaac Manjarres
2024-12-06 21:14 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-11 20:56 ` Isaac Manjarres
2025-01-03 15:13 ` Jann Horn
2025-01-06 18:26 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-07 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-08 19:06 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-08 22:07 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-09 23:30 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-14 20:02 ` Isaac Manjarres
2025-01-14 21:29 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-01-14 22:42 ` Isaac Manjarres
2025-01-14 23:41 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-14 23:56 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-06 1:09 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/2] selftests/memfd: Add tests for F_SEAL_FUTURE_EXEC Isaac J. Manjarres
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