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From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>,
	 Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
	 Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com>,
	Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>,
	 WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	 Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	 Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>,
	Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>,
	 Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi>,
	Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
	 "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	 Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	 Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
	 Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	 Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	 Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	 Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
	 Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>,
	 "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
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	Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	 Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
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	Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
	 Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
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	 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
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	 Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
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	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,  Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 25/29] mm: asi: Restricted execution fore bare-metal processes
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2025 18:40:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250110-asi-rfc-v2-v2-25-8419288bc805@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250110-asi-rfc-v2-v2-0-8419288bc805@google.com>

Now userspace gets a restricted address space too. The critical section
begins on exit to userspace and ends when it makes a system call.
Other entries from userspace just interrupt the critical section via
asi_intr_enter().

The reason why system calls have to actually asi_relax() (i.e. fully
terminate the critical section instead of just interrupting it) is that
system calls are the type of kernel entry that can lead to transition
into a _different_ ASI domain, namely the KVM one: it is not supported
to transition into a different domain while a critical section exists
(i.e. while asi_state.target is not NULL), even if it has been paused by
asi_intr_enter() (i.e. even if asi_state.intr_nest_depth is nonzero) -
there must be an asi_relax() between any two asi_enter()s.

The restricted address space for bare-metal tasks naturally contains the
entire userspace address region, although the task's own memory is still
missing from the direct map.

This implementation creates new userspace-specific APIs for asi_init(),
asi_destroy() and asi_enter(), which seems a little ugly, maybe this
suggest a general rework of these APIs given that the "generic" version
only has one caller. For RFC code this seems good enough though.

Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h   |  8 ++++++--
 arch/x86/mm/asi.c            | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 include/asm-generic/asi.h    |  9 +++++++-
 include/linux/entry-common.h | 11 ++++++++++
 init/main.c                  |  2 ++
 kernel/entry/common.c        |  1 +
 kernel/fork.c                |  4 +++-
 7 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h
index e925d7d2cfc85bca8480c837548654e7a5a7009e..c3c1a57f0147ae9bd11d89c8bf7c8a4477728f51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h
@@ -140,19 +140,23 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct asi *, curr_asi);
 
 void asi_check_boottime_disable(void);
 
-void asi_init_mm_state(struct mm_struct *mm);
+int asi_init_mm_state(struct mm_struct *mm);
 
 int asi_init_class(enum asi_class_id class_id, struct asi_taint_policy *taint_policy);
+void asi_init_userspace_class(void);
 void asi_uninit_class(enum asi_class_id class_id);
 const char *asi_class_name(enum asi_class_id class_id);
 
 int asi_init(struct mm_struct *mm, enum asi_class_id class_id, struct asi **out_asi);
 void asi_destroy(struct asi *asi);
+void asi_destroy_userspace(struct mm_struct *mm);
 void asi_clone_user_pgtbl(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgdp);
 
 /* Enter an ASI domain (restricted address space) and begin the critical section. */
 void asi_enter(struct asi *asi);
 
+void asi_enter_userspace(void);
+
 /*
  * Leave the "tense" state if we are in it, i.e. end the critical section. We
  * will stay relaxed until the next asi_enter.
@@ -294,7 +298,7 @@ void asi_handle_switch_mm(void);
  */
 static inline bool asi_maps_user_addr(enum asi_class_id class_id)
 {
-	return false;
+	return class_id == ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE;
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/asi.c b/arch/x86/mm/asi.c
index 093103c1bc2677c81d68008aca064fab53b73a62..1e9dc568e79e8686a4dbf47f765f2c2535d025ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/asi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/asi.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *asi_class_names[] = {
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
 	[ASI_CLASS_KVM] = "KVM",
 #endif
+	[ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE] = "userspace",
 };
 
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct asi *, curr_asi);
@@ -67,6 +68,32 @@ int asi_init_class(enum asi_class_id class_id, struct asi_taint_policy *taint_po
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asi_init_class);
 
+void __init asi_init_userspace_class(void)
+{
+	static struct asi_taint_policy policy = {
+		/*
+		 * Prevent going to userspace with sensitive data potentially
+		 * left in sidechannels by code running in the unrestricted
+		 * address space, or another MM. Note we don't check for guest
+		 * data here. This reflects the assumption that the guest trusts
+		 * its VMM (absent fancy HW features, which are orthogonal).
+		 */
+		.protect_data = ASI_TAINT_KERNEL_DATA | ASI_TAINT_OTHER_MM_DATA,
+		/*
+		 * Don't go into userspace with control flow state controlled by
+		 * other processes, or any KVM guest the process is running.
+		 * Note this bit is about protecting userspace from other parts
+		 * of the system, while data_taints is about protecting other
+		 * parts of the system from the guest.
+		 */
+		.prevent_control = ASI_TAINT_GUEST_CONTROL | ASI_TAINT_OTHER_MM_CONTROL,
+		.set = ASI_TAINT_USER_CONTROL | ASI_TAINT_USER_DATA,
+	};
+	int err = asi_init_class(ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE, &policy);
+
+	WARN_ON(err);
+}
+
 void asi_uninit_class(enum asi_class_id class_id)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ASI))
@@ -385,7 +412,8 @@ int asi_init(struct mm_struct *mm, enum asi_class_id class_id, struct asi **out_
 	int err = 0;
 	uint i;
 
-	*out_asi = NULL;
+	if (out_asi)
+		*out_asi = NULL;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ASI))
 		return 0;
@@ -424,7 +452,7 @@ int asi_init(struct mm_struct *mm, enum asi_class_id class_id, struct asi **out_
 exit_unlock:
 	if (err)
 		__asi_destroy(asi);
-	else
+	else if (out_asi)
 		*out_asi = asi;
 
 	__asi_init_user_pgds(mm, asi);
@@ -515,6 +543,12 @@ static __always_inline void maybe_flush_data(struct asi *next_asi)
 	this_cpu_and(asi_taints, ~ASI_TAINTS_DATA_MASK);
 }
 
+void asi_destroy_userspace(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	VM_BUG_ON(!asi_class_initialized(ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE));
+	asi_destroy(&mm->asi[ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE]);
+}
+
 noinstr void __asi_enter(void)
 {
 	u64 asi_cr3;
@@ -584,6 +618,11 @@ noinstr void asi_enter(struct asi *asi)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asi_enter);
 
+noinstr void asi_enter_userspace(void)
+{
+	asi_enter(&current->mm->asi[ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE]);
+}
+
 noinstr void asi_relax(void)
 {
 	if (static_asi_enabled()) {
@@ -633,13 +672,15 @@ noinstr void asi_exit(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asi_exit);
 
-void asi_init_mm_state(struct mm_struct *mm)
+int asi_init_mm_state(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ASI))
-		return;
+		return 0;
 
 	memset(mm->asi, 0, sizeof(mm->asi));
 	mutex_init(&mm->asi_init_lock);
+
+	return asi_init(mm, ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE, NULL);
 }
 
 void asi_handle_switch_mm(void)
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/asi.h b/include/asm-generic/asi.h
index d103343292fad567dcd73e45e986fb3974e59898..c93f9e779ce1fa61e3df7835f5ab744cce7d667b 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/asi.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/asi.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum asi_class_id {
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
 	ASI_CLASS_KVM,
 #endif
+	ASI_CLASS_USERSPACE,
 	ASI_MAX_NUM_CLASSES,
 };
 static_assert(order_base_2(X86_CR3_ASI_PCID_BITS) <= ASI_MAX_NUM_CLASSES);
@@ -37,8 +38,10 @@ int asi_init_class(enum asi_class_id class_id,
 
 static inline void asi_uninit_class(enum asi_class_id class_id) { }
 
+static inline void asi_init_userspace_class(void) { }
+
 struct mm_struct;
-static inline void asi_init_mm_state(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
+static inline int asi_init_mm_state(struct mm_struct *mm) { return 0; }
 
 static inline int asi_init(struct mm_struct *mm, enum asi_class_id class_id,
 			   struct asi **out_asi)
@@ -48,8 +51,12 @@ static inline int asi_init(struct mm_struct *mm, enum asi_class_id class_id,
 
 static inline void asi_destroy(struct asi *asi) { }
 
+static inline void asi_destroy_userspace(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
+
 static inline void asi_enter(struct asi *asi) { }
 
+static inline void asi_enter_userspace(void) { }
+
 static inline void asi_relax(void) { }
 
 static inline bool asi_is_relaxed(void) { return true; }
diff --git a/include/linux/entry-common.h b/include/linux/entry-common.h
index 1e50cdb83ae501467ecc30ee52f1379d409f962e..f04c4c038556f84ddf3bc09b6c1dd22a9dbd2f6b 100644
--- a/include/linux/entry-common.h
+++ b/include/linux/entry-common.h
@@ -191,6 +191,16 @@ static __always_inline long syscall_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, l
 {
 	long ret;
 
+	/*
+	 * End the ASI critical section for userspace. Syscalls are the only
+	 * place this happens - all other entry from userspace is handled via
+	 * ASI's interrupt-tracking. The reason syscalls are special is that's
+	 * where it's possible to switch to another ASI domain within the same
+	 * task (i.e. KVM_RUN), an asi_relax() is required here in case of an
+	 * upcoming asi_enter().
+	 */
+	asi_relax();
+
 	enter_from_user_mode(regs);
 
 	instrumentation_begin();
@@ -355,6 +365,7 @@ static __always_inline void exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs)
  */
 static __always_inline void exit_to_user_mode(void)
 {
+
 	instrumentation_begin();
 	trace_hardirqs_on_prepare();
 	lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare();
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index c4778edae7972f512d5eefe8400075ac35a70d1c..d19e149d385e8321d2f3e7c28aa75802af62d09c 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -953,6 +953,8 @@ void start_kernel(void)
 	/* Architectural and non-timekeeping rng init, before allocator init */
 	random_init_early(command_line);
 
+	asi_init_userspace_class();
+
 	/*
 	 * These use large bootmem allocations and must precede
 	 * initalization of page allocator
diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c
index 5b6934e23c21d36a3238dc03e391eb9e3beb4cfb..874254ed5958d62eaeaef4fe3e8c02e56deaf5ed 100644
--- a/kernel/entry/common.c
+++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ __visible noinstr void syscall_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work(regs);
 	instrumentation_end();
 	exit_to_user_mode();
+	asi_enter_userspace();
 }
 
 noinstr void irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index bb73758790d08112265d398b16902ff9a4c2b8fe..54068d2415939b92409ca8a45111176783c6acbd 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ void __mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	/* Ensure no CPUs are using this as their lazy tlb mm */
 	cleanup_lazy_tlbs(mm);
 
+	asi_destroy_userspace(mm);
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(mm == current->active_mm);
 	mm_free_pgd(mm);
 	destroy_context(mm);
@@ -1297,7 +1298,8 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
 	if (mm_alloc_pgd(mm))
 		goto fail_nopgd;
 
-	asi_init_mm_state(mm);
+	if (asi_init_mm_state(mm))
+		goto fail_nocontext;
 
 	if (init_new_context(p, mm))
 		goto fail_nocontext;

-- 
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-10 18:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-10 18:40 [PATCH RFC v2 00/29] Address Space Isolation (ASI) Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/29] mm: asi: Make some utility functions noinstr compatible Brendan Jackman
2025-01-16  0:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-16 10:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-16 13:22       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-01-16 14:02         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/29] x86: Create CONFIG_MITIGATION_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION Brendan Jackman
2025-01-16 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-01  7:23   ` Mike Rapoport
2025-03-05 13:12     ` Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/29] mm: asi: Introduce ASI core API Brendan Jackman
2025-02-19 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-19 13:50     ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-19 13:53     ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-27 12:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-28  8:43         ` Brendan Jackman
2025-03-14 13:14           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-15  1:34             ` Junaid Shahid
2025-03-15 12:36               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-17 11:40                 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-03-18  0:50                   ` Junaid Shahid
2025-03-18 13:03                     ` Brendan Jackman
2025-03-18 22:48                       ` Junaid Shahid
2025-03-19 15:23                         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/29] mm: asi: Add infrastructure for boot-time enablement Brendan Jackman
2025-03-19 17:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-19 18:47     ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-03-20 10:44       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/29] mm: asi: ASI support in interrupts/exceptions Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/29] mm: asi: Use separate PCIDs for restricted address spaces Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/29] mm: asi: Make __get_current_cr3_fast() ASI-aware Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/29] mm: asi: Avoid warning from NMI userspace accesses in ASI context Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/29] mm: asi: ASI page table allocation functions Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/29] mm: asi: asi_exit() on PF, skip handling if address is accessible Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 11/29] mm: asi: Functions to map/unmap a memory range into ASI page tables Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 12/29] mm: asi: Add basic infrastructure for global non-sensitive mappings Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/29] mm: Add __PAGEFLAG_FALSE Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/29] mm: asi: Map non-user buddy allocations as nonsensitive Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH TEMP WORKAROUND RFC v2 15/29] mm: asi: Workaround missing partial-unmap support Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/29] mm: asi: Map kernel text and static data as nonsensitive Brendan Jackman
2025-01-17 11:23   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/29] mm: asi: Map vmalloc/vmap " Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/29] mm: asi: Map dynamic percpu memory " Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/29] mm: asi: Stabilize CR3 in switch_mm_irqs_off() Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/29] mm: asi: Make TLB flushing correct under ASI Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/29] KVM: x86: asi: Restricted address space for VM execution Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 22/29] mm: asi: exit ASI before accessing CR3 from C code where appropriate Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 23/29] mm: asi: exit ASI before suspend-like operations Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 24/29] mm: asi: Add infrastructure for mapping userspace addresses Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` Brendan Jackman [this message]
2025-02-28 15:32   ` [PATCH RFC v2 25/29] mm: asi: Restricted execution fore bare-metal processes Yosry Ahmed
2025-03-20 15:55   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 26/29] x86: Create library for flushing L1D for L1TF Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 27/29] mm: asi: Add some mitigations on address space transitions Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 28/29] x86/pti: Disable PTI when ASI is on Brendan Jackman
2025-01-10 18:40 ` [PATCH RFC v2 29/29] mm: asi: Stop ignoring asi=on cmdline flag Brendan Jackman

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